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Abstract: The provision of air navigation services (ANS) is a sovereign prerogative of individual nation
states. As a result, today’s European air traffic management (ATM) system is highly frag- mented, im-
peding smooth and efficient traffic flows and causing delays and additional costs for airspace users. As
earlier attempts to integrate ATM in Europe did not overcome the prob- lem of fragmentation, the Eu-
ropean Commission launched the Single European Sky (SES) initiative in 1999. One key element of SES
is so-called functional airspace blocks (FABs), which encompass the airspace of several states. However,
due to their strong impact on na- tional sovereignty, the successful implementation of FABs is difficult.
This study attempts to identify the supporting and constraining elements affecting FAB development
by analyzing one of the most significant FAB projects, the Functional Airspace Block Europe Central
(FABEC). It reverts to two theories of political integration offering conflicting viewpoints on the factors
that are supposed to be decisive for the progress of integration. The study con- cludes that, with regard to
the implementation of FABs, the EU is considerably limited by the sovereign interests of states. Although
supranational pressure is steadily growing as the Euro- pean Commission makes extensive and intelligent
use of its regulatory capacity, the legal ba- sis is missing to allow it to take supranational decisions in
respect of national airspace and infrastructure. Governments, in turn, are keen on maintaining national
supremacy in military issues and do not support far-reaching steps of integration in ANS provision at this
time. Moreover, national service providers find themselves in an environment dominated by com- petition
rather than cooperation, as they may be faced with structural and financial losses. In order to achieve
the goals of SES, the European Commission thus should consider measures to incentivize cooperative be-
havior between ANS organizations. ZUSAMMENFASSUNG Flugsicherung ist eine hoheitliche Aufgabe.
Die daraus resultierende Fragmentierung des eu- ropäischen Flugsicherungssystems behindert einen ef-
fizienten Verkehrsfluss und hat für die Luftraumnutzer Verspätungen und Mehrkosten zur Folge. Weil
frühere Integrationsversuche erfolglos blieben, lancierte die Europäische Kommission im Jahr 1999 die
Initiative zur Schaffung eines Single European Sky (SES). Wesentliches Element des SES sind so genan-
nte funktionale Luftraumblöcke (functional airspace blocks, FABs), die den Luftraum mehrerer Staaten
umfassen. Die damit verbundene Beschneidung staatlicher Souveränität erschwert jedoch die erfolgreiche
Umsetzung solcher FABs. Die vorliegende Studie identifiziert be- günstigende und hemmende Faktoren
für die Entstehung von FABs anhand eines der bedeu- tendsten FAB-Projekte, dem Functional Airspace
Block Europe Central (FABEC). Sie greift dabei auf zwei politische Integrationstheorien zurück, welche
konträre Auffassungen über die treibenden Kräfte in Integrationsprozessen vertreten. Die Studie kommt
zum Schluss, dass die souveränen Interessen der Staaten die Handlungsfähigkeit der EU in Bezug auf die
Errichtung funktionaler Luftraumblöcke stark einschränken. Obwohl die Europäische Kommission durch
geschickte Wahrnehmung bestehender regulatorischer Kompetenzen stetig an Einfluss ge- winnt, verfügt
sie über keine rechtliche Grundlage um über nationale Lufträume und Infra- strukturen zu entscheiden.
Die staatlichen Regierungen sind ihrerseits darauf bedacht, die nationale Hoheit in militärischen An-
gelegenheiten zu bewahren und unterstützen gegenwärtig keine weitreichenden Integrationsschritte im
Bereich der Flugsicherung. Darüber hinaus fin- den sich die nationalen Flugsicherungsorganisationen
eher in einem auf Wettbewerb statt auf Zusammenarbeit ausgerichteten Umfeld wieder, da Integration
mit strukturellen und finan- ziellen Verlusten einhergehen könnte. Zur Erreichung der Zielsetzungen des
SES sollte die Europäische Kommission deshalb Massnahmen in Betracht ziehen, welche die Flugsiche-
rungsanbieter zu kooperativem Verhalten bewegen.
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I 
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
Background 
The provision of air navigation services (ANS) is a sovereign prerogative of individual na-
tion states. As a result, today’s European air traffic management (ATM) system is highly 
fragmented, impeding smooth and efficient traffic flows and causing delays and additional 
costs for airspace users. As earlier attempts to integrate ATM in Europe did not overcome 
the problem of fragmentation, the European Commission launched the Single European 
Sky (SES) initiative in 1999. One key element of SES is the introduction of so-called func-
tional airspace blocks (FABs), which are to be designed no longer to reflect national 
boundaries, but according to operational requirements, and encompassing the airspace of 
several states. As FABs have a strong impact on national sovereignty, the present study 
aims to answer the question of whether the European Union will be successful in promot-
ing their implementation. The specific case analyzed for this purpose is the Functional 
Airspace Block Europe Central (FABEC). As it covers the area with the highest air traffic 
density in Europe, FABEC plays a paramount role for the Single European Sky. A first 
significant institutional step was taken when a treaty between FABEC member states was 
signed at the end of 2010. However, although bi- and multilateral collaboration between 
air navigation service providers in the FABEC area has intensified, major challenges pre-
vail in terms of functional airspace redesign and in the attempt to find specific institutional 
arrangements that go beyond simple forms of cooperation.        
Theoretical and methodological approach 
To identify the supporting and constraining elements affecting FAB development, the 
study reverts to two theories of political integration offering conflicting viewpoints on the 
factors that are supposed to be decisive for the progress of integration. The liberal inter-
governmentalist account proposes a ‘bottom-up’ perspective, in which domestic societal 
actors determine the need for enhanced cooperation in a specific policy area. This need is 
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subsequently accommodated by national governments and taken to an international nego-
tiation setting, where the level of integration is ‘bargained’ between states. Supranational 
organizations only play a minor role in this context and merely serve as facilitators of ne-
gotiation processes. Rationalist supranationalism identifies growing regulatory structures 
and ‘path dependencies’ at the supranational level, which nation states find increasingly 
difficult to escape from. Hence, integration is rather governed by supranational organiza-
tions, leaving little room for unilateralist leanings of individual states. Based on the first 
theory, the study has compared the relative influencing power of various domestic stake-
holders assumed to be relevant in the area of ATM in terms of their impact on governmen-
tal preferences related to cooperation and integration: national defense authorities, air 
navigation service providers, major air carriers, and staff associations representing air traf-
fic controllers. It has then attempted to determine differentiations in bargaining power be-
tween FABEC states. Based on the second account, EU regulatory activity in the field of 
ATM was examined in relation to the evolution of competences assigned to the institu-
tions of the European Union. 
Conclusions and possible way forward 
It can be concluded from the analysis that, with regard to the implementation of functional 
airspace blocks, the EU is considerably limited by the sovereign interests of states. The 
Union lacks the necessary legal basis to take supranational decisions with respect to na-
tional airspace and infrastructure. However, supranational pressure is steadily growing and 
becomes harder for nation states to avoid. It was demonstrated that the European Commis-
sion searches for ways to make extensive use of its regulatory capacity even in the absence 
of additional competences. The two subsequent timeframes under analysis, referred to as 
SES I and SES II, have not only seen a quantitative increase in regulatory density with a 
potential of advancing FAB development, but also the emergence of an intelligent frame-
work of incentives, which may push states into integrative solutions without having to 
touch on sovereignty directly.  
Yet, since the ultimate decision lies with the nation state as to which form and to 
what extent integration will be effected, the final outcome is still uncertain. It was shown 
that government positions largely correlate to those of the military and the ANS providers; 
these are assessed to be the most influential, due to their strong institutional involvement 
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in FABEC matters. Governments’ main focus is on maintaining national supremacy in 
military issues, be it airspace or infrastructure; furthermore, they do not support far-
reaching steps of integration in ANS provision at this time. The FABEC Treaty, the 
founding document of the Functional Airspace Block Europe Central, reflects these rather 
conservative state preferences. Although the decision-making scope provided by the 
agreement goes as far as including quite sensitive areas such as military airspace design, 
the unanimity principle allows all contracting states to support or reject functional steps of 
integration as they see fit. At this stage, no evidence could be found regarding the use of 
individual bargaining powers by the states involved. 
Within the context of a governmental preference structure that supports the continu-
ous existence of national air navigation service providers, the latter find themselves in an 
environment dominated by competition rather than cooperation. The prospect of ‘integra-
tion’ seems to create apprehension because it implies restructuring, which may result in 
the loss of organizational units or business opportunities. Moreover, competition for traf-
fic volumes and corresponding revenues poses an impediment to a traffic-flow oriented 
route and airspace structure, as redesigned airways may no longer feed through a pro-
vider’s airspace. The European Commission thus should consider measures to eliminate 
competitive thinking and promote collaboration between providers. The introduction of a 
revised revenue allocation mechanism (based on a FAB single unit rate) in conjunction 
with a ‘Best-in-Class’ standard for air navigation service provision, which should aim at 
positively incentivizing cooperation, could be one step in that direction.  
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1 
INTRODUCTION 
Air traffic management1 plays a pivotal role in aviation. Its significance has notably in-
creased during the last 20 years as a result of the rapid growth of air traffic subsequent to 
deregulation and liberalization of the air transport sector, starting in the United States of 
America and extending to Europe, Asia, and Latin America.2 The necessity of coordinat-
ing the rising number of aircraft operating in the skies and to provide them with continu-
ous supervision from departure to arrival had already been identified in the early 1930s 
when the first aerodrome control towers were established in the U.S. Since then, the de-
velopment of ever faster aircraft able to fly in almost all weather conditions required the 
introduction of an air navigation service system on a global scale.  
Under international law, nation states enjoy sovereignty over their airspace and thus 
full prerogative in respect of its use.3 From the very beginning, regulation and provision of 
air navigation services have therefore been the responsibility of individual states. How-
ever, given the fact that air transport is a transnational activity, there is an obvious need 
for a global regulatory approach. In 1944, the International Civil Aviation Organization 
(ICAO)4 was founded to define worldwide standards and facilitating the conduct of civil 
aviation across national boundaries. Over time, an extensive number of standards and rec-
ommended practices have developed within the framework of ICAO and have been put 
down in 18 annexes to the ICAO founding document, the Convention on International 
Civil Aviation. They also include rules and procedures related to air traffic management.  
                                                        
1
  The term ‘air traffic management’ (ATM) is used throughout this thesis to refer to the totality of services 
and functions comprised by both ATM and air navigation services (ANS), the two of which partly com-
plement each other, but also share specific services (see table 1).    
2
  See, for instance, Poole/Butler (1998), Sinha (2001), Smith/Cox (2008).  
3
  In accordance with article 1 of the Convention on International Civil Aviation. 
4
  The International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) is a specialized agency of the United Nations 
linked to the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) and seated in Montreal (Canada). In 2011, ICAO 
counted 190 contracting states. See www.icao.int. 
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What is Air Traffic Management? 
Air traffic management (ATM) and air navigation services (ANS) constitute overarching 
terms subsuming a multitude of different services and functions relevant to ensure the safe 
and efficient movement of aircraft during all phases of flight. Air traffic services (ATS) 
may be considered as the principal component of both ATM and ANS. The term ATS 
comprises all services destined to prevent collisions between aircraft in the air and on the 
ground, to ensure an efficient and orderly traffic flow, to supply aircrews with all informa-
tion relevant for a safe operation of their flight, and to notify and assist appropriate or-
ganizations with regard to aircraft in need of search and rescue aid.5 These ATS functions 
are referred to as air traffic control service (ATC), flight information service (FIS) and 
alerting service (ALRS) respectively. ATC service is only provided in specifically desig-
nated airspace, referred to as controlled airspace, which is normally defined around busy 
airports, along air routes, and in the upper airspace,6 where aircraft operate under instru-
ment flight rules (IFR)7 and thus require protection from other aircraft. 
There are three functionally distinct types of operational units providing air traffic 
services: Aerodrome control units are installed at controlled airports and located in a 
physical control tower able to visually observe the relevant airport movement area. These 
towers are responsible for controlling traffic mainly on runways, taxiways, and in the im-
mediate vicinity of an airport (usually designated control zone or CTR). Approach control 
units offer air traffic services to arriving and departing aircraft, typically within a terminal 
control area or TMA. At major airports, this task is commonly assigned to a dedicated 
unit, while approach control units serving smaller aerodromes are often combined with the 
respective aerodrome control unit or an area control unit. Area control units are located in 
an area control center (ACC) and ensure the provision of air traffic services for en-route 
traffic in a specified block of airspace, which usually encompasses all controlled airspace 
outside CTRs and TMAs. Consequently, area control centers cover the largest part of air-
space in geographical terms.   
                                                        
5
  Article 2.2. of Annex 11 to the ICAO Convention. 
6
  Usually above 19’500 feet = flight level 195. 
7
  IFR = Rules governing flight under (weather) conditions where navigation cannot be accomplished 
through visual reference, but rather through the use of on-board instruments and electronic navigation 
signals (as opposed to VFR = Visual Flight Rules).  
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All three types of ATS units are geographically or functionally subdivided into a number 
of control sectors, depending on the size and complexity of the airspace or airport under 
control. Every sector is manned by one or two air traffic controllers (ATCOs), responsible 
for managing all traffic within their sector. ATCOs are in continuous radio contact with 
the flight crews they are responsible for and provide them with the necessary instructions 
and information to ensure safe and efficient traffic handling. Aircraft are progressively 
handed over between successive sectors, thereby ensuring permanent monitoring and con-
trol of flights from the point of departure until destination. Updated flight plan data, such 
as flight identification, type of aircraft, route of flight, and altitude, is made available to 
every downstream sector in a timely manner to allow for advance situational awareness 
and traffic planning by the respective controller. While visual observation is the prevailing 
means of controlling aircraft from an aerodrome control tower, radar8 is used at approach 
and area control units – particularly in busy traffic environments – to obtain the current 
position and flight identification of aircraft. Over oceanic and other remote areas where no 
radar is available, position information is acquired by GNSS9 position downlink from the 
aircraft or, if such procedures are not applicable in that region, by regular oral position re-
ports transmitted by the flight crew. The air traffic controllers’ task is to keep all aircraft 
within their sector apart from each other at defined separation minima in accordance with 
the type of surveillance equipment used, and to ensure efficient traffic throughput.  
In order to be able to execute ATS functions, appropriate technical infrastructure is 
required. This is made available by the infrastructural component of ANS, which includes 
communication, navigation and surveillance services (CNS). Amongst others, CNS assure 
the operation and maintenance of radio, telephone and radar systems, as well as of all 
navigational infrastructure on the ground. A third type of service, which is part of ANS, is 
meteorological services for air navigation (MET), aiming at supplying aircrews with up-
to-date flight weather information. Finally, ANS comprise the provision of aeronautical 
information services (AIS), designed to systematically collect and distribute all necessary 
                                                        
8
  RADAR = Radio Detection and Ranging; a system using electromagnetic radio waves to detect the 
range, direction, speed and (possibly) altitude of fixed or moving objects (primary surveillance radar). 
Secondary surveillance radar systems (SSR) are used to obtain additional information such as identifica-
tion, altitude and other current flight data by triggering a reply from an on-board transponder.  
9
  GNSS = Global Navigation Satellite System is a satellite-based system used to obtain precise information 
about the geographical location on the earth’s surface. 
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information for the safe conduct of flight, including, for example, updates on the opera-
tional status of airport and ANS infrastructure. 
As of the mid-1990s – in light of growing air traffic – the rather short-term oriented 
ATS functions were complemented by more strategic and pre-tactical planning tools in 
order to better manage the increasingly scarce resource of airspace. One of these tools, 
airspace management (ASM), intends to maximize the utilization of airspace by dynamic 
and flexible assignment of specific airspace portions to various users in accordance with 
their requirements.10 This is used in particular to efficiently accommodate civil and mili-
tary air traffic. Air traffic flow and capacity management (ATFCM) is a centralized func-
tion designed to ensure that available air traffic control capacity and traffic volumes are 
well balanced at all times. This is effected by comparing maximum sector or airport ca-
pacity, as reported by an air navigation service provider, to the traffic demand within a 
specified timeframe and subsequently delaying excess traffic at the departure aerodrome 
by means of a calculated take-off time (CTOT) allocated to the aircraft concerned. 
ATFCM is an essential element for protecting ATS units from temporary overload and 
thus significantly contributes to safe air traffic control operations.  
All tasks carried out in the framework of ATS, ASM, and ATFCM are considered 
air traffic management (ATM) functions. Although they do not include the remaining 
ANS components (CNS, MET, and AIS), the term ‘air traffic management’ shall – 
throughout this thesis – be considered to cover both ATM and ANS.11 The different ser-
vices are summarized in the following table: 
 
                                                        
10
  The so-called Flexible Use of Airspace (FUA) concept. 
11
  In principle, all types of ATM/ANS services and functions are applicable to both civil and military air-
space users. Civil aircraft, as well as military aircraft operating in civil airspace in accordance with the 
rules and procedures of ICAO, are considered General Air Traffic (GAT); military aircraft operating as 
GAT may be controlled either by a civil, military, or combined civil/military ATS unit. Military aircraft 
operating in designated military airspace according to the rules specified by appropriate national authori-
ties are considered Operational Air Traffic (OAT). OAT is normally controlled by a military ATS unit, as 
additional services such as tactical fighter control may be required (GAT/OAT definitions according to 
Eurocontrol EATM, Glossary of Terms). 
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Airspace Management (ASM) 
Air Traffic Management  Air Traffic Flow and Capacity Management (ATFCM) 
Air Traffic Control Service  
(aerodrome/approach/area control) 
Flight Information Service 
(ATM) 
Air Traffic Services (ATS) 
Alerting Service 
Communication, Navigation and Surveillance Services (CNS) 
Meteorological Services (MET) 
Air Navigation Services 
(ANS) 
Aeronautical Information Services (AIS) 
Table 1: Overview of types of services provided in the framework of ATM/ANS 
Air traffic management – a fragmented system in a transnational domain 
Despite the development of a comprehensive set of global standards for civil aviation in 
the framework of ICAO, harmonization in the ATM domain was mainly focused on ena-
bling aircraft to operate as seamlessly as possible between different countries and there-
fore basically limited to establishing common rules for navigational facilities and commu-
nication procedures. The remaining ATM infrastructure, however, was to a large extent 
exempted from standardization. This resulted in a complicated patchwork of nationally 
grown air navigation service providers (ANSPs) applying diverse standards in terms of 
technology, airspace organization, operating procedures, service quality, and training. To-
day, 67 area control centers are operational in Europe alone, mostly featuring distinct 
types of equipment with only limited technical and operational interoperability. Besides 
complicating the exchange of ATM-relevant data between centers, this entails high costs 
for procurement and maintenance of technical systems. Moreover, the concurrence of 
these control centers’ areas of responsibility with national borders hampers the implemen-
tation both of an optimized sector setup and of a pan-European route structure that would 
be able to accommodate the main traffic flows over the continent. Although bilateral 
agreements have been established to manage the interfaces between ANSPs and to ensure 
the uninterrupted availability of services across state borders, they do not take into account 
the ‘big picture’. National military training areas, frequently located in regions of high-
density civil air traffic, add to the suboptimal route network. Until recently, the lack of 
harmonized European training standards for air traffic controllers prevented international 
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mobility in the face of widespread staff shortages. Differences also exist with regard to the 
institutional setup of ANSPs, ranging from state agencies (e.g. France), government-
owned corporations (e.g. Switzerland), to private companies (e.g. the UK).12 
The various deficiencies of a disintegrated air traffic management system have be-
come even more evident since the economic upturn in the aviation sector, which started in 
the 1990s. As a result, the European air traffic network gradually reached its capacity 
limit, causing significant delays and reducing the safety margins in the system. Fragmen-
tation also brought higher costs which are mainly borne by the customers of ATM, the air-
space users. Commercial network airlines, whose operation is based on short connections 
in accordance with the hub-and-spoke principle,13 are particularly sensitive to delays, as 
they may generate compensation costs to passengers; an inefficient air route network leads 
to unnecessary route extensions and increased fuel consumption, which is costly not only 
from an economic but also an environmental point of view. Furthermore, a multitude of 
technically and operationally incompatible air traffic control centers operated by a number 
of diverse air navigation service providers each with their own administration and support 
structure, is another significant cost driver. ANS provision is financed by en route charges 
that cover area control services, and by terminal charges, which cover for approach and 
aerodrome control services. En route charges are calculated by multiplying the ‘great cir-
cle’14 distance flown between the entry and exit point of a specific area of responsibility 
by the ‘weight factor’ of the aircraft concerned (resulting in the number of ‘service units’) 
and by a so-called unit rate, which is determined by the respective air navigation service 
provider (no distance factor applies for terminal charges).15 Hence, revenues for ANSPs 
directly depend on the number of aircraft operating within their airspace. Since continuous 
availability of ANS infrastructure needs to be maintained irrespective of traffic demand, a 
                                                        
12
  For a comprehensive list of deficiencies of the European ATM system, see European Commission (1996, 
1999, 2000, 2008).  
13
  The ‘hub-and-spoke’ principle implies a type of airline operation where long-range and short-range 
flights to and from a specific airport are timed and coordinated to permit relatively short connections be-
tween respective flights, thereby optimizing network capacity. See, for instance, Kaemmerer (2000).  
14
  The great circle is the intersection of a sphere and a plane passing through the center point of the sphere, 
providing the shortest distance between two points on the surface of that sphere (from 
www.wikipedia.org, October 2011). It provides an approximation of the optimum horizontal trajectory of 
a flight from one point of the earth’s surface to another.  
15
  See Regulation (EC) 1794/2006 as amended by Commission Regulation (EU) 1191/2010, Annexes IV/V. 
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full cost recovery principle was originally introduced, permitting ANSPs to adapt their 
charges according to traffic numbers, thereby ensuring constant revenue. An obvious 
shortfall of this mechanism is that air navigation service providers embedded in a mo-
nopolistic and government controlled environment lack the necessary incentive to control 
their operating costs, as these can always be shifted onto customers. The combination of 
these factors raised growing criticism about the air traffic management system from air-
space users.16 
The inadequacy of a nation state based ANS system was already recognized at the 
inception of European commercial civil aviation. In 1960, the European Organisation for 
the Safety of Air Navigation (Eurocontrol) was founded to create a unified European struc-
ture for air navigation service provision. However, this goal was never achieved. Although 
cooperation between air navigation service providers and harmonization in various air 
traffic management sub-domains has advanced since the establishment of Eurocontrol, ba-
sic issues remained unresolved, largely due to contravening national interests.17 This 
prompted the Commission of the European Union18 in 1999 to launch the Single European 
Sky initiative, a comprehensive integration program, which aims at establishing a Euro-
pean air traffic management system beyond national boundaries. Mainly due to the institu-
tional advantages of the EU in terms of its (qualified) majority voting principle and rule 
enforcement opportunities, the Single European Sky ought to have a higher chance of suc-
cess compared with the Eurocontrol project, the latter being a purely intergovernmental 
approach (Ladenbauer 2005). Nevertheless, substantial elements of the Single Sky pro-
gram are still subject to the decision-making authority of EU member states and thus may 
be affected by potential discrepancies of national preferences. 
                                                        
16
  See, for instance, AEA/IATA (2002).  
17
  See section 2.1. 
18
  In this thesis, the term ‘European Union’ is used generically to refer to the current economic and political 
union of 27 European member states and its institutions as constituted by the Treaty of Lisbon, but also 
to all its predecessor constructions based on former treaties. Deviations from this principle are only made 
in specific historical contexts. 
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EU policymaking in a context of national diversity  
Policymaking in the European Union (EU) is aimed at harmonizing rules and removing 
market barriers between member states to enable the free exchange of people, goods, ser-
vices, and capital; in short, to create a common single market. Moreover, its purpose is to 
find coordinated answers to transnational issues and problems that cannot be successfully 
dealt with by nation states on an individual basis. Hence, the goal of the EU is to promote 
cooperation and integration in all areas where this is expected to result in an overall im-
provement of the political, economic or societal situation of EU citizens. However, the 
definition of shared objectives and standards among historically grown and culturally di-
verse nation states is not always a simple task; often individual interests prevail which are 
not necessarily compatible. The challenge of the EU is to find concerted and effective so-
lutions, whilst taking into account various national interests. The variety of interests obvi-
ously depends on the policy area in question. Areas where most member states will 
equally benefit from supranational policies will experience little difficulty in this respect; 
in other domains, the perceived disadvantages resulting from common rulemaking may be 
more substantial. This appears to be the case, for example, when matters of national secu-
rity are concerned. Security policy is an area where no relevant competences have been 
transferred to the supranational level and which is only marginally tackled by the EU. 
Consequently, areas of conflict may emerge with regard to issues where, from a functional 
perspective, a coordinated solution is indicated, but for which nation states are reluctant to 
transfer respective competences for reasons of individually competing preferences. Hence 
the question arises what instruments the European Commission – the agenda setter and 
policy proposer of the EU – uses to advance integration in contended policy areas.  
The subject under investigation in this thesis, the integration of air traffic manage-
ment in Europe, is an excellent example of the tension between the functional and opera-
tional requirement to harmonize and cooperate at the supranational level, and the sover-
eignty and security related interest of individual states seeking to keep control over their 
national airspace. This process is currently ongoing and final results are still pending. 
However, some progress was made and more progress is expected. A comprehensive 
package of regulations related to the Single European Sky has been adopted at EU level, 
achieving harmonization in several areas and with the potential to reduce fragmentation in 
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air traffic management. One critical element however, is the introduction of so-called 
functional airspace blocks (FABs). The idea of FABs is that they will encompass large 
blocks of airspace, which extend beyond national boundaries and are designed according 
to operational requirements in terms of their route and sector structure, thus accommodat-
ing for the transnational nature of civil aviation.19 The notion of functional airspace blocks 
is derived from the air traffic management system of the United States of America which, 
because it is centrally managed and based on a standardized technical system, requires less 
than a third of the number of air traffic control centers for the upper airspace and is shown 
to handle around 70% more flights than its European counterpart (Eurocontrol/FAA 2009: 
7). FABs could therefore be regarded as the core component of a future Single European 
Sky.  
The establishment of functional airspace blocks requires an integrative process both 
at an organizational and political level, since the objective is to define airspace manage-
ment and airway structures as well as common procedural and technical standards across 
multiple nation states. This obviously affects national sovereignty. Although the European 
Commission lacks top-down decision-making authority to implement functional airspace 
blocks, it has exploited a number of regulatory options in order to stimulate and support 
the development of FABs. This thesis analyzes the respective processes using the example 
of one of the current FAB initiatives, the Functional Airspace Block Europe Central (FA-
BEC), which may be considered one of the most significant FAB projects in terms of traf-
fic volumes handled within its airspace. 
Research question 
In light of above introductory remarks, the following research question shall be pursued in 
the present study: 
‘Is the European Union successful in its promotion of the establishment of functional air-
space blocks within the policy area of air traffic management?’ 
                                                        
19
  For a detailed description of the concept of ‘functional airspace blocks’ see Eurocontrol (2005). 
Introduction 
  
10 
Theories and hypotheses 
This analysis focuses on theories of European integration which are to be applied in a very 
specific policy area: air traffic management. Numerous concepts have been developed by 
various scholars to explain the phenomenon of integration in the context of the European 
Union.20 They approach the matter from different perspectives and sometimes even pro-
vide contradictory explanations. It is the intention of this study to capture the various 
forces that drive towards the implementation of a functional air traffic management sys-
tem, reflected above all by the integrative efforts displayed by the European Commission; 
those forces potentially emerging as ‘showstoppers’ in the process e.g. as a result of na-
tion-specific interests will also be addressed. By taking into account the dissenting vari-
ables affecting the issue, it will be possible to assess what type of influence dominates in-
tegration in this particular field, providing the opportunity to predict trends and optionally 
give advice on how to facilitate or promote a successful outcome.  
The study reverts to two theories of political integration, which originate from two 
traditional streams with conflicting viewpoints regarding the factors that are supposed to 
be decisive for the progress of integration. One of the main points of contention is the role 
of nation states: Are states still in full control of respective developments, deciding by 
themselves to what extent cooperation and integration should take place? Or are suprana-
tional organizations increasingly taking the lead, gradually ‘forcing’ states into integra-
tion? On one side, the liberal intergovernmentalist account proposes a ‘bottom-up’ per-
spective, in which domestic societal actors determine the need for enhanced cooperation in 
a specific policy area. This is subsequently accommodated by national governments and 
taken to an international negotiation setting, where the level of integration is ‘bargained’ 
between states. Supranational organizations only play a minor role in this context; they 
merely serve as facilitators of negotiation processes. On the other side, rationalist supra-
nationalism identifies increasing regulatory structures and ‘path dependencies’ at the su-
pranational level that nation states are unable to escape from. Hence, integration is more 
and more governed by supranational organizations, leaving little room for unilateralist 
leanings of individual nation states. The hypotheses used to carry out the present analysis 
                                                        
20
  See, for instance, Kohler-Koch/Schmidberger (1996). 
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are derived from both theoretical strains and refer to the mentioned variables identified by 
the respective accounts.    
State of research 
There is little research available dealing with the current developments of air traffic man-
agement integration in the context of the European Union from a Political Science per-
spective. Most literature takes on either a legal/institutional21 or technical/operational22 
viewpoint, or provides an overview of various facets and challenges of the process.23 
However, there are a few exceptions. Kassim/Stevens (2009) take a closer look at the 
European Union’s endeavors to extend their scope of activity to policy areas hitherto re-
served to nation states, namely aviation safety or air traffic control (ibid., 130ff.). They at-
tribute to the Commission the ability to expand its regulatory competence and to displace 
previous intergovernmental structures when it comes to managing regional aviation issues 
(ibid., 151). The regulatory process of the EU is also considered to be more effective than 
traditional intergovernmental procedures, thereby incentivizing member states to seek 
regulation at EU level if necessary. However, the authors admit that even though the in-
fluence of the European Union in the area of ATM resulted in “member states no longer 
treating air traffic management as a purely national matter” (ibid., 240), and led to the de-
velopment of certain supranational regimes, a full functional integration has not yet been 
achieved, albeit being a “clear prospect”. Only very general explanations are provided as 
to the difficulties underlying this very particular policy area, referring to the operational 
character of ATM (ibid., 132) and the traditional persistency of nation states for strict na-
tional control in this domain (ibid., 2). 
Ladenbauer (2005) offers a more in-depth analysis of integration processes in the 
field of air traffic management. He evaluates different phases in the history of European 
air traffic management as to their “integrative potential” (ibid., 13) in terms of functional 
drivers and national barriers, and compares them to the institutional and functional devel-
opments of Eurocontrol as well as to the first regulatory steps in the framework of the 
                                                        
21
  See, for instance, Schwenk/Schwenk (1998), Van Antwerpen (2008). 
22
  See, for instance, Bianco et al. (2001). 
23
  See, for instance, Calleja Crespo/de Leon (2011), Cook (2007). 
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Single European Sky. The study concludes that the increasing functional pressure towards 
integration stemming from growing air traffic control delays and the corresponding trans-
national lobbying activities by airspace users have eventually resulted in a respectable de-
gree of harmonization within the European ATM system. However, no revolutionary steps 
were taken, mainly due to conflicting national interests and in particular to the institutional 
weakness of Eurocontrol, which was unable to enforce measures or standards on its mem-
ber states. As the European Union has better institutional tools at hand to enforce policy 
decisions, the study credits the Single European Sky with a better chance of success, also 
taking into account the increasing complexity of the issue, which in any case may necessi-
tate further cooperation, and a potential general advancement towards a pro-integrative 
mindset within the EU. Yet, the study still expresses reservations with regard to the evolu-
tion of national preferences in the domain of ATM integration (ibid., 102ff.). The present 
thesis is based on the previous study and intends to verify respective assumptions, taking a 
closer look at the very building blocks of a future integrated European airspace.  
Ambitions and limitations of the study 
The results of this study will shed a light on the validity of current integration theories 
when related to the specific policy area of air traffic management, and indicate whether 
the EU is able to overcome national obstacles to integration. They should demonstrate 
what instruments are used by the institutions of the European Union and foremost by the 
European Commission to expedite functionally necessary steps of integration in this spe-
cialized domain, despite potentially obstructive behavior by member states resulting from 
dissenting national preference structures. The intention is also to show to what extent na-
tional interests come about through a domestic preference formation process. Finally, the 
study gives insight into whether functional airspace blocks, as core elements of the Single 
European Sky, stand a chance of being accomplished successfully, and which factors 
would need to be addressed to support implementation. 
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It is important to note that the present analysis is based on a concrete FAB project com-
posed of unique states with distinctive features. It will therefore be difficult to find gener-
alized answers to the question of how to advance integration in European air traffic man-
agement. Moreover, the complexity of diverging interest structures and influences – also 
within FABEC – cannot be grasped in its entirety. Consequently, this study is neither able 
nor does it intend to offer a detailed ‘recipe book’, explaining the process in all facets and 
formulating a meticulous action plan to be followed. It is able, at best, to provide a general 
approach that may point in a possible direction.     
Contents 
Chapter 1 outlines the theoretical framework of the present study. It describes the two op-
posing theoretical strains chosen to determine the potential influencing factors on integra-
tion and enunciates the respective hypotheses, which form the basis for analysis. 
Chapter 2 provides the contextual background for this study. It delineates and ex-
plains the history of endeavors made to promote integration in the domain of air traffic 
management from the very beginning, starting with Eurocontrol, the motor of harmoniza-
tion and integration over four decades, and moving on to the Single European Sky, today’s 
European Union-led large-scale ATM integration program. 
Chapter 3 explores the case study undertaken here: the Functional Airspace Block 
Europe Central (FABEC). The FAB project in the core area of Europe is described from 
its initialization by feasibility study to the current status of institutional and functional in-
tegration. 
Chapter 4 explains the methodological approach employed by the study to evaluate 
the hypotheses formulated in chapter 1. Theoretical concepts are operationalized, and the 
methods to acquire the respective indicators are specified. The chapter also identifies the 
relevant stakeholders involved in and/or affected by ATM integration in the context of 
FABEC. 
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In Chapter 5, the results from the collection of empirical data are presented. The respec-
tive findings are clarified per unit of analysis within the operational dimensions of each 
theoretical concept. 
Finally, chapter 6 closes the research cycle by aggregating the empirical findings of 
this study. First, the underlying hypotheses are verified based on comparisons of the vari-
ous units of analysis as required by respective theoretical conceptions, followed by a va-
lidity assessment of the selected accounts. This is complemented by an overall assessment 
of the current state of FABEC evolution and by an estimation of the inherent potential for 
further development. At the end of this chapter, a possible way forward is proposed.          
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1 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
Chapter introduction and summary 
In order to determine the factors which may be influential to the process of integration in 
European air traffic management, a theoretical approach is indicated. As stated above, the 
implementation of FABs requires decisions on a political level, since in principle air traf-
fic management is a sovereign task. Only after these decisions are taken can integration be 
pursued on an institutional and organizational level. Theories of political integration ap-
pear to be the most appropriate instruments to tackle the topic.  
This chapter initially provides a definition of ‘political integration’: the extent to 
which nation states defer sovereign powers to a supranational organization in terms of de-
cision-making authority and decision-making scope. Subsequently, the two theoretical 
concepts chosen for this analysis are described in detail: firstly, liberal intergovernmental-
ism, which suggests a ‘bottom-up’ evolution of integration controlled by powerful domes-
tic interest groups affected by positive or negative externalities from (non-)coordination of 
policies; secondly, rationalist supranationalism, advocating a ‘top down’ approach initi-
ated and continuously promoted by existing supranational organizations, in particular by 
the European Union, with its institutional and legal structures that member states find in-
creasingly harder to escape. Factors identified by theory that could potentially influence 
the progress of integration are then explored and further specified. Finally, the hypotheses 
that constitute the analytical basis for this study are formulated and possible correlations 
between independent variables discussed.  
Derived from the liberal-intergovernmentalist approach, the first hypothesis main-
tains that the relative influencing power of domestic societal actors determines national 
governments’ preference intensities with regard to cooperation or integration in the policy 
area of air traffic management. Subsequently, as proposed by the second hypothesis, the 
respective government uses its relative bargaining power to reflect this position in interna-
tional negotiations about the level of integration. The bargaining power of a nation state is 
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expected to be higher when the preference intensity in favor of integration is low. In con-
trast, the third hypothesis, based on rationalist-supranationalist accounts, suggests that the 
European Union – highly independent of influences from individual states – tends to in-
crease the quality and density of supranational regulation to promote cooperation and in-
tegration in the field of ATM, even without having explicitly acquired additional compe-
tences to regulate that policy area. 
1.1 Definition of ‘political integration’ 
A basic definition of political integration is the “peaceful and voluntary conjunction of so-
cieties, states and national economies beyond former national, constitutional and eco-
nomic boundaries” (Kohler-Koch/Schmidberger 1996: 152). The term not only implies an 
end result, but also describes the process by which that result is achieved. This process 
may encompass several consecutive steps, beginning with inter-state cooperation in spe-
cific functional areas, extending to international regimes, and eventually ending up with 
the implementation of federal institutions (Lehmkuhl 1997: 162). The institutional aspect 
enjoys particular relevance, as the establishment of institutions is an important conse-
quence of integration and thus reflects the success of a respective project (Sweeny 1984: 
25). Hence, the basic feature of political integration is the transfer of decision-making 
power from the states involved to a centralized body (Pentland 1973: 100), or alternatively 
the “pooling” of sovereignty at the supranational level (Mitrany 1970). The level of inte-
gration increases with the scope of binding decisions that a superior authority is legiti-
mized to take on behalf of the participating nation states, thereby directly affecting their 
sovereignty. The scope of supranational decision-making authority (and hence of integra-
tion) is variable in three dimensions (Holzinger et al. 2005: 22; see also Laursen 2002): a) 
the vertical dimension, comprising the degree of decision-making power transferred to the 
supranational level; b) the sectoral dimension, implying the number of policy areas subject 
to supranational decision-making; and c) the horizontal dimension, comprising the geo-
graphical scope where supranational decisions take effect.   
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1.2 Theoretical approaches to political integration 
Theoretical concepts attempting to explain the phenomenon of political integration have 
emerged along the unification process that took place in Western Europe after the end of 
World War II. Depending on the perspective, the greater purpose of political integration is 
either seen in securing political stability and peace (political view), or in increasing social 
and economic welfare (economic view). Consequently, while economists predominantly 
analyze the conditions and mechanisms leading to the integration of markets, political sci-
entists focus on societal and institutional integration (Kohler-Koch/Schmidberger 1996: 
153ff.). At this point, a decision is required as to which basic theoretical strain will be fol-
lowed when dealing with integrative processes in the domain of air traffic management. 
The provision of air navigation services is linked to exercising authority over all or spe-
cific portions of the airspace, which is part of a nation state’s territory and therefore rests 
under sovereign control of the respective government.24 Hence, although today’s often 
corporatized or even privatized air navigation service providers could in principle be con-
sidered as commercial actors, the sovereignty issues involved do not permit sole concen-
tration on economic aspects. It is therefore appropriate to include a wider political per-
spective in the analysis of integration processes in this very specific domain. Therefore 
political theories of European integration will be made use of in the present study.  
Although political theories of integration share the basic vision about the purpose of 
integration, their assumptions still differ in regard to the driving forces as well as to the 
achievable level of integration (Kohler-Koch/Schmidberger 1996: 155). Traditionally, two 
strains of political integration theories have opposed each other: Intergovernmentalism 
and (Neo-)Functionalism (Rosamond 2000: 131). Both perspectives act on different as-
sumptions regarding the role of the nation state in international relations, leading to di-
verging assessments about the relevance of states in integrative processes.  
                                                        
24
  See, for instance, Kimminich/Hobe (2000): 83. 
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1.2.1 Intergovernmentalism 
The realist view of international relations 
The intergovernmentalist view originates from a realist perspective of international rela-
tions. According to realism, nation states are the primary actors within an international 
system that is inherently anarchic (Stein 1990: 4ff.). Since, on a global scale, no overarch-
ing central authority exists that could impose rules on the actions and interactions of na-
tions, states enjoy full sovereignty and decision-making power. This in turn creates a 
competitive situation in which every nation state endeavors to sustain its position and 
strives for maximum autonomy (Gilpin 1981: 86). From this perspective, size, economic 
strength, and military power form the central focal points of national governments (see 
also Baumann et al. 1998: 7f.). Since mutual trust is hard to establish whilst in a perma-
nent state of competition, international cooperation tends to be difficult (Smith 2000: 35). 
Realists consider cooperation to be feasible only if nation states perceive it as beneficial. 
According to Hoffmann (1981), nation states can only profit from cooperation in the realm 
of “low politics”, which comprise economic and social issues. As soon as foreign and se-
curity policies or other power related issue areas are concerned (“high politics”), states are 
faced with a zero-sum game, since the gain in power of one state automatically leads to 
the reduction of power in another. Hoffmann believes that in these areas a common pursuit 
of interests is hardly possible. For realists, international cooperation thus is extraordinary, 
unstable, and only of a temporary nature (Stein 1990: 7). If cooperation does materialize, 
it will normally be pursued in the framework of international regimes or through interna-
tional organizations. International regimes are “sets of implicit or explicit principles, 
norms, rules, and decision-making procedures, around which actor expectations converge” 
(Keohane 1989: 147). Unlike international organizations, which possess executive bodies, 
regimes are not capable of acting by themselves (Keohane 1999: 290f.); they simply pro-
vide a set of norms, which regime participants are supposed to adhere to. Irrespective of 
whether policy coordination takes place within a regime or an organization, no surrender 
of state sovereignty is generally involved (McCormick 1999: 3). In the realist view the de-
cision about whether to engage in cooperative activities, and to what extent, is entirely up 
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to the states. Despite their basic ability to act autonomously, international organizations 
are considered to be merely “instruments” of nation states, serving as cooperation enablers 
by accommodating the exchange of information and by ensuring compliance monitoring 
as well as the correct distribution of goods – in short, by reducing transaction costs (Efin-
ger et al. 1990: 270). Consequently, they do not develop any political autonomy, but re-
main under full control of their member states. 
Consequences for intergovernmentalism 
The intergovernmentalist perception of integration takes up these realist propositions and 
considers them to be applicable to integration processes. In this view, integration is the re-
sult of decisions and actions of national governments based on their own political will 
(Rosamond 2000: 131). There is an underlying assumption of rational state behavior: gov-
ernments evaluate alternative courses of action in order to maximize their individual util-
ity (Moravcsik 1993: 481). States are therefore considered to be the single drivers of inte-
gration, only pushing for further integrative steps as long as their national preferences are 
provided for.  
The main reason for states to engage in cooperation and integration is their inability 
to successfully cope with transnational phenomena on their own. Since the onset of glob-
alization transnational dynamics have intensified (Messner 2000: 350ff.). Economic inter-
dependencies, transnationally operating corporations, international migration, ecological 
hazards, and other global threats pose an enormous challenge to nation states. Since the 
sphere of regulatory activities is restricted to their national territory, states are unable to 
deal with such challenges in isolation. States are required to cooperate in order to achieve 
common solutions to problems and consequences associated with transnational interac-
tions. According to Moravcsik (1998), and in agreement with realist views, the creation of 
international institutions (including the transfer of decision-making authority from the na-
tion state to an inter- or supranational organization) serves the purpose of enabling and op-
timizing cooperation by facilitating the exchange of trustworthy information and by ensur-
ing compliance monitoring and sanctioning, without the states losing control over the 
process.  
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1.2.2 Liberal intergovernmentalism  
In contrast to the traditional realist strain of intergovernmentalism, which conceives nation 
states’ preferences as emerging from mainly security and power considerations, Moravc-
sik’s liberal intergovernmentalism (1993) is somewhat more differentiated and introduces 
a liberal-economic point of view. According to this, the national preference structure is not 
primarily the result of a state’s geopolitical position within an international context of 
asymmetrical interdependencies, but is derived from a domestic preference formation 
process involving powerful (economic) interest groups in various policy sectors. Hence, 
Moravcsik uses a liberal theory of national preference formation.  
Focus on group interests and influence 
Liberal theories assume that societal groups with autonomous interests, e.g. corporations, 
political parties, associations, unions, but also influential individuals, are the most impor-
tant actors in politics (Moravcsik 1993: 483ff.). They are considered to be the principals 
empowering or constraining the governmental agents by providing or withdrawing de-
mocratic support necessary to keep them in office. In democratic societies, the backing by 
political parties and interest groups is essential for state officials to be (re-)elected. Na-
tional governments therefore aggregate the preferences articulated by such groups and 
strive to accommodate them, whether domestically or at the international level. Hence, na-
tional interests or goals are basically defined by pluralist groups in the framework of a 
democratic process. These interests or goals are subsequently brought to bear by govern-
ments in international negotiation settings if relevant in regard to foreign affairs. 
The question arises, which societal groups tend to be most influential when it comes 
to shaping domestic or foreign policy? Generally speaking, very specific and clearly de-
fined interests are more constraining for governmental actors than ambiguous or divided 
ones, since the latter provide governments with more leeway. Consequently, societal 
groups with highly specific interests may be considered to have a higher influence capabil-
ity than those with diffuse interests. Claus Offe (1969) even states that only specific inter-
ests related to a certain societal or professional status can form the basis of an interest 
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group, as it is only such interests that provide sufficient motivation for members. Further-
more, as Mancur Olson (1992) points out, group size is relevant as well. Based on the 
principle of rational choice, group preferences mainly depend on the expected net benefits 
or losses stemming from new policies or policy changes. Hence, the smaller the group, the 
higher the expected gains or losses per capita. According to Olson, the mobilization poten-
tial, and thus the influence of a group, increases with gains or losses inflicted on the indi-
vidual group member, thereby rendering smaller groups more influential. Offe (1969) 
adds “the ability to withstand conflict” as a relevant group feature when discussing influ-
ence power. This ability is high if a specific group possesses the capacity to interfere with, 
or even temporarily disrupt essential societal functions (like transportation, health care, 
and other relevant public sectors) by executing or credibly threatening collective industrial 
action. In summary, the following group features appear to affect influence in terms of 
domestic policymaking: 
• The representation of specific and clearly defined interests, possibly re-
lated to a societal or professional status. 
• A relatively small group size. 
• The ability to critically interfere with essential societal functions. 
Policy externalities and vulnerabilities as drivers of policy coordination 
Since in the liberal-rationalist view, net costs and benefits determine whether a policy is 
supported or rejected by an interest group, this principle may also apply to policy coordi-
nation at the international or supranational level. Societal actors of one state may suffer or 
benefit from so called “international policy externalities” (Moravcsik 1993: 485). Such ex-
ternalities exist when domestic policies of one nation create costs (negative policy exter-
nalities) or benefits (positive policy externalities) to societal groups in another nation. 
They are a consequence of trans-border interactions and flows. An example for a negative 
policy externality is the case where low environmental standards in one state lead to an in-
ferior environmental situation in a neighboring state, thereby imposing costs to domestic 
actors in the latter. In case of negative externalities, there may be an incentive for policy 
coordination and therefore cooperation, in order to establish common standards at an inter- 
or supranational level. According to Moravcsik, such policy coordination serves recipro-
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cal market liberalization and/or policy harmonization. In the first case, economic interde-
pendencies are accommodated by lifting import and export restrictions. Policy harmoniza-
tion, on the other hand, prevents states from undermining each others’ regulatory effec-
tiveness by divergent national policies, as would be the case in the previous environmental 
example. However, if a state is able to effectively counteract a negative externality 
through unilateral measures, an incentive for cooperation will hardly emerge. The same 
obviously applies in the case of a nation benefiting from positive externalities of others. 
Hence, the vulnerability of governments and societal actors to policy externalities may 
vary considerably.  
This notion of vulnerability of nations and of their domestic societal groups in par-
ticular needs to be taken into account when analyzing drivers and barriers to cooperation 
and integration processes. If domestically relevant actors suffer from negative interna-
tional policy externalities, they may be pushing for international policy coordination and 
even integration. Moravcsik argues that this is particularly the case if the expected net 
benefits of policy coordination for a specific actor are certain, significant, and risky. In 
other words: there is no doubt that policy coordination will create the expected benefits; 
the benefits are large in magnitude; and the risk that these benefits will not otherwise ma-
terialize is considered to be high. In this constellation, societal actors have a strong incen-
tive to mobilize politically. Conversely, if the benefits of policy coordination are diffuse 
or insignificant, the motivation for political mobilization is low, leaving preference forma-
tion to the discretion of national governments. However, there might be cases where do-
mestic groups are disadvantaged by policy coordination. Obviously, in this case, coopera-
tion or even integration is likely to be opposed. The same criteria of certainty, significance 
and risk also apply here, but in respect of estimated costs or losses. Depending on the in-
fluencing power of societal actors, diverging group interests may ultimately result in the 
failure of international cooperation.  
Moravcsik maintains that the distribution of costs and benefits, and thus political 
mobilization at the domestic level in favor of, or in opposition to cooperation and integra-
tion, varies in accordance with the policy area affected by externalities. Referring to the 
European Union framework, he differentiates three categories of policy areas, basing the 
differentiation on policy targets pursued within the respective area: a) the liberalization of 
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exchange of private goods and services, b) the provision of socio-economic collective 
goods, and c) the provision of non-economic collective goods (Moravcsik 1993: 488ff.). 
As the present study is focusing on the provision of air navigation services and air traffic 
management, definition is required as to the type of policy area concerned here.  
As was indicated earlier, liberalization, in its broadest sense, has in recent years also 
reached the domain of air traffic management. Although control and oversight over a na-
tion’s airspace is in essence a sovereign function, some states have corporatized or even 
privatized air traffic management.25 The respective tasks were delegated to specifically 
designated enterprises in order to increase managerial freedom and to provide them with a 
larger degree of budgetary independence from political processes. In most instances, how-
ever, national governments have retained strategic control over these entities. This is par-
ticularly true for air navigation service providers who are responsible for area control ser-
vices, as well as for approach and aerodrome control services at major airports. Europe 
has not yet seen any cross-border liberalization in these domains, in the sense that an 
ANSP of one country would have entirely taken over air traffic management in another. 
Yet, a different situation is presented with regard to air navigation services at regional 
aerodromes. Initial cross-border activities have already materialized here; for example, the 
Austrian provider Austro Control is in charge of ANS at a number of German regional 
airports.26 It is also evident that the Single European Sky initiative promotes a certain de-
gree of liberalization, since increased competition between ANSPs is often believed to 
lead to better cost-efficiency and thus reduce ATM costs for airspace users.27 At present it 
is hard to anticipate how far liberalization will advance, also taking into account the poten-
tial hazardous effects on the level of safety.28 In any case, cross-border liberalization 
should not be seen as the original driver for EU policy-making in the area of air traffic 
management. More likely, negative policy externalities imposed on airspace users that 
were brought about by different standardization levels accross Europe made the European 
airlines push for a harmonized and integrated air traffic control system (Ladenbauer 2005). 
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  See CANSO (1999). 
26
  See Austrocontrol (2008): 28. 
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  The separation between ATM regulation and service provision induced by the Single Sky legislation is 
one step in that direction (see sub-section 2.2.2). 
28
  See Ladenbauer (2009): 35ff. 
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Cross-border liberalization has only emerged subsequently as a possible facilitator to at-
tain specific objectives of an optimized ATM system. Hence, the primary policy objective 
in the area of air traffic management is not to liberalize, but to set common standards. 
Moreover, the provision of air navigation services is not a private domain. Although the 
direct beneficiaries of ANS are mainly air carriers operating under private law, it is the 
flying public and literally every person on the earth’s surface who have a profound interest 
in a safe air transportation system. Air traffic control is responsible for the prevention of 
collisions between aircraft and of subsequent crashes on potentially inhabited areas on the 
ground. ATC thus plays a vital role in ensuring public safety. Furthermore, air traffic ser-
vices are provided in a public sphere – the airspace; any airspace user is eligible to make 
use of these services. Consequently, air traffic management is essentially a public task. 
Nevertheless, air transport and to some extent even the provision of air navigation services 
are also a commercial activity, as air navigation service providers incur service charges 
from airspace users. Therefore, all policies pertaining to air traffic management aim at set-
ting a regulatory framework, within which this publicly relevant activity is to be executed. 
For that reason, it seems appropriate to include air traffic management in Moravciks’ sec-
ond category of policy areas, relating to the provision of socio-economic collective goods. 
Respective policies intend to define a set of standards and regulations to ensure public 
protection from market distortions or unwanted consequences caused by economic activi-
ties. This implies two dimensions: On one hand, regulation of economic activities nor-
mally affects private (commercial) interests; on the other hand, there are potentially strong 
public demands involved as well, which may sometimes even be in conflict with the pri-
vate interests. Both dimensions need to be taken into account when discussing the domes-
tic mobilization potential in favor of, or against policy coordination initiatives in respec-
tive policy areas. As explained before, the purpose of coordinating public goods policies is 
to avoid the problem of different national standards undermining each other, which may 
create negative policy externalities to other nations and their domestic stakeholders. Ad-
vancement of such coordination depends on the vulnerability of (powerful) domestic ac-
tors and national governments to negative externalities, and on the nation’s ability to 
counteract corresponding effects through unilateral policymaking and action. According to 
Moravcsik, vulnerability is particularly high for smaller states, due to the greater level of 
economic interdependence, or for nations exhibiting high regulatory standards (Moravcsik 
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1993: 492). Ultimately, the domestic interest groups are the principal factor in the states’ 
decision of whether to engage in policy coordination. As private commercial interests are 
normally more specific and therefore easier to organize than general public interests, such 
as environmental or public protection (which are often of a more diffuse nature), interna-
tional policy coordination will mostly accommodate private demands. Depending on their 
level of organization, groups representing public interests may also be influential, but to a 
lesser degree. Alternatively, if policy externalities are ambiguous in nature and do not cre-
ate any particular societal pressure, governments may strive for policy coordination on 
their own initiative, in order to prevent domestic policy from being ineffective. 
Inter-state negotiation process 
If the domestic preference definition process described above puts forward a requirement 
for a cooperative approach to solve a negative externality problem in a specific policy 
area, this is subsequently brought to bear in inter-state negotiations conducted at govern-
ment level (Moravcsik 1993: 497ff.). At this point, the relative power of nation states be-
comes the relevant factor with regard to the further progress of cooperation and integra-
tion. Liberal intergovernmentalism acts on the assumption that the European Union pro-
vides a near ideal framework for negotiation outcomes to be close to pareto-optimum. 
This is the situation where the negotiation outcome for one party cannot be further im-
proved without making any other party worse off, implying high negotiation efficiency.29 
This notion of an ideal negotiation framework is derived from the following assessments 
of EU decision-making processes: first, cooperation and negotiations in the EU take place 
in a non-coercive environment, i.e. neither military nor economic sanctioning power is ap-
plied by member states to impose their interests upon others, as the (economic and socie-
tal) interdependency between states is generally very high. Second, the flow of informa-
tion between member states is intense and almost exhaustive, providing states with the po-
tential to recognize the preferences and opportunities of their foreign counterparts. Third, 
the EU provides the institutional and procedural setting for negotiations to be effected at 
relatively low cost. Consequently, relative power of states is not defined in military or 
economic terms, as realists would suggest. In fact, the relative intensity of national prefer-
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 See, for instance, Fudenberg/Tirole (1983). 
Theoretical Framework 
  
26 
ences, as defined during domestic preference formation, becomes the critical element 
when determining power asymmetries between states. Generally speaking, the more a na-
tion state (and its domestic actors) depends on international policy coordination, the 
weaker its relative position in the international bargaining process. A government strongly 
requiring an international policy solution will be willing to make more concessions during 
the international bargaining process in order to achieve this goal, whereas those for which 
non-agreement is a viable option are able to stick more rigidly to their individual interests, 
thereby finding themselves in a relatively strong negotiating position. The bargaining 
power of a nation state in international relations is determined through its capacity to ei-
ther a) pursue unilateral policy alternatives, b) join alternative coalitions in favor of policy 
coordination, or c) find compromises and/or linkages between issue areas. 
Negotiation theory utilizes the concept of ‘BATNA’ (Best Alternative to Negotiated 
Agreement) to describe a point in a negotiation process where the value of an agreement at 
hand is inferior to that of a unilateral action alternative.30 The better the ‘BATNA’ of a na-
tion state involved in international negotiations, the greater its bargaining leverage, as the 
desire for a cooperative approach is less intense. A high ‘BATNA’ means low vulnerabil-
ity of a nation and its society to negative policy externalities and/or high satisfaction with 
the status quo. According to Moravcsik, this situation mainly applies to “large, prosperous 
and relatively self-sufficient countries” (Moravcsik 1993: 500). However, in today’s glob-
alized context, a certain degree of (often asymmetrical) interdependency and therefore 
vulnerability still exists, leaving even very autonomous governments with a certain inter-
est in policy coordination. Nevertheless, the continuous ‘threat of non-agreement’ by such 
states helps them to see their preferred policy solution accommodated in inter-state bar-
gaining, whereas those nations eagerly striving for a cooperative agreement will still bene-
fit, while considerably compromising on their side. This also implies that the government 
least willing to compromise is able to set the standard of an eventual international agree-
ment (particularly if decisions are taken unanimously) resulting in policies based on the 
lowest common denominator. It must however be emphasized that this lowest common 
denominator does not automatically correspond to the interests of self-sufficient states 
only, or to a lowest possible policy standard. As mentioned, these states often prefer 
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agreement over veto and are therefore willing to make a few concessions. This is particu-
larly the case if higher regulatory standards in one issue area facilitate activities and inter-
actions in others. 
A second determinant of bargaining power in international negotiations is the possi-
bility of states to join alternative coalitions that ensure policy coordination. Its principle is 
based on the ‘threat of exclusion’, where countries unwilling to cooperate are left out of 
consideration, and policies are agreed between those states looking for international solu-
tions. To be excluded from a coordinated agreement may impose negative policy external-
ities, building pressure toward a more cooperative behavior and eventually leading to geo-
graphical expansion of a cooperation or integration area. Negative externalities, however, 
are not a necessary implication of an alternative coalition. A state excluded from a coordi-
nated policy may even benefit from positive externalities, creating an incentive for this 
particular state to free-ride without having to participate in the costs of policy coordina-
tion. In such cases, the geographical scope of integration will not be increased. 
A third determinant of negotiation outcomes is the potential for compromises, side 
payments and linkages between issue areas. Final negotiation results often depend on the 
intensity of preferences at the margin of a feasible set of agreements. If marginal gains or 
losses are less important to a negotiating party, it will be more able to compromise. In this 
case, the preferences of a counterpart eagerly looking for gains at the margin can be ac-
commodated. Different preference intensities may also arise across various issues; a party 
may look for marginal gains in one particular issue area, which is not as valuable to the 
other party, while the situation is converse in a different issue area. By ‘linking’ these two 
issues in a package deal, there is potential benefit to both parties when compromising on 
their low preference issue in exchange for concessions in the respective issue area of 
higher individual preference intensity. In international negotiation settings, such bargain-
ing solutions are possible mainly between states with highly asymmetrical interests in di-
verse issues. However, package deals of this sort may also generate domestic opposition, 
since concessions in one specific issue area, albeit of no great relevance, might leave cer-
tain actors disadvantaged. The intensity of such opposition may have a blocking effect on 
potential issue linkages, even more so considering that losers tend to be willing and able to 
put considerable pressure on governments. Hence, the negotiation strategy of linking dif-
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ferent issue areas could be complex and risky. Success of issue linkage will be most likely 
if domestic preferences are of low intensity in regard to the area where concessions are 
supposed to be made. Whenever possible, financial or even just symbolic side-payments 
will be effected to compensate for gains in a particular issue area. The use of issue linkage 
strategies is predominantly expected in the final stages of a negotiation process, when it 
comes to balancing marginal gains and losses, as opposed to applying them to the ‘big’ 
deals. The issues linked will be closely related to each other rather than completely sepa-
rate, in order to allow for intra-sector compensation of potential losses. Alternatively, if 
losses to domestic actors remain significant, governments may be required to pay com-
pensation to disadvantaged groups in order to enable the linkage. Ultimately, as far as po-
litical integration is concerned, issue linkages are costly and therefore only a second-best 
option to achieve this objective. 
The role of supranational organizations 
As previously noted, the liberal-intergovernmentalist view regards supranational organiza-
tions mainly as facilitators of inter-state negotiation processes. They increase negotiation 
efficiency by providing a common negotiation forum as well as transparent decision-
making procedures and by ensuring monitoring as well as compliance of negotiation out-
comes.31 However, the institutional setup of the European Union is unique insofar as EU 
institutions do not only play the passive role of a facilitator; on the contrary, national sov-
ereignties are pooled at the supranational level in the framework of a qualified majority 
voting system.32 In addition, certain sovereign powers are even delegated to central insti-
tutions. A partial explanation for this relinquishment of national sovereignty may be the 
inability of a unanimity based, ad-hoc negotiation framework to deal with unexpected con-
tingencies at short notice (Garrett and Weingast 1991). Considering this motivation insuf-
ficient to explain the variations in sovereignty pooling and delegation, Moravcsik pro-
poses that a cost-benefit analysis underlies the decision for transfer of sovereignty and that 
national governments put greater value on the benefits of high efficiency decision-making 
in specific areas, as opposed to the risks involved in a certain non-controllability of re-
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spective decision outcomes. However, for this cost-benefit analysis to be in favor of sov-
ereignty delegation and/or pooling, three conditions need to be fulfilled (Moravcsik 1993: 
510f.): 1) States must potentially benefit from cooperation and more rapid decision-
making at the supranational level; the greater the expected gains from increased coopera-
tion, the higher the willingness of national governments to transfer sovereignty. 2) Future 
decisions must be uncertain in terms of form, details, and outcome; the more precise the 
available knowledge is about downstream decisions, the higher the potential for political 
mobilization at the national level, thereby the pursuit of specific national interests is pro-
moted in the less precarious setting of ad-hoc unanimity decision-making. 3) The political 
risks for national governments and domestic interest groups with high preference intensi-
ties must be low; if the danger exists that an unwanted delegated or pooled decision will 
lead to significant losses for an individual nation state and/or major domestic groups in a 
specific issue area, transfer of sovereignty will not be effected. 
Supranational organizations not only serve as negotiation enablers and efficient de-
cision-making bodies, they also help national governments to strengthen their autonomy 
against domestic pressure groups. In this “two-level game” (Putnam 1988), domestic op-
position can be overcome more successfully if national governmental policy initiatives are 
linked to political processes and/or outcomes in the framework of the European Union. 
This increases political legitimacy of respective initiatives as well as domestic agenda set-
ting power. The latter is supported by the institutional structure of the EU, with its dense 
flow of information not generally available within the national setting and the possibility 
of taking binding ‘black box’ decisions secluded from public influence. Agreements found 
in the supranational frame are presented at the national level as package deals which can-
not be untied, leaving domestic political actors with a ‘yes’ or ‘no’ choice only, without 
any opportunity for amendment. Such advantages to national leaders provide an additional 
incentive for them to engage in policy coordination at EU level. 
Summary 
To summarize the liberal-intergovernmentalist account, the requirement for policy coordi-
nation on the international level mainly arises from negative policy externalities affecting 
powerful domestic pressure groups with specific and easily organizable interests. This re-
quirement is subsequently taken by national governments to the inter- or supranational ne-
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gotiation scene, where the relative national preference intensities determine the final out-
come of an eventual agreement. Generally speaking, the higher the preference intensity, 
the weaker the bargaining position of a state. Supranational institutions assist the negotia-
tion process by reducing transaction costs and by providing national leaders with a pres-
sure element to overcome domestic opposition. 
1.2.3 Supranationalism 
A theoretical strain that provides a somewhat different perspective of integrative processes 
compared to intergovernmentalism is supranationalism. Supranationalist theories are 
rooted in an earlier theoretical approach – (neo-)functionalism – which mainly opposed 
realist and traditional intergovernmentalist accounts. In order to fully understand the con-
cept of supranationalism, the predecessor concepts will be explored first. 
(Neo-)Functionalism 
David Mitrany (1943) initially proposed a functionalist theory of integration. He main-
tained that there exists a clear separation between a functional, welfare-oriented sphere 
and a political, power-oriented sphere. As different nation states and societies are con-
fronted with similar problems and often pursue concurrent objectives, particularly on 
technical issues, there is a common interest of states to find common solutions to such 
problems. It may be expected that this will result in functional cooperation, since, accord-
ing to Mitrany, “true welfare can only be achieved beyond national boundaries” (ibid.). In 
contrast to its political counterpart, the functional sphere is devoid of power considera-
tions, as this sort of practical cooperation is equally beneficial to everyone. Consequently, 
no redistribution of wealth and therefore no political authority are required. Thus the rele-
vant actors are the technical experts and those international organizations serving as plat-
forms to enable functional cooperation. Through expansion and deepening of this uncon-
troversial collaboration, positive effects promote a learning process, finally leading to a 
“global community” where technical organizations at the international level turn into focal 
points and eventually become structures of global governance. Criticisms on Mitrany’s 
functionalism are aimed at its strict distinction between welfare and politics and its as-
sumption of an automatic expansion of functional cooperation. Harrison (1974: 32ff.) 
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points to the fact that the allocation of welfare related resources always occurs within a 
political framework. Moreover, technical cooperation is often a result of preceding politi-
cal decisions. Politics and welfare are thus not separable. Hence, there is a certain state in-
fluence on integration which cannot be neglected. This implies that the need for coopera-
tion is not automatically transferable from one issue area to another and that integrative 
processes are not of the universal nature that functionalism presumes. 
After critically reviewing Mitrany’s assumptions, Ernst Haas (1964) reformulated 
the functionalist approach into neo-functionalism. In view of the comprehension that a 
clear separation between politics and welfare is not practicable and that welfare should in 
fact be regarded as the overarching objective of politics, the question arises, whose wel-
fare is in the spotlight of political activities? According to Haas – and similar to liberal-
intergovernmentalist accounts – interest groups play a determining role in this respect. In 
his view, political parties and other interest associations aggregate and consolidate public 
needs and interests; they feed the political decision-making process, which in turn pro-
vides those actors with considerable influence power.33 It is these political ‘elites’ who 
also have the say when it comes to initiating integration processes. Integrative activities 
may only be expected if they conform to the interests of relevant political actors. As op-
posed to Mitrany’s functionalism, there is no general ‘welfare orientation’ gradually lead-
ing to comprehensive integration in all available policy areas. Integration is initially re-
stricted to those domains where the political elites of several nation states simultaneously 
perceive additional benefits by increased cooperation. Such common perception of bene-
fits requires a homogenous level of basic values in different countries. Consequently, po-
litical integration will more easily be realizable in the narrower regional context (e.g. 
within Europe) than on a global scale. If integration is successful in one policy area, it will 
promote further integration in others, until a point is reached where more politically sensi-
tive domains are affected, which originally may not have been subjected to integration due 
to conflictive state interests. This dynamic is known as ‘spill-over’. Three types of spill-
over processes are distinguished (Holzinger et al. 2005: 34ff.): If integration in one sector 
alone is unable to provide sufficient benefits, or even has negative impacts on another 
area, this may create a demand for additional integration in a neighboring policy domain. 
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This is referred to as functional spill-over,34 which in essence corresponds to the intergov-
ernmentalist view of integration as a reaction to negative policy externalities. Political 
spill-over involves a “shift of loyalties” to supranational institutions (Mutimer 1994: 32). 
The underlying assumption is that domestic political groups gradually see their interests 
and goals provided for more substantially through supranational policy solutions than in 
the national context. Thus they begin realigning their expectations and political activities 
to the supranational level by building transnational coalitions and formulating suprana-
tional policy objectives. This accelerates the process of integration in various domains. Fi-
nally, integrative activities of international or supranational organizations may lead to in-
stitutional spill-over. If the political will exists to pursue integration in specific policy ar-
eas, then international organizations are created, by which cooperation in the respective 
issue area is institutionalized. They constitute a first step towards integration. In order to 
be able to carry out their assigned functions, international organizations form administra-
tive structures which develop discrete identities and values, build up expertise, and, in 
principle, are able to act autonomously, even if restricted by the framework of their as-
signment. Haas therefore concludes that a certain dynamic and institutional momentum 
will eventually emerge from these organizations. This assumption is derived from a sys-
temic viewpoint: International organizations are seen as systems that are fed with policy 
requests and generate output in terms of collective policy decisions. Respective output 
may also have (unintended) side effects on the environment of the system, such as pro-
moting the realization of political elites that their interests are better accommodated 
through international cooperation. In the course of this learning process, input patterns are 
adapted by assigning additional tasks to the international organization, or even by increas-
ing its decision-making authority. Furthermore, the expanding expertise and autonomy of 
an international organization, which over time develops its own values and policy objec-
tives, may be able to eventually initiate such a transformation process on its own. This 
could particularly be the case if the organization’s values and objectives are compatible 
with the basic interests of external actors, show sufficient flexibility, and are strongly rep-
resented as well as propagated by the employees and the leaders of the organization.  
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Rationalist supranationalism 
The rationalist-supranationalist concept of Stone Sweet and Sandholtz (1997) draws 
greatly from the neo-functionalist accounts. They find themselves in agreement with 
Haas’ basic postulation that transnational coalitions of political elites and interest groups 
are the driving forces of integration. This is also deduced from Karl Deutsch (1953) who 
argues that transnational social exchange among individuals over a prolonged period of 
time will eventually lead to the creation of new communities beyond national borders. In 
addition, Stone Sweet and Sandholtz share and further develop the idea of the logic of in-
stitutionalization at the supranational level, a process whereby supranational bodies be-
come the new locus of politics, channeling and forming subsequent decisions. However, 
rationalist supranationalism is distinct in the way that it does not categorically exclude in-
tergovernmentally driven processes of integration. On the contrary, Stone Sweet and 
Sandholtz admit that especially the “grand bargains” leading to Community treaties, for 
example, are by nature intergovernmental (Stone Sweet/Sandholtz 1997: 307). They also 
maintain that the modes of governance within the European Union vary between policy 
areas. While intergovernmental politics are found in some domains, others are governed 
by supranational politics. They do not share the notion implied by neo-functionalist theo-
ries that the European Union is gradually replacing the nation state in all its functions. 
Spill-over is taking place, but not automatically and not into all issue areas. Rationalist su-
pranationalism tries to provide an explanation for the differences in governance between 
policy sectors, as well as for the transition from an intergovernmental to a supranational 
mode of governance. According to Stone Sweet and Sandholtz, the movement from inter-
governmental to supranational governance in the framework of the European Union, and 
thus the level of integration, is measurable in three dimensions which are interrelated: 1) 
transnational society; 2) EU institutions; and 3) EU rules (Stone Sweet/Sandholtz 1997: 
304). In the rationalist-supranationalist account, transnational society is the starting point 
of integration. A large number of non-state actors transact and communicate beyond and 
across national boundaries. In order to be able to keep their cross-border transactions at 
low costs,35 these actors require internationally coordinated standards and rules. They will 
turn to their national executives, but also directly to existing supranational organizations 
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in order to have their demands fulfilled. With increasing transnational exchange, more and 
more supranational rules will eventually emerge. This is expected to happen despite the 
more closed-in interests of national governments, since the latter are unable to indefinitely 
deny their domestic transnational actors the benefits of supranational regulation. Govern-
ments therefore take on a reactive rather than proactive role when it comes to integration, 
gradually accepting and effecting transfer of additional competences to the supranational 
level. The increase in supranational standards and rules will in turn facilitate further trans-
national interactions, rendering those interactions increasingly dense and elaborate, which 
may create further needs for policy coordination. The varying demands of societal actors 
also explain the differences in the level of integration across policy domains. In those ar-
eas where intensity and value of cross-border transactions are relatively low, the need for 
supranational regulation will be correspondingly low; in these sectors, a more intergov-
ernmental mode of governance may be expected. Consequently, in sectors with a high 
level of transnational interactions, governance tends to move towards the supranational 
pole (ibid., 308). 
In order to be able to produce, execute and enforce supranational regulation, institu-
tions have to be created and given respective competence to fulfill their functions. The 
European Union principal institutions consist of the European Parliament; the European 
Council, composed of the heads of state or government of member states; the Council, 
composed of the relevant national ministers; the European Commission; the Court of Jus-
tice of the EU; and the European Central Bank.36 On one hand, these bodies facilitate the 
intergovernmental bargaining process, which is their main purpose from an intergovern-
mentalist perspective. On the other hand, and in accordance with neo-functionalist ac-
counts, they increasingly become autonomous actors. Stone Sweet and Sandholtz define 
autonomy as “an organization’s capacity to define and pursue, on an ongoing basis, a po-
litically relevant agenda” (1997: 304). EU organizations make extensive use of the compe-
tences transferred to them and regularly come up with policy initiatives on their own, of-
ten aiming at reinforcing and further promoting integration. The degree of autonomy of 
such organizations forms the second dimension to measure supranational governance. 
This capacity is expected to grow with the addition of policy domains to be regulated at 
                                                        
36
  According to article 13 (1) TFEU. 
Theoretical Framework 
  
35 
the supranational level and with greater density of European Union regulation, since it en-
larges the scope of action of supranational organizations. Moreover, the greater their scope 
and influence, the more they become focal points for political demands from national and 
transnational societal actors, while increasingly leaving the nation state on the sideline of 
political activities. 
The number and density of supranational rules is recognized as the third indicator 
for the shift towards supranational governance. As described above, they are the result of 
growing transnational interactions. At the supranational end, rules not only become more 
formalized, specific, and comprehensive, but also increasingly enforceable, even against 
the will of individual nation states. Furthermore, for rationalist-supranationalists, it is not 
only the legally binding rules that must be considered, but also less formal constraints 
such as procedures, roles, or expected behaviors that are applicable in the supranational 
decision-making framework. All these formal and informal rules provide the context 
within which social interactions take place and political decisions are taken. Conse-
quently, they set boundaries to those acting within that framework. On one hand, actors 
adapt to these boundaries by recognizing and exploiting the room for maneuver and by 
avoiding possible restrictions they may encounter based on their interests. On the other 
hand, actors attempt to expand those limits either by seeking new regulation or by de-
manding increased clarity of the rules through legal interpretation. To that effect, they turn 
to the respective supranational body, be it the legislator, the administration, or court. Both 
the issuance of new legislation and the interpretation of existing rules are creative proc-
esses leading to a new or adapted set of rules and consequently to a revised context, which 
serves as the new basis for further political and social interaction. This dynamic is referred 
to as institutionalization (Stone Sweet/Sandholtz 1997: 310ff.), implying that the institu-
tions – defined as systems of rules – are in constant development and evolution. The point 
of rationalist supranationalism is that this phenomenon is virtually unpredictable and 
therefore outside the area of influence of nation states. Once institutionalized, rules are 
also very difficult to reverse, even if disliked, as decision-making procedures such as 
qualified majority or even unanimity voting provide considerable obstacles to a change of 
policy.37 Moreover, in the view of increasing costs of isolation, exit is no longer an option 
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for nation states, even if they are unsatisfied with specific regulations. In this perspective, 
states are not in full control of rulemaking and subsequent integration at all times, as in-
tergovernmentalism would suggest. It also becomes apparent that the three dimensions – 
transnational exchange, organizations, and rules – are positively interconnected. Albeit the 
integration process is seen to be initialized by increased transnational interactions, change 
in either dimension will result in corresponding shifts in the other two as the emerging ef-
fects are mutually reinforcing. In this way, integration is growing due to its own dynam-
ics; the nation states become reactive spectators rather than the drivers of the process.  
1.2.4 Conclusion of theoretical considerations 
In sum, both intergovernmentalism and rationalist supranationalism consider domestic in-
terest groups and other societal actors to be the determining factor in whether integrative 
processes will be initiated in the first place. However, intergovernmentalists perceive this 
domestic pressure as mainly being imposed on national governments, which subsequently 
enter international negotiations about further cooperation and integration. Rationalist-
supranationalists on the other hand, focus on the activities of transnational coalitions who 
not only try to influence nation state officials, but also put forward their demands to exist-
ing supranational organizations. Intergovernmentalism does not concede a large extent of 
political autonomy to supranational organizations. Despite their ability to take binding de-
cisions in specific issue areas, intergovernmentalists maintain that such decisions are not 
of high importance, as the delegation of powers to supranational authorities will only be 
effected if no significant risks are posed to national governments. In contrast, rationalist 
supranationalism identifies an amplifying dynamic emerging after the first steps of inte-
gration have taken place. The elevated density of supranational rules encourages increased 
transnational activity, furthering demand for even more supranational rules. Rules also 
produce ‘path dependencies’ (Pierson 1993/1996), shaping the context for social and po-
litical interactions and moving progressively outside the national framework. Suprana-
tional organizations gradually become more competent and evolve into autonomous ac-
tors, which further promote integration by submitting policy initiatives or by (re-) inter-
preting existing regulation.  
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1.3 Conceptualization of factors affecting integrative processes 
Any study of integration processes in a specific policy domain should take into account as 
many relevant explanatory variables as possible in order to be able to maximize the under-
standing of the dynamics involved. For the analysis, it therefore seems advisable to de-
duce hypotheses from both theoretical strains discussed so far, since they offer a contrast-
ing perspective on the driving forces of international policy coordination and integration. 
Moreover, the requirement to include more than one theory when investigating policy-
making within the European Union is also supported by several authors, as unicausal theo-
ries are considered unable to provide sufficient explanation (Cornett and Caporaso 1992; 
Pentland 1973: 189ff.; Puchala 1972). In doing so, it may also be possible to assess the va-
lidity of respective theories in the specific context of air traffic management.  
1.3.1 Basic determinants of integration: Domestic and transnational interest groups 
Since domestic interest groups (whether acting nationally or transnationally) are consid-
ered in both theoretical views to be the basic determinants of any political action in plural-
istic societies, it seems advisable to bring them into focus first. Literature generally fails to 
provide an agreed definition of the term ‘interest group’ (McCormick 1993: 132). Broadly 
speaking, they can be considered as “organizations with an explicit or implicit objective to 
permanently, temporarily, or in singular cases, impact societal decisions” (Vieler 1986: 2). 
Interest groups may encompass a large number of different types of organizations, includ-
ing professional and economic associations, consumer and environmental protection 
groups, political parties, labor unions, business corporations, media, and other organized 
groups of individuals trying to promote specific interests or opinions. Even governmental 
agencies as well as supranational organizations could be regarded as such when furthering 
interests independent of any ‘official’ position. Therefore there is a vast variety of poten-
tial influence on political processes. Whether a particular societal group will engage in po-
litical activities in a policy domain highly depends on its perception of a specific problem 
Theoretical Framework 
  
38 
possibly requiring regulatory action. Rochefort and Cobb (1993) maintain that the prob-
lem definition of an issue and the corresponding political attention correlate with the exis-
tence of a number of impartial as well as subjective criteria: the severity of the effects of a 
problem, the complexity of causal factors, and the availability of resolution strategies to 
that problem. As explained above, an issue becomes particularly salient if it directly and 
strongly affects relevant societal actors. This is mainly the case for interest groups that are 
very closely related to a specific policy domain and all the issues associated with it. The 
decisive factors in terms of whether a societal group shows high potential for having an 
impact on political processes have already been identified.38 They include: a) the represen-
tation of specific and clearly defined interests, possibly linked to a professional or societal 
status; b) a relatively small group size; c) the ability to interfere with vital public func-
tions. Consequently, the combination of an intense problem perception together with those 
group features that tend to enhance influencing power may be expected to increase the 
likelihood of successful political influence. 
Dimensions of influencing power 
In order to be able to identify whether a particular societal group should be attributed a 
high influencing potential, the favoring conditions have to be further differentiated. The 
specificity of interests – a first important condition – may be regarded as high if the mem-
bers of the respective group are homogenously affected by an issue in terms of economic 
gains or losses, or of changes in social status and recognition. This being the case, the re-
sulting way forward to secure or improve benefits and/or status will normally be unambi-
guous and agreed upon by a large majority of group members. Clear and broadly sup-
ported positions are easier to communicate and can be more decisively represented to the 
outside world. Offe’s assumption that interests associated with a specific professional or 
societal status are relatively powerful becomes evident here. Professional associations, un-
ions, and business enterprises are groups that will most likely be able to articulate highly 
specific interests and positions. The greater the variety of interests or opinions within a 
group in regard to the problem definition and desirable objectives (as is often the case in 
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conjunction with environmental or consumer protection), the more difficult it is to come 
up with an unequivocal position, which renders influencing efforts less effective. 
Mancur Olson’s reference to group size as an important factor to determine influ-
ence power is largely related to the ‘problem severity’ issue described by Rochefort and 
Cobb. To recap, Olson argues that in relatively small groups the per-capita gains or losses 
associated to policy change are higher, because they are distributed amongst fewer indi-
viduals. Therefore he grants greater power to smaller more specialized groups to control 
or adjust policy outcomes. The underlying idea is that the more an individual member is 
concerned by a benefit or loss, the more intensely he or she will assist in promoting the 
group interest, with less opportunity to free-ride on the efforts of others. This assumption 
may be correct, however, it is problematic to draw the conclusion that a reduced group 
size automatically generates more influence. It is also conceivable that a larger group of 
individuals exhibiting uniform interests and elevated personal concern may provide a bet-
ter basis for political activity. Hence, the main criteria to concentrate on is the degree by 
which individuals of a societal group – and ultimately the group as a whole – are affected 
by policy change in terms of certainty, significance, and risk,39 be it in a positive or nega-
tive way. Moreover, the possibility exists for group leaders to convey their own levels of 
concern to the rest of the members, especially if group individuals are only indirectly af-
fected, or where their situational awareness about their own anxieties is low as may be the 
case if they play only a minor role within a larger organization. The more that political ac-
tion or inaction touches the interests of group members and/or their leaders, the more dy-
namically they will mobilize and push for their preferred policy solution. Corresponding 
efforts can take on various sorts of activities, dependent on the opportunities of a societal 
group. In democratic pluralistic societies, classical forms of interest promotion comprise 
direct lobbying with political decision-makers and/or governmental authorities, and/or the 
application of indirect pressure by influencing public opinion through media channels or 
public manifestations.40 Often, ‘framing strategies’ are used to transfer the interest group’s 
perspective of a problem and its solutions to the outside world (Keck/Sikkink 1998: 18ff., 
McAdam 1994). By framing an issue, it will be presented in a way allowing others to per-
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ceive and evaluate it in an identical manner (Dombrowski 1997: 150f.), thus advancing 
understanding and support for the matter. Furthermore, the conduct of legal proceedings at 
different levels of jurisprudence may also provide an option to change or re-interpret pol-
icy decisions. In direct-democratic societies such as Switzerland, even policy initiatives 
can be launched and, if successful, submitted to the public vote. All these efforts require 
high motivation, organizational skills, financial investments, and access to political deci-
sion-makers; they will only be made if societal actors consider them worthwhile and likely 
to accommodate their individual interest structure. 
The third dimension of influence power is the ability of a group to temporarily dis-
rupt vital societal functions, or to credibly threaten such interference. This mainly refers to 
industrial action by associations or unions representing those professionals who exercise 
essential tasks in society. Such vital areas primarily include functions of public good pro-
vision, such as health care and emergency services (e.g. police, hospitals, rescue services, 
or doctors), transportation (aviation, railway, and other public transport systems), energy 
and water supply, or waste disposal services. In order for any societal interference to be 
effective, the substitution of such services by alternate means or other service providers 
must either be impossible, or not available in time. In the domain of public services, this 
may regularly be the case as often only a single official agency or designated service con-
tractor is assigned the respective duty in a certain geographical area and/or on behalf of a 
specific population. In addition, in order to be able to generate adequate public pressure to 
resume service provision, a large number of people must be affected by the service inter-
ruption.  
Although a particular group may functionally be able to sustain a disruptive effect 
on society, a number of pre-conditions must be fulfilled in order for that group to actually 
revert to this sort of action. First, groups may be bound by contractual or other legal 
agreements to refrain from such action, or have to undergo certain procedures such as me-
diation or arbitration before they are allowed to proceed with collective measures. Such 
legal constraints must initially be overcome. Second, a very large majority of the group 
members must be supportive of and prepared to actively engage in respective activities. 
This is often associated with a highly psychological momentum, especially when group 
individuals fear subsequent repression or even dismissal from their professional function. 
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Consequently, personal motivation must be extraordinarily high, which can be the case if 
individuals are very negatively affected by policy externalities. It is even conceivable that 
a group could be in such a strong position that group members do not perceive any risk of 
disadvantageous repercussions. This is to be expected in organizations or groups carrying 
out highly skilled tasks of a monopolistic nature, where substitution is almost impossible, 
neither in terms of the individual, nor the organizational level. In these instances, obstacles 
to industrial action may be lower. In any case, one may assume that personal dismay of 
individual group members over a specific situation is an important factor when encourag-
ing willingness to resort to more aggressive means. Given the risks usually involved in 
undertakings of this kind, general welfare considerations will rarely be sufficient to deliver 
the necessary motivational basis. The group concerned must possess adequate organiza-
tional skills to arrange disruptive activities. Public tasks are often of a complex nature in-
volving a large number of people in various functions, locations, and decision-making po-
sitions. Interference with operations therefore requires a high degree of coordination and a 
dense flow of information, as well as a close relationship and mutual trust between the or-
ganizers and the activists at the front-end.  
Even though pressure emanating from public service interruptions may result in an 
aspiration to accommodate the demands of the group responsible for such actions, there is 
always the risk of counterproductive effects. Since the original intention of the group is to 
have a determining influence on a specific policy outcome, public opinion and the opinion 
of political elites are of paramount importance to achieve this. If demands made by a 
group are considered to be excessive and beyond reason, group actions might be perceived 
as ‘blackmailing’, and thus, instead of respecting the group’s policy requests, all efforts 
will be directed at substituting disruptive individuals or the entire service provider. A care-
ful appreciation of the situation is therefore required in order to make sure that goals and 
means remain aligned. In conclusion, a group’s capacity to interfere with vital functional 
areas of society depends on numerous factors that do not automatically apply to every 
possible organization. 
Asymmetries of influencing power 
To determine expected relative influencing power, one needs to examine structure, organi-
zation, motivation and objectives of a group. In order to do that, a priority order of the 
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relevant dimensions of influencing capability (which were just explained) is required. One 
would tend to assume that the ability to interfere with vital societal functions could be the 
most important factor affecting influence. As was shown above though, this capacity can-
not be put to use if distinct policy solutions fail to be developed, adequate individual mo-
tivation is missing, or group objectives are not intelligible to the public. Personal con-
cernment, and thus motivation of individual group members, is also insufficient if the 
group’s interests are of a highly heterogeneous nature, as group dynamics will be dissi-
pated towards multiple, sometimes even conflicting objectives. Yet, even a highly ho-
mogenous interest structure as well as the ability to formulate policy goals are of no use if 
the organization lacks the required organizational preconditions to convey the message to 
the public or to relevant decision-makers.  
Consequently, it is fair to presume that organizational capabilities, such as an effec-
tive management structure, the ability to establish and make use of political networks, as 
well as financial strength are the primary requirements to grant an organization influenc-
ing potential. If these conditions are fulfilled, it depends on the levels of concern and the 
incentive of individual group members, or the group leaders, as to whether political activi-
ties are considered necessary; the higher the motivation to act, the greater the probability 
that respective efforts are put into practice and recognized by political decision-makers. At 
this point, the availability of specific policy alternatives comes into play. Policy proposals 
have to be clearly focused in content and must be capable of finding general acceptance by 
the public. If one subsequent form of action chosen to bring the message across is associ-
ated with disruptive interference in certain areas of society, the amount of pressure created 
may be crucial in deciding whether a group’s preferred policy solution will be imple-
mented. However, for this option to be effective, the necessary legal basis and – depend-
ing on the degree of personal concernment – an enormous group motivation must be 
available. If this is the case, the next relevant success factor to be considered is whether 
the substitutability of a group or organization is low or high, as this determines the extent 
to which disruptive activities can potentially impact on the targeted sphere of society. Fi-
nally, the expected intensity and magnitude of societal implications need to be taken into 
account. Any other order of priority would be impractical, since the listed elements only 
take effect if the superior conditions are fulfilled. There is little purpose in attempting to 
differentiate impact severity between various types of service interruption. In principle, all 
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public service functions are of relevance to society, and a lack of service provision will be 
noticed eventually in any case. Obviously implications in some areas are more immediate 
and more visible than in others, thereby drawing faster and greater public or media atten-
tion. This is particularly the case in the aviation sector, where service disruptions leave 
thousands of passengers stranded at airports within a very short period of time.  
Relative influencing power comes into play when several groups with competing in-
terests strive to have their individual policy proposals prevail in the political decision-
making process. According to the liberal-intergovernmentalist view, national governments 
will take policy decisions based on the aggregated interests stemming from domestic pres-
sure groups. If the majority of powerful interest groups share a common vision on how to 
proceed politically, the corresponding policy solution will be easier to determine. How-
ever, if groups featuring similar power patterns display conflicting views and interests, 
matters become more complicated. One may expect that governments will try to compro-
mise between extreme positions in an endeavor to accommodate the different require-
ments set by societal actors. As regards political integration, a compromise will presuma-
bly emerge by postulating close cooperation and integration in some areas, while keeping 
other domains subject to national decision-making. The following table summarizes the 
various dimensions of influencing power of domestic interest groups and includes the pro-
posed order of priority in order to be able to determine relative power asymmetries: 
Priority Dimensions Sub-dimensions (in order of priority) 
Level of organization 
Density of political (lobbying) network 1 Organizational capabilities 
Financial strength 
2 Degree of concernment of the group / group members 
Operational, financial, status-related, and/or cultural con-
cernment 
3 Specificity and homogeneity of group interests Availability of specific policy objectives and solutions 
Legal basis  
Substitutability of group tasks 4 Ability to interfere with vital  
societal functions 
Magnitude of implications 
Table 2: Dimensions of ‘influencing power of societal actors’ 
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The transnational sphere 
Having focused above on domestic interest groups, the same criteria for influencing power 
may basically be expected to apply when relating to transnational interest actors and ad-
vocacy networks.41 Certain differences do exist, particularly with regard to the ability of 
transnational groups to interfere with vital societal functions. On one hand, implications of 
coordinated industrial actions across different countries would be excessive and therefore 
could have a very high potential for impact on the relative advantage of the respective in-
terest groups. On the other hand, the legal basis for engaging in such activities differs 
from nation to nation and may present a major obstacle. In addition, homogenous group 
motivation is much harder to achieve when a significantly larger number of people is in-
volved. Finally, coordination of actions over a wider geographical area is more difficult. 
Influencing power of transnational groups will therefore most probably be limited to the 
first three dimensions listed above.  
However, the first determinant of integration processes in the rationalist-
supranationalist account, the intensity of activities by transnational society, will not be fur-
ther analyzed in the framework of this study. Ladenbauer (2005: 94ff.) has shown that the 
influence of transnational interest groups was an important factor leading to the launch of 
the Single European Sky initiative by the European Commission in 1999. One of the prin-
cipal actors was the Association of European Airlines (AEA) whose members were most 
intensely affected by the increasing delay situation, due to the lack of air traffic control 
capacity in the European airspace caused by fragmentation. Obviously a clear requirement 
for supranational rulemaking was perceived by this transnational actor to reduce the level 
of fragmentation in ATM. The AEA therefore – via lobbying and public framing of the is-
sue – promoted an integrated solution and continues to do so.42 However, since the incep-
tion of the Single Sky program, the main driver of integration is the European Commis-
sion itself. On the other hand, the possibility might exist that transnational interest groups 
actually oppose integration and work towards influencing EU institutions respectively. 
This is rather unlikely, as the very nature of transnational coalitions is to foster coopera-
tion based on shared interests and visions. Moreover, any obstructing tendencies will be 
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discovered when analyzing domestic stakeholders who usually compose the membership 
of a transnational organization. There is therefore no necessity to further detail the pres-
ence of transnational activity in respect of ATM integration. The present analysis will fo-
cus on the subject of supranational institutionalization, i.e. on the development of rules 
and regulations during the phase of SES development.43  
1.3.2 Bargaining power in international negotiation settings 
The second determinant of integration in the liberal-intergovernmentalist perspective 
which becomes relevant subsequent to the process of domestic preference formation is a 
nation state’s bargaining power in an international negotiation framework. Theory main-
tains that bargaining power is mainly connected to the preference intensity related to co-
operation and/or integration: the greater the wish or need of a state to cooperate, the lower 
the respective negotiation power. Moravcsik lists additional factors that have an impact on 
the ability to control negotiation outcomes:44 1) the capacity to effectively pursue unilat-
eral policies, 2) the ability to form alternate coalitions, or 3) the possibility to link various 
policy issues. As it seems unlikely that a high preference for integration exists while being 
able to successfully define unilateral policies, the first element might already be reflected 
in the level of preference intensity of a nation state. It may still be the case, though, that a 
state exhibits an interest in cooperation and integration despite being capable of walking 
its own path. This may occur for moral or solidarity reasons, to foster interests in other is-
sue areas, or because the overall benefit of a cooperative strategy is recognized. Moravcsik 
also puts forward conditions under which states (and their domestic interest groups) are 
willing and ready to transfer decision-making authority to a supranational level and 
thereby allow for integration. They comprise benefits from cooperation and central deci-
sion-making, perceived uncertainties as to the outcome of future decisions, and a low risk 
of unwanted supranational decisions. However, these conditions will most certainly be re-
flected by the national preference structure, as they constitute part of the considerations of 
governments and domestic actors. 
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Consequently, when determining nations’ relative bargaining power one should prioritize 
the following four variables: a) preference intensity as defined in the context of a domestic 
preference formation process, b) unilateral capacity to act in a specific policy domain, c) 
ability to form alternate coalitions, and d) opportunities for issue linkage and compromise. 
The strongest bargaining position is provided by the ability to unilaterally define policy 
which is equally beneficial to a nation state when compared to a coordinated solution, 
since any negotiation outcome inferior to that position will not be accepted. The same ap-
plies if low preference intensity prevails in respect of cooperation or integration in a spe-
cific domain: as there is no real urge to cooperate, there is no need to compromise or devi-
ate from one’s negotiation position. Although to be expected in practice, it does not neces-
sarily imply the ability to act unilaterally or vice versa. Low preference intensity is there-
fore put second in order. Should a high preference in favor of cooperation prevail, the pos-
sibility to form alternate coalitions may provide some bargaining leverage. This ‘exit op-
tion’ will only be rewarding if the respective nation’s preferences correspond to the inter-
ests of the members of the alternate coalition. This ability is therefore no guarantee for 
success and thus is ranked number three in priority. Finally, bargaining power can be in-
fluenced by the ability to compromise, link issues to each other, or to effect side pay-
ments. As noted above, these options refer to differences between preferences at the mar-
gin of a set of agreements. They allow adjusting a negotiation package in its final stage, 
but normally cannot be used to settle the ‘big deals’. In sum, the following order of prior-
ity is proposed when determining relative levels of bargaining power: 
Priority Factors Explanation 
1 Capacity for unilateral policy definition 
Ability of a nation state to define its own uncoordinated 
policies in a specific issue area without facing negative pol-
icy externalities 
2 Low preference intensity  Lack of perceived necessity to reach a specific agreement 
on a negotiated issue 
3 Ability to form alternate coali-tions 
Availability of the option to cooperate with other nations 
than previously foreseen, to be able to attain the same ob-
jectives and benefits of policy coordination 
4 Possibility for compromise, is-
sue linkage and side payments 
Ability to make use of differential preference intensities at 
the margin of one issue area, or across various issue areas, 
to enable mutually beneficial negotiation outcomes 
Table 3: Factors determining ‘bargaining power in inter-state negotiations’ 
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1.3.3 Autonomy of supranational organizations 
As shown earlier, rationalist supranationalism – in contrast to liberal intergovernmenta-
lism – puts its focus on the transnational and supranational level when attempting to ex-
plain integration in the European context. The role of transnational actors in promoting in-
tegrative processes was already elaborated on. Transnational activity was demonstrably 
involved in the process of initializing the development of the Single European Sky.45 
Therefore, the second and third dimensions which both reflect and, according to rational-
ist-supranationalist theory, promote further integration are of primary interest to this 
study: the development of European Union institutions’ autonomy and the expansion of 
supranational rules, in other words, the degree of institutionalization. According to theory, 
both elements are interrelated: supranational organizations use their ability to act autono-
mously within a certain legal framework to come up with new agenda items and legisla-
tive proposals, which often result in more comprehensive supranational regulation and, 
consequently, integration.46 This, in turn, broadens the competences of supranational bod-
ies in terms of rulemaking and interpretation of rules, whereby they are provided with a 
new basis for further policy initiatives. One relevant question to be looked at is whether 
such a dynamic can also be observed within the Single European Sky program. More spe-
cifically: Has the density of regulatory content related to SES augmented since the begin-
ning of the project and, if so, is this increase connected to the transfer of additional com-
petences to the European Union from member states, or was it initialized by the relevant 
EU bodies within the scope of their existing authority as rationalist-supranationalist theory 
suggests? If the latter is empirically supported, it may provide an indication that individual 
EU member states are not in full control of all the rulemaking processes ongoing in this 
policy area. Ultimately, the SES regulations at EU level set the legal framework for the 
creation and development of functional airspace blocks, and so this aspect is of high im-
portance to the present study. 
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  See sub-section 1.3.1. 
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  See also Schmitter (2004): 62. 
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According to Stone Sweet and Sandholtz, the autonomy of supranational organizations is 
characterized by their ability to define and pursue a politically relevant agenda on an on-
going basis.47 The agenda setting process determines those subjects which will be attended 
to on a political level and keeps other topics out of scope. Since alternative political deci-
sions can only be taken on items that are in fact present on a political agenda, Schat-
tschneider (1960: 68) maintains that this “definition of alternatives” is a “supreme instru-
ment of power”. The ability to define a relevant political agenda requires certain compe-
tences in terms of the issue areas that are subject to supranational regulation. Agenda 
items can only relate to policy areas where supranational rulemaking is possible. Agenda 
setting, however, is only a first step as Stone Sweet/Sandholtz also indicate, by adding the 
ability to “pursue” a relevant agenda. After an item is put on the agenda list, policy alter-
natives have to be formulated and later decided according to a specific decision-making 
procedure, possibly involving several bodies with different competences and decision-
making rules. Only by following this process, which is part of the policy cycle,48 new su-
pranational regulation can be implemented. In order to assess the autonomy of a suprana-
tional organization, the relevant phases of the policy cycle to be analyzed are the agenda 
setting and the decision-making phase, taking into account the institutions involved in the 
process. The autonomy of the supranational organization may be considered to increase 
when this process runs independently from the influence of individual nation states. As the 
European Union is the organization focused on by this study, the necessary enforcement 
mechanisms are already in place to ensure proper implementation of new regulation.49 
This latter aspect may therefore be set aside in the present analysis. 
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  See sub-section 1.2.3. 
48
  The ‘policy cycle’ refers to the various stages of policymaking, beginning with agenda setting in the 
sense of problem identification, policy formulation, adoption, implementation, to ultimately post-
implementation evaluation of policy, possibly resulting in a new agenda item, whereby the cycle is 
closed. See, for instance, Jann/Wegrich (2003): 81ff. 
49
  See also Ladenbauer (2005): 81ff. 
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1.4 Hypotheses 
Based on above specifications of theoretical concepts, the following hypotheses, derived 
from the theoretical strains previously discussed, will be subject to empirical testing in or-
der to determine the correlation between the level of integration and several factors possi-
bly having an influence on integrative processes in the domain of air traffic management: 
Hypothesis 1a 
The influencing power of a societal group determines the extent to which its prefer-
ences in terms of cooperation and/or integration in the area of air traffic manage-
ment are reflected in the government’s respective position (preference intensity). 
Hypothesis 1b 
The bargaining power of a nation state determines the extent to which its position in 
terms of cooperation and/or integration is reflected in the level of integration 
achieved in the area of air traffic management.  
Hypothesis 2 
The European Union seeks to enhance the quality and density of supranational 
regulation in order to promote integration in the area of air traffic management 
even without a corresponding increase of regulatory autonomy on its part. 
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1.5 Correlation of independent variables 
There is a requirement to examine potential correlations between independent variables 
included in the formulated hypotheses as this might reduce the informative value of inde-
pendent hypothesis testing. As none of the three hypotheses shares the same dependent 
variable, the relationship between influencing factors may not have to be subjected to this 
examination, especially as hypothesis 1a is just a preparatory hypothesis to determine a 
nation’s preference intensity, which in turn is one element of bargaining power included in 
hypothesis 1b. Nevertheless, this check is conducted to attain a high degree of complete-
ness and to find possible correlations apart from those suggested by theory.  
First, the relationship between influencing power of a societal group and bargaining 
power of a nation state is looked at. As stated before, liberal-intergovernmentalist ac-
counts suggest that a nation state’s bargaining power mainly depends on its vulnerability 
to negative policy externalities and consequently on its preference intensity related to a 
matter subject to negotiation. This preference intensity originates from the requirements of 
the most powerful domestic pressure groups. It is not, however, solely influencing capa-
bility that affects bargaining power, but also the group’s attitude and/or position towards a 
specific issue. Hence, there is no direct positive or negative correlation between those two 
variables. A possible link may only exist when a pressure group is also highly influential 
in the domestic setting of negotiation partners. For example, this could be true for a trans-
nationally operating large-scale business corporation or interest group creating certain 
domestic dependencies in those nations. In such a case, it is conceivable that a group 
would be using its influencing channels at the respective national levels, which could – in 
theory – lead to homogenous preference intensities and thereby to a leveling-out of bar-
gaining powers across several states. However, given the firm assumption that hardly any 
organization possesses that kind of power, this situation is very unlikely to occur. Fur-
thermore, no relevant correlation exists between the two variables in the opposite direc-
tion: the various factors determining influencing power are completely independent from 
governmental bargaining power. 
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Second, and more importantly, the relationship between a nation state’s bargaining power 
and the regulatory autonomy of the European Union is examined. Liberal-intergovern-
mentalist theory excludes any influence of supranational organizations on the inter-state 
negotiation process, with the exception of facilitation and reduction of transaction costs. 
On the other hand, the more autonomously a supranational organization is able to take de-
cisions in a certain policy area, the less relevant individual bargaining power of nation 
states becomes. However, the theoretical bargaining power, as determined by the factors 
specified above, still remains unaffected. Conversely, supranational autonomy is to some 
extent determined by the individual preferences of powerful states which relinquish more 
or less decision-making authority to the supranational level. Since the already existing 
autonomy of the EU is in focus of the present analysis, this aspect is irrelevant, though. 
Finally, the relationship between regulatory autonomy of the European Union and 
influencing power of a societal group is analyzed. The influencing capability of groups 
might be considered to be enhanced when, in the framework of a policy network, close 
links exist between a domestic pressure group and EU institutions, particularly if suprana-
tional autonomy is high. In that case, the group is able to address its policy requirements 
to the supranational level directly, while bypassing the national government. Governments 
could perceive a close connection of that kind as an opportunity to open up an indirect in-
fluence channel to the supranational institutions and, for that reason, might be more open 
to the opinions of that group, whereby its domestic influencing capability is increased. 
However, as a network link to the supranational level would be only one of several factors 
determining influencing power (if it, in fact, played a part at all), a respective correlation 
is of low significance. In the opposite direction, liberal-intergovernmentalist theory con-
siders the sum of preferences of powerful interest groups aggregated through national 
governments to be an essential factor when it comes to integration and, ultimately, to the 
definition of supranational autonomy. Yet again, it is the already existing autonomy of EU 
institutions, decided at an earlier stage, which is relevant here. Such a correlation is there-
fore negligible. 
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2 CONTEXT: EUROPEAN INITIATIVES TO INTEGRATE AIR 
TRAFFIC MANAGEMENT 
Chapter introduction and summary 
This chapter describes the various initiatives carried out over more than 50 years in order 
to foster an integrated ATM system in Europe. The first section delineates the develop-
ment of the European Organisation for the Safety of Air Navigation, Eurocontrol, founded 
in 1960. The initial aspiration to introduce “a common organization of air traffic services 
in the upper airspace”50 led to several integration activities at the operational level and 
even included the establishment of a multinational cross-border upper area control center. 
From the mid-1970s onward, the functional and political pressure for an integrated solu-
tion diminished and left Eurocontrol with the role of an expert and coordinating body. Al-
though efforts were made to enhance the institutional power of Eurocontrol, after the 
problems of a fragmented ATM structure became more salient in the course of the avia-
tion upswing in the 1990s, the effects were minimal and limited to harmonization only. 
The European Commission therefore launched the Single European Sky initiative, covered 
by the second section of this chapter. In close cooperation with Eurocontrol, and making 
use of the institutional powers of the European Union framework, the Commission is cur-
rently driving an ambitious and wide-ranging integration program in the field of ATM. 
Two subsequent legislative packages were issued and the corresponding implementing 
rules defined to regulate air navigation service provision, airspace organization, as well as 
technical interoperability and development. However, the Commission does not have the 
authority to enforce structural changes such as the establishment of functional airspace 
blocks without the consent of member states. The Commission therefore attempts to pro-
mote respective changes, amongst a series of measures, through a rigid and comprehen-
sive performance scheme.  
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  See article 1 of the founding Eurocontrol Convention. 
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2.1 Eurocontrol: The first step towards a European ATM system 
2.1.1 The inception 
After the end of World War II, the European air traffic management system, organized 
strictly on a national basis, was confronted with significant challenges: The economic up-
swing subsequent to the war, the development of jet aircraft operating at higher speeds and 
altitudes compared to their propeller-driven counterparts, and the deployment of allied air 
force squadrons in former Western Europe in the wake of an emerging east-west-conflict 
resulted in a substantial growth of continental and trans-Atlantic air traffic (Mahon 2003: 
130ff.). Since the basic principle of ‘see and be seen’ was no longer safe to avoid colli-
sions, aircraft using the same portion of airspace had to be coordinated from the ground. 
In 1957, the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) asked its contracting states 
to consider the conclusion of mutual international agreements to enable air traffic control 
regardless of national boundaries – particularly in the upper airspace above 20’000 feet – 
in order to accommodate the flight envelopes of the new generation of aircraft. At an 
ICAO European regional meeting in Geneva in January 1958, the Director Generals of 
Civil Aviation of the Federal Republic of Germany, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Lux-
embourg announced their intent to mandate a task force with the planning of a common 
international air traffic control center. This task force, which later also involved members 
from France, Italy, and the United Kingdom, presented a first report in January 1959 en-
visaging the creation of an international organization to control air traffic in the (former) 
Western European upper airspace. Further study work was subsequently conducted in 
technical, operational, and institutional domains (Eurocontrol 1978: 10f.). With the excep-
tion of Italy, which backed out for internal political reasons, the representatives of the re-
maining participating states signed on 13 December 1960 the International Convention re-
lating to Co-operation for the Safety of Air Navigation ‘EUROCONTROL’ (ibid., 203). 
After ratification of the Convention, the European Organisation for the Safety of Air 
Navigation (Eurocontrol) seated in Brussels (Belgium) formally came into force on 1 
March 1963. 
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2.1.2 Functional and institutional developments 
Eurocontrol constitutes an international organization in accordance with public interna-
tional law. Its Convention defines the institutional setup, the activities, and the compe-
tences of the organization. The founding Convention of 1960 was substantially amended 
in 1981 and 1997, which also reflects the functional development of Eurocontrol.51 The 
first decade after the creation of Eurocontrol saw a high intensity of ATM-related integra-
tion activities. Several international projects were realized to meet the objective of a 
“common organisation of air traffic services in the upper airspace”, as stipulated in article 
1 of the founding Convention. In January 1967, the Eurocontrol Experimental Center 
(EEC) was established in Brétigny-sur-Orge (France) to conduct research and develop-
ment in the area of ATC technology and to promote technical coordination and harmoni-
zation at an international level. In 1969, Eurocontrol opened its own training academy at 
the Institute of Air Navigation Services (IANS) in Luxembourg, with the aim of harmoniz-
ing training standards. A Central Route Charging Office (CRCO) at the Brussels head-
quarters took care of the collection of route charges imposed on airspace users on behalf 
of the contracting states, a service later extended to non-participating members.  
A key milestone for Eurocontrol was the implementation of a multinational cross-
border upper area control center in Maastricht (the Netherlands) in February 1972. 
MUAC took control over the upper airspace covering Belgium and Luxembourg, later 
also including the Netherlands and the north-western part of the Federal Republic of Ger-
many. From the beginning, the center featured state-of-the-art technology and joined to-
gether civil and military air traffic controllers under one roof, facilitating the coordination 
of the different categories of airspace users. The original intention was to extend the area 
of responsibility of MUAC to the southern part of Germany as well (Eurocontrol 1970: 
15); however, due to the lack of infrastructural capacity, a new control center was con-
structed in the area of Karlsruhe (Germany) in accordance with Maastricht’s technological 
standards. The Karlsruhe center was supposed to also manage the upper airspaces of Swit-
zerland, Austria, as well as parts of France. Yet, at the time of completion of the building 
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  See Ladenbauer (2005): 21ff. 
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in 1977, the concerned states were not ready to transfer the required competences in anal-
ogy to the Maastricht solution (Ladenbauer 2005: 23). The area of responsibility of the 
Karlsruhe center thus remained restricted to the southeastern part of Germany and there-
fore was eventually taken over by the German air navigation services authority, leaving 
Eurocontrol with Maastricht as the only multinational control center. This marked the be-
ginning of a longer period of stagnation in terms of integrative activities. Ladenbauer 
(2005: 100f.) explains this decline coming about due to the progress made in ATM tech-
nology and the faltering growth of air traffic in the beginning of the 1970s, which permit-
ted the existing national air navigation service organizations to cope with the traffic de-
mand at that time. This alleviated the need for a cooperative approach. Already by 1966 it 
became apparent that the objective formulated in article 1 of the Convention was not sup-
ported by all participating states. A study group was therefore tasked to reassess the role 
of Eurocontrol and to delineate possible future options for the organization.52 As the valid-
ity period of the first Convention was set to twenty years, the institutional changes were 
not effected until 12 February 1981. In the respective amendment protocol to the Conven-
tion, which was ratified by all contracting states in 1986, the intent to establish a common 
organization for the provision of air traffic services was abandoned. Instead, it was de-
cided that the cooperation between states in the framework of Eurocontrol should be 
strengthened to develop common objectives and plans in the domain of air traffic man-
agement and to coordinate all required measures to ensure safe and efficient air naviga-
tion.53  
After the European air transport sector was subjected to deregulation and liberaliza-
tion at the end of the 1980s, air traffic increased considerably and pushed the capacity of 
the air traffic management system to the limits, resulting in a substantial rise in flight de-
lays (Ladenbauer 2005: 83f.). The rapid availability of new aircraft, which accommodated 
the enhanced demand for air transportation, contrasted with an ATM infrastructure devel-
oping too slowly. Eurocontrol took on a central role in the subsequent debate about possi-
ble solutions to this issue, as the organization had acquired substantial expertise in the area 
of air traffic management over the years in particular due to its comprehensive operational 
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and technical research and development programs. Between 1988 and 2000, six Ministe-
rial Meetings on the Air Traffic System in Europe (MATSEs) were held in the framework 
of the European Civil Aviation Conference (ECAC).54 These meetings served as a plat-
form for ECAC member states’ ministers of transport to discuss with experts the problems 
related to European air traffic management and to define remedial actions. Following 
these meetings, Eurocontrol was tasked with the implementation of suitable measures. A 
major result of the first MATSE, held in October 1988, was the creation of a Central Flow 
Management Unit (CFMU), inaugurated in 1996 at the Eurocontrol headquarters in Brus-
sels. It is a central Air Traffic Flow and Capacity Management (ATFCM) function, de-
signed to balance air traffic demand with available ATM capacity, to smooth traffic flows, 
and to ensure protection from system overload.55 The CFMU still plays an important role 
in managing air traffic over Europe. In 1990, a European Air Traffic Control Harmonisa-
tion and Integration Programme (EATCHIP) was launched, aiming at increasing capacity 
by harmonizing and further developing ATM technology and operational procedures 
(Ladenbauer 2005: 25). Further measures arose along the interface between airports and 
the air traffic system, pursued under the so-called APATSI Programme. The corresponding 
package also included the implementation of a Central Office for Delay Analysis (CODA) 
to gain a more comprehensive picture about the flight delay situation in Europe (ECAC 
1997: 8). In 1997, EATCHIP and APATSI were joined together into a European Air Traf-
fic Management Programme (EATMP) and supplemented in 2000 by the ATM 2000+ 
strategy, introducing a gate-to-gate concept of air traffic management. The latter implies a 
comprehensive view on all phases of air traffic management handling of a flight, begin-
ning with the first contact to the ATM system, up to charging for air traffic services after 
arrival. A major component of the ATM 2000+ strategy was the objective to realize a pan-
European airspace continuum by implementing a harmonized airspace structure, as well as 
a seamless and coordinated airway network. However, this strategy did not specify to 
what extent cross-border arrangements between national air navigation service providers 
would be necessary to achieve this goal (Eurocontrol 2002a). 
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 See www.ecac-ceac.org. 
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  See www.cfmu.eurocontrol.int. 
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In spite of all these steps taken on the functional level, it soon became evident that the sole 
coordination of national air traffic management activities would not suffice to substan-
tially improve the situation. Repeatedly, there were calls for an integrated European air 
traffic management system based on one executive authority, fully interoperable technol-
ogy, and common standards and procedures (ECAC 1997: 8). One of the chief shortfalls 
of Eurocontrol proved to be the organization’s lack of authority to force member states 
into adopting defined standards. In addition, the inertness of its executive bodies’ deci-
sion-making procedures (based on unanimity) was also apparent. In 1994, the fourth 
ECAC ministerial meeting mandated a study to examine the possibilities for institutional 
changes and the expansion of Eurocontrol competences. The respective ECAC Institu-
tional Strategy was adopted at MATSE 5 in February 1997 and provided the basis for a 
third revision of the Eurocontrol Convention to be known as the revised Convention. In 
the course of this revision, additional regulatory units and processes were introduced to 
render the coordination of common efforts towards a harmonized air traffic management 
system more effective (ECAC 1997: 26ff.). Another significant change was the increased 
application of the majority voting principle in internal decision-making procedures. The 
revised Convention also allowed for membership of “regional economic integration or-
ganizations” at Eurocontrol,56 which provided the legal basis for the accession of the 
European Union to the organization. The ratification by respective member states, both of 
the revised Eurocontrol Convention (signed in June 1997) and of the accession protocol of 
the European Community (signed in October 2002), is, to date, still pending. Neverthe-
less, they are applied on a provisional basis. 
2.1.3 Governance structure of Eurocontrol 
Until completion of the ongoing ratification process of the revised Convention, Eurocon-
trol is managed through a provisional governance structure based on the setup defined in 
the new agreement. Political governance of Eurocontrol is ensured by the Permanent 
Commission, which is composed of the representatives of member states on a ministerial 
level. After the revised Convention comes into force, it will be renamed General Assem-
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bly. The Provisional Council (later: Council), one hierarchical level below, consists of the 
national director generals for civil aviation and of their military counterparts. It carries out 
an advisory function in support of the Commission, assures the execution of the Commis-
sion’s general political guidelines, and supervises the activities of Eurocontrol. In the con-
text of the institutional reorganization effected by the revised Convention, a number of 
additional bodies have been introduced that directly report to the Provisional Council. 
These include: a Performance Review Commission (PRC), responsible for performance 
assessments and the setting of performance targets to enhance efficacy of the air traffic 
management system; a Safety Regulation Commission (SRC), developing harmonized 
safety regulatory objectives and requirements; and a Civil-Military Interface Standing 
Committee (CMIC), providing advice on any matter concerning the coordination of civil 
and military needs related to ATM. The executive body of Eurocontrol, the Agency, is 
administrated by a Director General who is the external representative of Eurocontrol and 
possesses a right of initiative towards his superior boards.  
In 2011, Eurocontrol counted 39 member states. In the course of the organization’s 
efforts in support of a harmonized pan-European air traffic management system, it has 
evolved into an important focal point for all actors associated with the ATM domain (Van 
Dam 2004: 20) and is well recognized as a neutral and competent expert authority. Today, 
Eurocontrol plays a significant role with regard to the development of the Single European 
Sky program, as the organization advances towards becoming the ‘executive arm’ of the 
European Commission in the domain of air traffic management. The Agency has already 
been restructured to ensure that its activities are tailored towards working on the Single 
European Sky together with the European Union.57 It is therefore expected that Eurocon-
trol will face more structural and institutional changes in the mid-term future.58    
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2.2 Single European Sky 
2.2.1 Initial developments     
The Single European Sky initiative was launched in 1999 by the Commission of the Euro-
pean Union. The Commission already recommended in 1988 various measures at Com-
munity level to counteract the problems associated with the bottlenecks of the air traffic 
service system.59 However, the Council rejected related proposals at that time, having re-
gard to the ongoing multilateral cooperation in the framework of ECAC and Eurocontrol 
(European Commission 1996: 7f.). In 1995, the European air traffic delay situation 
reached another climax, whereupon the Commission submitted a White Paper on Air Traf-
fic Management.60 It identified the main structural deficiencies of the air traffic manage-
ment system and presented possible options for a future single ATM network. The Com-
mission argued that, due to the national diversity prevailing in Europe, a highly central-
ized “monolithic” air traffic management structure would not be realizable (European 
Commission 1996: 20). Instead, Eurocontrol should be given broader regulatory compe-
tences, while the provision of air navigation services would remain under the responsibil-
ity of individual states – with the exception of centralized air traffic flow management, 
which was already carried out by Eurocontrol. Strengthening Eurocontrol would also be 
advantageous from a regulatory point of view, as its extensive geographical scope (which 
includes non-EU-members) could be made use of. Moreover, the European Union pos-
sesses jurisdiction in the domain of air transport, and thus also in the area of air traffic 
management, in accordance with the EU treaties.61 The possibility of the European Union 
becoming a member of Eurocontrol should therefore be considered in order to ensure 
compatibility of Eurocontrol standards with EU policies and to facilitate the implementa-
tion of respective decisions. 
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Urged by massive flight delays associated with large-scale airspace closures during the 
Kosovo-crisis in 1999, the Commission concluded that previous efforts to improve the air 
traffic situation in Europe had been inadequate and called for substantial structural re-
forms in the area of air traffic management (European Commission 1999). Besides ensur-
ing operational and technical interoperability, a collective management of airspace regard-
less of national boundaries and along the lines of efficiency should be aspired to (ibid., 
4f.). In addition, collective decision-making processes to involve all relevant players 
should be established and research and technological developments intensified. The 
Commission announced the implementation of a high level group to specify the necessary 
reform steps based on the Commission proposal of a Single European Sky. The high level 
group was composed of representatives of the civil and military aviation authorities of the 
EU member states, Norway, and Switzerland, and obtained advice from Eurocontrol, the 
ATM industry, staff representatives, as well as airspace users (European Commission 
2000: 9f.). The group convened a first meeting in January 2000 and submitted its report at 
the end of the same year. To support the creation of a Single European Sky, the high level 
group recommended: 
• establishing suitable and effective regulatory structures in the framework 
of the EU institutions both for civil and military aviation, independent 
from ANSPs; 
• integrating non-EU-states into the regulatory framework through bilateral 
agreements and/or through Eurocontrol; 
• making use of the operational and technical expertise of Eurocontrol; 
• creating, regulating, and administrating airspace as a common resource at 
European level, thereby considering civil and military interests; 
• reforming the charging regime to stimulate cost-effectiveness and to cre-
ate incentives for capacity-enhancing measures; 
• harmonizing training and licensing of ATS personnel to foster mobility; 
• implementing wide-ranging consultation procedures at European level.  
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2.2.2 SES I 
Regulatory framework 
Based on the very detailed report of the high level group and its recommendations, the 
European Commission completed a first set of regulations by the end of 2001. This pack-
age included the Framework Regulation for the Creation of the Single European Sky,62 the 
regulatory foundation of SES; the Service Provision Regulation;63 the Airspace Regula-
tion;64 and the Interoperability Regulation.65 The Framework Regulation explains the ne-
cessity for the creation of the Single European Sky, states the concept’s general objectives, 
and defines the institutions and procedures needed for its implementation. In particular, it 
requires the separation of provision of air navigation services and regulation/oversight of 
such services by establishing separate national supervisory authorities (NSAs). The three 
subsequent regulations provide guidance for action in domains that are relevant to the re-
alization of SES: The Service Provision Regulation mandates the European Commission 
to establish uniform criteria and standards by which air navigation services should be pro-
vided within the EU and associated states, and spells out the basic principles for the certi-
fication of ANS organizations. The goal of the Interoperability Regulation is the develop-
ment of compatible ATM technical systems and procedures. The Airspace Regulation 
aims at promoting the provision of air traffic services according to functional criteria, irre-
spective of national boundaries. This encompasses the harmonization and simplification of 
the airspace structure, the implementation of functional airspace blocks (FABs) across the 
upper airspace of several nation states, the flexible use of airspace between civil and mili-
tary air traffic, and the centralized management of air traffic flows. It is important to note 
that according to (former) article 5 (4) of the Airspace Regulation,66 functional airspace 
blocks are to be established by mutual agreement between states. Hence, the European 
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  Regulation (EC) 550/2004. 
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  Regulation (EC) 551/2004. 
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  Regulation (EC) 552/2004. 
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Union does not possess the authority to impose a functional airspace structure onto mem-
ber states. EU competence in this domain is restricted to the formulation of criteria accord-
ing to which FABs should be created. Nevertheless, states are required to cooperate to the 
maximum extent possible and to establish FABs in a ‘bottom-up’ approach. 
Implementation process 
Based on the four basic SES regulations, which were adopted on 10 March 2004 by the 
Council of the European Union and the European Parliament, the European Commission 
has pursued the concretization and implementation of the Single European Sky by means 
of implementing rules. According to article 290 TFEU,67 the Commission enjoys limited 
legislative power if so foreseen by the respective overarching regulatory framework, in 
this case, the SES regulations. This is done in accordance with the so called ‘comitology 
method’,68 whereby a specifically designated committee composed of member state repre-
sentatives comments and votes (by qualified majority) on proposed regulation before final 
adoption by the Commission. The comitology method ensures state involvement and in-
fluence at the level of implementation. For the creation of implementing rules in the do-
main of SES, three comitology procedures are applicable, the use of which is specified in 
the various provisions of the framework regulations. The advisory procedure, the weakest 
form in regard to committee involvement, simply requires the Commission to take into 
consideration the committee’s opinion before adopting a regulation under discussion; in 
case of the regulatory procedure, a negative opinion of the committee can be deferred to 
the Council for further discussion and decision; finally, when applying the regulatory pro-
cedure with scrutiny, the committee opinion, whether positive or negative, is automati-
cally forwarded to Council and European Parliament who independently have the potential 
to oppose a regulation proposal in accordance with their respective voting procedures. In 
the Single European Sky program, this committee function is assigned to the Single Sky 
Committee (SSC) where each EU member state is represented with one civil and one mili-
tary official but possesses one vote only. Non-EU-members affiliated with the Union 
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through bilateral agreements (such as Switzerland, accession candidates to the EU, as well 
as Eurocontrol) participate in the SSC as observers. 
Industry Consultation Body (ICB) 
Based on the SES Framework Regulation, the Industry Consultation Body (ICB) was es-
tablished with the aim of supporting the implementation of the Single European Sky 
(European Commission 2011a). The ICB involves all interested actors that have a stake in 
air traffic management. They include air navigation service providers, airspace users, air-
ports, ATM industry, and staff representatives. The function of this consultative group is 
to advise the Commission on technical and operational matters and to define the long-term 
strategy of the air traffic management system.69 The ICB is an SES specific committee 
and exists independently from the internal consultation mechanisms of Eurocontrol.   
Social Dialogue 
It is a basic requirement in the European Union to establish sectoral dialogue committees 
that offer an institutionalized framework to debate social issues associated with EU activi-
ties.70 The Framework Regulation for the Single European Sky program also provides for 
a corresponding Social Dialogue. Respective platforms at various levels have been estab-
lished for that purpose. Besides the civil aviation sector dialogue, which includes staff and 
employer representative organizations from the entire branch, consultative expert groups 
specifically related to air traffic management are also in place to advise the Commission 
with respect to the implementation of the Single European Sky regarding all measures that 
have social implications.71 
                                                        
69
  See ICB (2007). 
70
  In accordance with Commission Decision 98/500/EC. 
71
  See Commission Decision C/2010/9016. 
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2.2.3 Involvement of Eurocontrol in the Single European Sky 
The SES Framework Regulation particularly emphasizes the need for close cooperation 
with Eurocontrol. Due to its long-standing reputation in the domain of European air traffic 
management, Eurocontrol is considered to be the suitable organization to support the 
European Union’s regulatory function and to develop the operational and technical im-
plementing rules and specifications. In order to define the areas and methods of such co-
operation and to complement and mutually reinforce respective activities, a memorandum 
of cooperation was signed between the European Commission and Eurocontrol in Decem-
ber 2003. From the inception of the Single Sky concept, the membership of the European 
Union at Eurocontrol was seen as an important element to render this synergetic partner-
ship most efficient.72 The respective accession protocol was signed in October 2002 and 
formally concluded on 29 April 2004 by Council Decision. As formal entry into force is 
subject to ratification and also linked to the final ratification by all signatory states of the 
Eurocontrol revised Convention, the relevant articles of the protocol are applied on a pro-
visional basis only, as is the case for the Eurocontrol revised Convention.73 
The European Commission assigns specific mandates to Eurocontrol to support the 
development of ATM-related operational and technical regulation. The mandated imple-
menting rules are elaborated within the framework of the organization’s internal regula-
tory mechanisms, making use of its extensive consultation processes in order to ensure in-
clusion of a broad variety of stakeholders and to strive for a widest possible consensus. 
Apart from this regulatory support function, Eurocontrol has been charged over time with 
additional coordinating functions and continues to play an important role in respect of 
technological research, as well as ATM system development and deployment in the 
framework of SESAR (Single European Sky ATM Research; see below). Moreover, the 
pan-European dimension of the organization is seen as an opportunity to expand the vision 
of a Single European Sky beyond the European Union and its affiliated countries. It is 
planned to further strengthen the formal relationship between the European Union and 
                                                        
72
  See sub-section 2.2.1. 
73
  See sub-section 2.1.2. 
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Eurocontrol in the form of a high level agreement, which will possibly be followed by an-
other institutional reform of Eurocontrol.74 
2.2.4 SESAR (Single European Sky ATM Research) 
A key element for the successful realization of a Single European Sky is to overcome the 
technical fragmentation in today’s air traffic management infrastructure and to develop 
technologies that will be able to cope with future air traffic demands. An initiative of the 
ATM supply industry asking for a coordinated approach to solve this issue was taken up 
by Eurocontrol and the European Commission in 2004 and conveyed in SESAME, the 
Single European Sky Implementation Programme, which was later renamed SESAR (Sin-
gle European Sky ATM Research). The first objective of SESAR – covered in the frame-
work of a ‘definition phase’ launched in November 2005 – was to create a vision of future 
air traffic management performance requirements and the corresponding future ATM con-
cept of operation, and to set out a technological roadmap for the development and imple-
mentation of the systems necessary to accommodate that vision. This was to be outlined 
by a European ATM Master Plan. From its beginning, SESAR aimed at involving all rele-
vant aviation players in this pan-European technological modernization project. The goal 
was to obtain a complete picture in terms of stakeholders’ views and to synchronize ef-
forts as well as the use of resources. The ‘definition phase’ was managed by Eurocontrol 
and carried out by a contract-based consortium composed of 29 members including air 
navigation service providers, airspace users, airports, ATM supply industry, as well as air-
craft and airborne equipment manufacturers. Several ATM research centers, staff repre-
sentative bodies and ATM industry corporations from the United States of America also 
contributed to the work as associated partners to the SESAR Consortium. In March 2009, 
the main result of the ‘definition phase’, the SESAR Master Plan, was endorsed by the 
Council of the European Union as the initial version of the European ATM Master Plan,75 
whereby the continuation of the SESAR program was formally supported along the pro-
posed lines through the ‘development phase’. This phase is currently ongoing and sched-
                                                        
74
  See Tytgat (2011); see also European Commission (2011b): 3.3. 
75
  See SESAR JU (2009). 
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uled to be officially completed in 2013. The objective of this phase is to develop the 
equipment, systems, or standards, which will ensure convergence towards a fully interop-
erable European air traffic management system according to the master plan.76 In February 
2007, the Council adopted Regulation 219/2007, establishing a ‘Joint Undertaking’ for the 
management of the SESAR development stage. This was motivated by the need for an ef-
fective governance structure with legal personality to run this large-scale public-private 
partnership project in a coordinated way.77 The SESAR Joint Undertaking (SESAR JU) is 
a non-profit entity enjoying the status of an international organization.78 It is composed of 
the European Commission, Eurocontrol, and 15 organizations that have signed a member-
ship agreement with the SESAR JU. They include all relevant industry branches already 
involved in the ‘definition phase’ of SESAR. The SESAR JU is governed by an adminis-
trative board, which is chaired by a representative of the European Commission. It com-
prises military organizations as well as professional staff associations. An executive direc-
tor is responsible for the execution of the SESAR project. Coordination is also effected 
with ongoing ATM modernization programs in other parts of the world and with the Inter-
national Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) to ensure global compatibility and interop-
erability of technologies. On 3 March 2011, a memorandum of cooperation was signed be-
tween the European Union and the civil aviation authority of the United States of Amer-
ica, the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA).79 Funding of the estimated 2.1 billion 
Euro SESAR development phase is equally shared by the European Union (European 
Commission and Trans-European Transport Network fund), Eurocontrol, and industry. 
The ‘deployment phase’, intended to begin in 2014 and continuing through 2020, is ex-
pected to see the subsequent implementation and installation of the newly developed ATM 
infrastructure, which will be carried out mainly under the responsibility of the industry. 
The goals set for the future technological ATM environment are ambitious: the perform-
ance targets to be achieved by year 2020 are a threefold increase in ATM capacity, the 
improvement of safety by a factor of 10, the reduction of the environmental impact per 
flight by 10%, and to cut ATM costs by 50% (SESAR JU 2011: 2). 
                                                        
76
  Council Regulation (EC) No 219/2007, recital 10. 
77
  See European Commission (2005).  
78
  See www.sesarju.eu. 
79
  See European Commission (2011c). 
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2.2.5 Achievements and shortfalls of SES I 
The Framework Regulation requires the European Commission to periodically review the 
application of the Single Sky legislation and to report to Council and European Parliament 
every three years on the respective progress.80 The first report was submitted in December 
2007 and lists the accomplishments of SES within the first three-year period following the 
launch of the initiative.81 It highlights the basic achievements, such as the introduction of 
an institutional structure for Community action in the field of air traffic management in-
volving all relevant stakeholders, thereby referring to the Single Sky Committee, the In-
dustry Consultation Body, and the cooperation agreement with Eurocontrol. Separation of 
air navigation service provision from regulation was achieved in all EU member states to 
ensure independence of regulatory and oversight activities by national supervisory au-
thorities (NSAs). The certification of ANSPs against common requirements as set by the 
European Union was introduced, and a Community air traffic controller license was estab-
lished, setting a harmonized level of competence and increasing intra-European mobility 
for ATCOs. Transparency was advanced in the area of ANS charges by requiring air navi-
gation service providers to disclose their individual cost bases. Airspace improvements in-
cluded new rules on the flexible use of airspace between civil and military airspace users 
and the harmonization of airspace classifications in the upper airspace. Finally, the 
SESAR project was initiated and an interoperability mechanism introduced that allows for 
the development of Community specifications related to technical systems and their op-
erational use. 
Nevertheless, various SES domains were still under development at the time of re-
porting, showing only little advancement in certain key areas. This mainly concerns air-
space harmonization in the lower airspace, or the implementation of functional airspace 
blocks. The requirement set in article 5 of the Framework Regulation to establish FABs 
using a ‘bottom-up’ approach had led to a number of corresponding initiatives by member 
                                                        
80
  Article 12 (2) of the Framework Regulation EC 549/2004. 
81
  See European Commission (2007a). 
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states.82 However, according to the Commission report, these initiatives were only pro-
gressing slowly and with varying intensity of efforts and ambition. The expected benefits 
of FAB implementation, i.e. improved flight efficiency by more direct routes, cost reduc-
tion, and general system defragmentation by consolidation and integration of ATM infra-
structure and services, had not yet materialized. Although the delay problem had generally 
receded in the years after the aviation slowdown following the terrorist attacks on 11 Sep-
tember 2001 in the U.S.A., new challenges such as increased fuel costs and environmental 
considerations continued to push for improvements in both economic and flight efficiency. 
The Commission therefore concluded in its assessment report that a second Single Sky 
legislative package was necessary to overcome the deadlocks present at this stage of de-
velopment and to give the process additional thrust. This was also based on the recom-
mendations made by a second high level group, installed in November 2006 to advise the 
European Commission on the future of the European aviation regulatory framework. The 
related conference asserted that there was a need to foster the ‘Community method’83 in 
order to reduce the inefficiencies stemming from fragmentation and duplication in the 
European aviation system, which was still seen as a considerable hindrance to the realiza-
tion of the Single European Sky.84 The high level group subsequently issued a package of 
proposals.85 The group recommended: 
• strengthening the role of the EU and the Community method as the sole 
vehicle to set the regulation agenda for European aviation by eliminating 
overlaps between EU and other regulatory processes; 
• appointing an ‘Aviation System Coordinator’ to drive forward necessary 
actions; 
                                                        
82
  See chapter 3. 
83
  According to www.europa.eu, glossary (October 2011): The ‘Community method’ is the expression used 
for the institutional operating mode for the first pillar of the European Union (as conceived by the Treaty 
of Maastricht). It proceeds from an integration logic and has the following salient features: 
 - Commission monopoly of the right of initiative  
 - general use of qualified majority voting in the Council  
 - an active role for the European Parliament in co-legislating frequently with the Council 
 - uniformity in the interpretation of Community law ensured by the Court of Justice  
84
  See Barrot (2006). 
85
  See European Commission (2007b): 7ff. 
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• involving aviation industry more systematically in the rulemaking proc-
ess for the aviation system and making it possible to compete for contest-
able activities in ATM, such as MET, AIS, and CNS infrastructure; 
• driving improved performance, in particular in the monopoly elements of 
ANSP activities by setting performance objectives, maximizing the use 
of incentives and requiring independent performance reporting; 
• accelerating the delivery of SES and SESAR through proactive manage-
ment and annual monitoring of progress by the European Commission; 
• focusing the activities of Eurocontrol on pan-European functions and 
ATM network design, as well as on the support to regulation; 
• addressing the forthcoming airport capacity crunch by raising the profile 
of this emerging bottleneck in the European aviation system; 
• empowering EASA86 as the single EU instrument for aviation safety 
regulation, implying transfer of all safety regulation activities from Euro-
control to EASA; 
• developing an integrated strategy to accommodate environmental aspects 
of aviation and air traffic management. 
2.2.6 SES II  
On the basis of the above recommendations, the European Commission proposed a second 
Single Sky legislation package in 2008, amending the existing regulatory framework. The 
Council of the European Union and the European Parliament adopted this second package 
on 21 October 2009.87 It focuses on the following four pillars:88 
                                                        
86
  The European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA), founded in 2003, is the EU rulemaking body for safety 
and environmental protection standards in European civil aviation. It is located in Cologne, Germany; see 
easa.europa.eu. 
87
  See Regulation (EC) 1070/2009.  
88
  See European Commission (2008). 
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• implementation of an effective performance framework including a new 
charging regime; 
• consolidation of safety regulation and oversight within a single safety 
framework in the body of the European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA); 
• advancement of new technologies in the framework of SESAR; 
• increased consideration of airport capacity. 
New performance framework and charging regime 
The original SES Framework Regulation was amended and supplemented by a Commis-
sion regulation that introduced a performance scheme, which comprises various measures 
not only to monitor but also to drive the performance of the European ATM system in four 
selected key performance areas (KPAs): safety, environment, capacity, and cost-
efficiency.89 The first measure entails the establishment of an independent Performance 
Review Body (PRB),90 responsible for assessing ATM system performance, developing 
key performance indicators (KPIs) for each key performance area, and proposing Com-
munity-wide quantifiable performance targets (see following sub-section). Proposed tar-
gets are subsequently approved by the European Commission and form the overarching 
frame for national/regional performance plans to be elaborated by national supervisory au-
thorities, which are required to be consistent with the defined Community-wide targets. 
The Commission ensures compatibility between Community and national/regional targets 
and has the authority to direct member states to revise their performance plans, if neces-
sary.91 Performance targets, when finally agreed, are binding and adherence supposed to 
be assisted by financial incentive schemes. In support of this, the charging principle for air 
navigation service provision was completely revised. Whereas previously air navigation 
service charges had been allowed to automatically cover all costs incurred by air naviga-
tion services, the revised charging regulation requires air navigation service providers to 
                                                        
89
  See Commission Regulation EU 691/2010.  
90
  The task of the Performance Review Body of the Single European Sky was assigned to the Performance 
Review Commission of Eurocontrol on 27 July 2010 by European Commission Decision C(2010)5134. 
91
  This is done in accordance with the regulatory procedure of the comitology method as briefly described 
in sub-section 2.2.2. 
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announce their ‘determined costs’ for ANS provision in advance on an annual basis.92 Ad-
ditional income due to lower actual costs may be kept back by the ANSP, whereas costs in 
excess of the determined costs are to be returned to the airspace users. This revised 
scheme is designed to provide an incentive for air navigation service providers to apply 
better cost control.    
The second measure is to support ongoing initiatives of setting up functional air-
space blocks in order to be able to achieve the established performance targets. This in-
cludes the setting of a firm implementation deadline for FABs on 4 December 2012, the 
extension of the scope of FABs to include lower airspace and airports (gate-to-gate ap-
proach), and the Commission’s assistance in removing both legal and institutional obsta-
cles for FAB creation at the national level. 
The third measure is to put an enhanced focus on European network management in 
order to ensure harmonized ATM performance across different FABs. This is to be 
achieved by a European airway network design, comprehensive traffic flow management, 
and the coordinated deployment of new technologies in the framework of SESAR. A 
Commission Regulation was adopted in July 2011, introducing inter alia the function of a 
Network Manager.93 This function is responsible for developing and implementing a Net-
work Strategy Plan followed by a more detailed Network Operations Plan, as well as an 
integrated air traffic route structure. Member states remain responsible for the detailed de-
velopment and approval of airspace design matters. In addition, the Network Manager 
shall ensure the coordination of scarce resources, such as radio frequencies, and execute 
the obligations of the central unit for air traffic flow management. Performance targets are 
set at Network Manager level, with the overall goal to make a positive contribution to EU-
wide performance targets. Eurocontrol was formally nominated as the Network Manager, 
taking into account that the organization already carries out the European central flow 
management function.94   
                                                        
92
  See article 11a of Regulation (EC) 1794/2006 amended by Commission Regulation 1191/2010. 
93
  See Commission Regulation (EU) No 677/211; detailed descriptions of the various Network Manage-
ment tasks are contained in the related annexes. 
94
  See Commission Decision C(2011) 4130. 
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A single safety framework through EASA  
In 2002, the European Union decided to establish a European Aviation Safety Agency 
(EASA) to allow for the safety challenges induced by the continuous growth in air traffic, 
capacity limitations, airspace and aerodrome congestions, and the progressive use of new 
technologies in aviation. EASA was founded in 2003 and mandated to assure a harmo-
nized approach to safety regulation in combination with effective and synchronized regu-
lation implementation. It aims to increase or at least maintain safety levels in the aviation 
domain. As a logical consequence and as part of the SES II package, the Commission pro-
posed an extension of the regulatory competences of EASA and that the aerodrome and air 
traffic management sector should be able to pursue a ‘total system approach’, allowing for 
common standardization activities by a single entity in all relevant key safety areas. The 
original Commission Regulation was amended accordingly.95 Eurocontrol, which until 
that time provided for safety-related regulation in the field of ATM through its Safety 
Regulation Commission (SRC), continues to assist EASA in this respect.    
Further advancement of the SESAR program 
In its communication on SES II, the Commission reiterates the major significance of 
SESAR, the technological pillar of the Single European Sky program, and announces that 
it will propose that the SESAR ATM Master Plan be endorsed by the Council of the Euro-
pean Union.96 As mentioned above, the Council subsequently supported the initial version 
of the European ATM Master Plan in March 2009. Further updates of the plan are subject 
to regular endorsement.  
Airport capacity 
In 2007, the European Parliament and Council endorsed the Action plan for airport capac-
ity, efficiency and safety in Europe.97 The objective of this action plan is to ensure the nec-
essary mid- and long-term investments in airport infrastructure and the use of new tech-
nologies in compliance with the SESAR program to increase airport capacity and avoid 
                                                        
95
  See Regulation (EC) 216/2008 as amended by Regulation (EC) 1108/2009. 
96
  See European Commission (2008). 
97
  See European Commission (2006). 
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bottlenecks on the ground, while at the same time augmenting the capacity of the air traf-
fic management system. As a follow-up measure, the European Commission established a 
Community Observatory involving all relevant stakeholders, to monitor and exchange data 
and information on airport capacity and to advise the Commission on the development and 
implementation of capacity-increasing solutions.  
2.2.7 Status of relevant SES developments (as of October 2011) 
Definition of EU-wide performance targets 
On 21 February 2011 the European Commission, upon proposal of the Performance Re-
view Body, adopted the EU-wide performance targets for a first reference period (RP1) 
lasting from 2012 until 2014.98 As the key performance indicators to measure ‘safety’ are 
still under development, no performance targets for this key performance area have been 
set for RP1.99 Member states will be required to publish data on safety related occurrences 
according to a harmonized risk classification scheme and to monitor the effectiveness of 
implemented safety management systems, as well as the application of ‘Just Culture’ prin-
ciples.100 The indicators required for that purpose are due to be available prior to the be-
ginning of the first reference period and will be included in the Performance Regulation 
by amendment.  
The EU performance target addressing the ‘environment’ KPA is based on the indi-
cator of ‘en-route horizontal flight efficiency’, measuring the average difference between 
actual and optimum flight trajectory, the latter normally being the ‘great circle’.101 The 
target set for RP1 is a reduction of route extension from the optimum trajectory by 0.75% 
point until 2014, deduced from the baseline average extension in 2009, which is calculated 
at 4.5%. A second environment KPI, which is only monitored without a related target for 
                                                        
98
  See Commission Decision (2011/121/EU). 
99
  See Commission Regulation (EU) No 691/2010, Annex 1, as well as Eurocontrol (2010b): 15. 
100
  ‘Just Culture’ is defined as “a culture in which front line operators or others are not punished for actions, 
omissions or decisions taken by them that are commensurate with their experience and training, but 
where gross negligence, wilful violations and destructive acts are not tolerated” (Eurocontrol 2008b: 11). 
The idea behind this is to establish a culture where so-called ‘honest mistakes’ are freely reported by 
those who committed them, and their findings used to learn and continuously improve the system. 
101
  See footnote 14. 
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the first reference period, is the effective use of civil/military airspace structures. As of the 
2nd reference period (RP2: 2015-2019), a third indicator addressing airport/ANS related 
environmental issues shall be introduced.  
The key performance indicator used as the basis for the ‘capacity’ target is the ‘min-
utes of en-route ATFM delay per flight’ as calculated annually by the Central Flow Man-
agement Unit. In 2009, a delay of 0.94 minute per flight was achieved (Eurocontrol 
2010b: 20). The capacity target for RP1 aims at an improvement of the average delay so as 
to reach a maximum of 0.5 minute per flight in 2014. For the second reference period, a 
second KPI is foreseen to cover airport capacity issues related to air navigation services.  
As regards cost-efficiency, the KPI applied is the ‘average determined unit rate for 
en-route air navigation services’. The performance target is calculated by dividing deter-
mined costs for ANS provision by the forecast traffic expected at European Union level. 
The target consists of a stepwise reduction of the average unit rate from €69.8 in 2009 to 
€53.92 in 2014. As from the second reference period, the determined unit rate for terminal 
air navigation services (encompassing the arrivals and departures to and from airports) 
will be used as the second indicator to set cost-efficiency targets.    
In order to ensure flexibility of performance targets in case of unexpected deviations 
from the forecast assumptions or unexpected events outside of the control of air naviga-
tion service providers, an alert mechanism has been established.102 For the first reference 
period, a deviation over a calendar year by at least 10% of the actual traffic recorded or of 
the actual costs at EU-wide level, compared to the respective forecasts, will activate this 
mechanism, allowing the European Commission to propose appropriate action, including a 
revision of targets if necessary. 
Assessment of performance plans by the European Commission 
Based on the performance indicators listed above, national supervisory authorities of 
member states were required to submit their national or FAB performance plan to the 
European Commission by the end of June 2011. Mandatory performance targets at na-
tional/FAB level consistent with the EU-wide targets were to be defined for the key per-
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  See article 18 of the Commission Regulation (EU) No 691/2010. 
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formance areas of capacity and cost-efficiency only, as no safety targets were set by the 
Commission and as the environment target for RP1 is addressed by the Network Man-
agement function. The respective performance plan is expected to be available in spring 
2012.  
On behalf of the European Commission, the Performance Review Body (PRB) of 
the Single European Sky analyzed the 26 national and two FAB performance plans for 
consistency with the EU-wide performance targets.103 Overall, the PRB is satisfied with 
the punctual adoption and submission of performance plans and with the fact that, collec-
tively, they are “not too far from the EU-wide targets for RP1” (Eurocontrol 2011: 2). Ca-
pacity targets reach a 0.76 minute delay per flight, instead of the EU target of 0.5 minute 
per flight; the collective cost-efficiency target for 2014 falls short of the EU-wide target 
by +2.4%. However, in most performance plans the PRB has identified opportunities for 
further improvements in these areas and also expects positive contributions from the ac-
tivities of the Network Management function. With a view to the second reference period, 
stronger coordination and cooperation in the framework of functional airspace blocks ac-
companied by the development of performance plans at FAB level instead of national 
level is seen to bring additional benefits and provide for better overall consistency. Those 
member states that will be asked to revise their performance plan based on the PRB as-
sessment have the possibility to do so within two months of the issuance of the respective 
recommendation, followed by a second Commission review.      
First deployment activities in the context of the European ATM Master Plan 
Parallel to the ongoing ‘development phase’ of SESAR, a first implementation package 
(IP1) is currently being deployed, which is scheduled to be completed by 2013. This first 
package is intended to introduce first operational improvements to enable the transition 
from the present fragmented ATM infrastructure to the future harmonized and modernized 
air traffic management system (European Commission 2009: 2). To a large extent this 
package consists of ongoing activities in the framework of Eurocontrol. Respective de-
ployment is supported by technical and operational implementing rules and community 
specifications, defining EU-wide system standards. An IP1 Steering Group was estab-
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lished to ensure a coordinated implementation of the 80 improvement steps foreseen in the 
package. One of the main challenges is the alignment of IP1 with the investment and de-
ployment plans of air navigation service providers, the more so as the steering group does 
not possess a legal basis to enforce steering measures (European Commission 2011d: 
24f.). As a consequence, the proportion of improvements already deployed, or planned to 
be deployed, is rather low. The European Commission is therefore going to make propos-
als to increase the efficacy of the steering group, amongst others by providing “soft en-
forcement”, e.g. by applying the performance scheme (ICB 2011a). Moreover, the Com-
mission has recently initialized a consultation process concerning its propositions for the 
implementation of an effective governance structure for the official ‘deployment phase’ of 
SESAR, expected to start in 2014 (ICB 2011b). 
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3 CASE STUDY: THE FUNCTIONAL AIRSPACE BLOCK EUROPE 
CENTRAL (FABEC) 
Chapter introduction and summary 
In this chapter the case that will be subject to analysis is introduced: the Functional Air-
space Block Europe Central (FABEC). As FABEC covers the area with the highest den-
sity in European air traffic, FABEC is paramount when intending to establish a functional 
air traffic management system beyond national borders. Based on overriding SES regula-
tions, FABEC was initialized by a feasibility study, which in a very comprehensive man-
ner outlines the problems associated with the current ATM setup and identifies those areas 
where further cooperation and integration between FABEC states and ANSPs would be 
beneficial to the overall ATM system. Institutional models for air navigation service pro-
viders and governance options are also discussed. The feasibility study concludes that 
FABEC is “feasible and necessary” (FABEC 2008a: 113). On the basis of this study, the 
implementation of FABEC is currently ongoing. First institutional steps were taken by 
signing a FABEC Treaty and two memoranda of cooperation between national supervi-
sory authorities and air navigation service providers. With regard to the concrete steps of 
functional cooperation and integration the principle achievements can be observed firstly 
in the technical domain, where, for example, common specifications have been elaborated 
on for specific ATM system components, and secondly in the area of training, where bi- 
and multilateral collaboration has intensified. However, major challenges prevail when 
looking at airspace redesign and when it comes to finding specific institutional arrange-
ments between air navigation service providers that go beyond simple forms of coopera-
tion.        
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3.1 Why FABEC? 
As discussed earlier, the regulatory framework for the creation of the Single European Sky 
places an obligation upon EU member states and those third countries associated to the 
EU by aviation agreements, such as Switzerland, to set up arrangements for the establish-
ment of functional airspace blocks. The states concerned have subsequently joined to-
gether in a total number of nine FAB initiatives (see figure 1), which are currently under 
development albeit at different stages of progress.104 The initiative chosen for this analysis 
is the Functional Airspace Block Europe Central. It includes the airspace above Belgium, 
France, Germany, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, and Switzerland. FABEC may be con-
sidered one of the most significant projects in the Single Sky context. It encompasses the 
‘core area’ of Europe, featuring the highest density of air traffic over the continent and ac-
commodating the majority of busy European airports, such as Paris, Frankfurt, Amster-
dam, Munich, and Zurich (FABEC 2008a: 24). With regard to the baseline objectives of 
SES to increase system capacity and reduce delays while simultaneously enhancing the 
safety levels, the success of FABEC is critical. In addition, out of the nine FAB programs 
FABEC is one of the more advanced in institutional terms. Only two north European func-
tional airspace blocks, which are both composed of only two member states, the UK-
Ireland FAB and the Danish-Swedish FAB, have progressed further.105 From a theoretical 
point of view, the involvement of six states of different size, historical backgrounds, po-
litical systems, and membership status in the European Union, may contribute to different 
perspectives and thus preference intensities in respect of air traffic management integra-
tion. Hence, it appears consistent to focus the study on that specific FAB initiative. 
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Figure 1: Functional airspace block initiatives in the framework of SES (source: Jarzembowski 2011) 
3.2 Current air traffic management in the FABEC airspace 
Civil air traffic operating within the FABEC airspace is managed from 14 air traffic con-
trol centers that belong to 6 different air navigation service providers (FABEC 2008a: 33). 
There are 5 national ANSPs providing area control service in their respective airspace, 
whereas in some cases, services in specified areas are delegated to a foreign ANSP. The 
Swiss provider, for example, controls more than 40% of its flights in adjacent foreign air-
space.106 The only exception is the Maastricht Upper Area Control Center (MUAC), a 
multinational center operated by Eurocontrol. With regard to operational/military air traf-
fic (OAT), service provision in some countries is strongly integrated with their civil coun-
terpart; in other countries, organizational separation exists between the two. 
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Country ANSPs Civil ACC units Military ATC 
Belgium Belgocontrol Brussels 
Provided by Belgian Defense in 
dedicated mil airspace(separated 
from civil ANS) 
France 
Direction des Services 
de la Navigation Aé-
rienne (DSNA) 
Bordeaux  
Brest 
Marseille 
Paris 
Reims 
Provided by DIRCAM (separated 
from, but coordinated with civil 
ANS) 
Germany Deutsche Flugsicherung GmbH (DFS) 
Bremen 
Karlsruhe  
Langen  
Munich 
Provided by DFS (except for mil 
aerodromes) 
Luxembourg 
L’Administration de la 
Navigation Aérienne 
(ANA) 
--- --- 
The Netherlands Air Traffic Control The Netherlands (LVNL) Amsterdam 
Provided by the Royal Nether-
lands Air Force in dedicated mil 
airspace(separated from civil 
ANS) 
Switzerland 
Skyguide (Schweizeri-
sche Aktiengesellschaft 
für Flugsicherung) 
Geneva  
Zurich 
Provided by Skyguide 
Multinational 
Eurocontrol/Maastricht 
Upper Area Control 
Center (MUAC) 
Maastricht 
DFS unit collocated to provide 
ANS to OAT in German MUAC 
airspace 
Table 4: Civil and military air navigation service provision in the FABEC area (2011) 
As was elaborated earlier, the current organizational setup of ATM results in a fragmented 
system in most of the relevant aspects of the domain. Operational concepts and airspace 
design around national boundaries are not aligned to allow for optimized traffic flows; the 
diversity of individually procured and maintained technology precludes interoperability 
and an optimal maintenance and development of technical systems; support and adminis-
trative functions are multiplied; training standards are incompatible in some areas, and 
contingency procedures are only locally applicable. A certain degree of harmonization has 
been achieved by previously existing regulation and standardization in the framework of 
ICAO and Eurocontrol, or recently through increasing regulation at EU level by SES im-
plementing rules. This is particularly the case in respect of technological standards, opera-
tional procedures, and safety management (FABEC 2008a: 42ff.). 
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3.3 Initiation of FABEC: The FABEC Feasibility Study 
3.3.1 Definition of FABEC objectives 
The FABEC program was initialized by a feasibility study launched in 2006 and com-
pleted in September 2008, involving the civil and military authorities as well as the desig-
nated air navigation service providers of the six states. The United Kingdom was also in-
vited as a cooperative partner to ensure connectivity of FABEC to UK airspace and par-
ticularly to the high-density airports in the London area. The study is based on the as-
sumption that the predictable future will see a continuous growth in air traffic demand, in-
creasing importance of cost-effectiveness due to pressures from airspace users, the envi-
ronmental impact of aviation increasingly becoming a significant issue, and – most impor-
tantly – the requirement to maintain or even enhance safety levels (FABEC 2008a: 42). 
The objective of the feasibility study was to identify possible areas of cooperation with a 
view to addressing these factors and enhancing ATM performance respectively, and to 
propose an implementation plan towards FABEC (ibid., 24). Corresponding performance 
objectives were defined as a baseline reference to the study. These objectives include the 
following (ibid., 43ff.): 
• Overall safety shall be improved through low-complexity airspace design 
and procedures and by widespread introduction of advanced controller 
tools, including planning and conflict resolution assistance as well as 
monitoring devices used as safety nets; moreover, the uniform applica-
tion of safety and risk assessment methodologies and an integrated safety 
management system shall enable comprehensive safety oversight and 
sharing of experience following safety relevant incidents.   
• ATM capacity shall be ensured so as to keep delay at a maximum of one 
minute per flight, even in the face of growing air traffic; apart from re-
designing airspace and increasingly using controller support tools and 
automation, as under development in the framework of SESAR, this can 
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be achieved by enhanced coordination of air traffic flows at FABEC net-
work level. 
• Horizontal flight efficiency shall be increased by implementing more di-
rect routes to realize a reduction of route extensions by 10 kilometers 
within FABEC; currently, the FABEC states Switzerland, Germany, Bel-
gium, and France feature excessive route extensions from the optimum 
trajectory that are mainly associated to airway network design and to the 
geographical location of military training areas.107 
• Cost efficiency shall be increased to achieve a 17% reduction in en-route 
unit rates; this is expected to be possible by generally reducing fragmen-
tation and multiplication of functions in the provision of ANS, whereas 
the delay costs versus the cost of providing ATM capacity need also to be 
taken into account.    
• The effectiveness of military missions shall be improved; the intent here 
is to accommodate air force training requirements, accessibility of train-
ing areas, and mission readiness status. 
• Environmental impact shall be reduced; this is closely connected to hori-
zontal flight efficiency (see above). 
3.3.2 Areas of cooperation identified by the study 
The feasibility study endeavors to anticipate the developments in the abovementioned ar-
eas in both a FABEC- and a non-FABEC scenario, taking into account other improvement 
initiatives already ongoing, or those which have been scheduled independent from the 
FABEC program. To fulfill the listed objectives, the study identifies several areas of co-
operation that would significantly increase ATM performance in the FABEC area.108 They 
are subsequently described in brief. 
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  See Eurocontrol (2008a): 56f. 
108
  See FABEC (2008a): 48ff. 
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Development of a common operational concept 
The operational concept is the basis for executing air traffic management functions. It de-
scribes by which methods and based on what technology, airspace design, procedures, and 
information air navigation services are carried out. It covers all operational phases in 
ATM from strategic planning to tactical air traffic control. Four elements to be addressed 
in the common concept are put in focus by the feasibility study:  
• Common information management, which encompasses the seamless ex-
change of information between all stakeholders in the ATM system, in-
cluding airspace users; relevant information includes real-time flight plan 
data, real-time and predicted air traffic situation, air traffic demand and 
ATM capacity information, as well as weather information. Using this in-
formation, strategic and tactical air traffic management related decisions 
can be taken in the framework of collaborative decision-making (CDM). 
• Common airspace organization and management, involving airspace de-
sign regardless of national boundaries, the establishment of cross-border, 
modular and dynamic military training areas, the introduction of a multi-
ple choice route network with direct connectivity between major airports, 
and the implementation of cross-border air traffic control sectors to en-
sure efficient traffic flows. 
• Demand and capacity balancing to make best use of overall ATM capac-
ity in the FABEC area, effected by means of centralized air traffic flow 
management and through realization of modular and flexibly adaptable 
air traffic control sectors based on traffic demand. 
• Common introduction of increased automation in air traffic control to as-
sist the air traffic controller in managing the aircraft under his responsi-
bility; this comprises automated tools designed for conflict detection and 
resolution, monitoring aids to detect deviations from flight trajectories, 
data-link communication between air traffic control and flight crews, 
and, in the longer term, anticipated traffic synchronization and de-
confliction. 
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In the framework of the feasibility study, a step-by-step implementation plan has been de-
veloped to realize the common operational concept over the entire FABEC evolution 
phase.109 
Airspace design at FAB level 
As was indicated above, a commonly agreed airspace design is one of the crucial enablers 
of a functional airspace block. It is the prerequisite for an optimized airway network and 
allows for the establishment of cross-border air traffic control sectors in accordance with 
traffic flow demands and to put sector boundaries including handover points in areas of 
low complexity. It facilitates placing military training areas in a manner compatible with 
the civil ATS route structure; evidently the integration of military stakeholders, both in the 
study and in the entire FABEC program, is vital in order to achieve a workable solution in 
this respect. 
The feasibility study shows that there is room for improvement in the cross-border 
route network design in terms of horizontal flight efficiency. It can even be enhanced fur-
ther by coordination with adjacent FABs. One major issue of the study proved to be the 
definition of military training areas that accommodate the operational requirements of na-
tional air forces. The intention to locate such areas in so-called ‘white spots’, areas of 
lower civil traffic density, appears inconsistent with military needs. The study stipulates 
that “a balance between civil and military requirements needs to be established” (FABEC 
2008a: 57).  
The feasibility study also looks at various options of designing air traffic control 
sectors. The goal is to arrange control sectors in such a way that traffic flow patterns and 
flight profiles are taken into account and traffic loads are manageable in a safe and effi-
cient manner. A modular and flexible approach to sector layout will be required when 
considering the implementation of so-called ‘tailored routes’ that allow airspace users to 
choose their preferred flight trajectory according to operational and meteorological re-
quirements, as opposed to using a fixed airway structure. One of the main challenges here 
is that in an established route network the number of conflict points is controllable, 
whereas a user-preferred routing system would result in a multiplication of conflicts that 
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are difficult to anticipate, thus requiring respective conflict detection tools to render them 
manageable. 
In the study framework, three transnational hotspot areas within FABEC featuring 
high traffic density and complexity were addressed and concepts developed with regard to 
airspace and sector design.110 These concepts could be implemented as a short-term meas-
ure and as a first step to a more comprehensive reorganization of airspace. They would al-
low for a reduction of complexity and conflicts and for a more balanced distribution of 
sector workload. One precondition to airspace optimizations of this kind is to reduce in-
centives to airspace users to plan their routings through controlled airspace with lower en-
route unit rates. This would imply a certain alignment of the significantly diverging en-
route unit rates of air navigation service providers (see figure 4). 
Common technical approach 
Another relevant area of cooperation to reduce fragmentation and increase ATM perform-
ance is the technical domain. The feasibility study identifies several opportunities in the 
areas of specification of functional and non-functional requirements, procurement, devel-
opment and maintenance service of common technical (sub-)systems, including training. 
Respective cooperation is essential to be able to attain the level of interoperability and 
automation within FABEC in accordance with the common operational concept. More-
over, this will provide the possibility to pool technical expertise available in the different 
air navigation service providers and to create the leverage required to foster the relevant 
technological developments in the ATM supply industry. A technical systems roadmap111 
has been integrated with the abovementioned implementation plan of the common opera-
tional concept. One of the challenges is to ensure a smooth migration from the current 
technical framework to the advanced system landscape of the future, thereby progressively 
accommodating the evolving operational requirements and technological possibilities. The 
study also emphasizes that these efforts need to be in line with the SESAR program.112 
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  See sub-section 2.2.4. 
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Common safety management 
According to the feasibility study, a common FABEC safety management system (SMS) 
is closely linked to the institutional model of ANSP cooperation.113 Currently, each air 
navigation service provider has its own safety certificate under SES regulations, with re-
sponsibilities that cannot be shared. A common SMS will only be possible as soon as in-
stitutional arrangements allow for the centralization of ANSP functions. Nevertheless, the 
study proposes to begin preparations for a common safety management structure through 
various stages, starting off with a FABEC Safety Management Office, which incremen-
tally could take over additional safety functions with increased ANSP cooperation. 
Common charging 
As indicated above, the current differences in cost structures and consequently en-route 
unit rates (see figure 4), as well as the distribution of route charges between air navigation 
service providers, may constitute a hindrance to implementing a functional airway net-
work, since they create an incentive to airspace users to proceed along the ‘cheapest’ 
route, as well as an incentive to ANSPs to ensure keeping routes within their area of re-
sponsibility, thereby competing for traffic. One option consequently proposed in the feasi-
bility study is to establish a single charging zone for the entire FABEC area, implying a 
single unit rate, and to divide the collected revenues among the participating ANSPs in the 
ratio of their individual cost bases. An identified problem with such an arrangement is that 
airspace users predominantly operating in relatively ‘cheap’ airspace today would be dis-
advantaged, as the single unit rate is expected to be higher on average. It is thus suggested 
that mechanisms be found for a certain convergence of unit rates. Furthermore, disparities 
in national taxation and charging exemption rules need to be taken into consideration. In 
any case, the feasibility study proposes that the single charging zone should be imple-
mented before introducing operational improvements in airspace design.  
Cooperation in the area of training 
Alongside with increased cooperation and integration in the operational and technical do-
mains, it will become necessary to develop common training standards and a common 
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training organization. The feasibility study recognizes opportunities to increase staff mo-
bility across FABEC, also in respect of job attractiveness. Training cooperation is seen as 
an evolutionary process following integrative steps in other areas. It may range from shar-
ing of information and materials, through definition of common recruiting and selection 
standards, development and definition of common course and training contents, the use of 
standardized training tools such as simulators to implementing a single training organiza-
tion. However, the provision of training services from one single FABEC unit is not ad-
vised, in order to retain the connection to local operational units which ultimately are the 
‘customers’ of training. This is to ensure the sufficient availability of instructors and to 
possibly enable the distribution of specific competences among various training units. 
Common aeronautical and meteorological information management 
In the framework of the feasibility study, integrated FABEC concepts were developed 
with regard to both aeronautical information services (AIS) and meteorological services 
(MET). The study concluded that a combined networked and centralized approach featur-
ing coordinated data collection at the local level whilst carrying out the harmonization, 
production and distribution of data centrally would be favorable; this would ensure the 
correct availability and integration of information in accordance with the requirements 
provided by the common operational concept.  
Common contingency management 
The feasibility study also looks into the possibility of creating common procedures in case 
of disruptive events that could result in the failure of one or several air traffic control 
units, or in the unserviceability of respective airspace. Benefits from cooperation in this 
area are mainly expected in terms of the potential for continuously ensuring service provi-
sion, albeit at a lower overall capacity level. According to the proposed contingency con-
cept, this could be achieved by making available ‘regional’ backup facilities that would 
each serve a specific number of air traffic control centers. Such a solution, however, 
would require alignment of technical center infrastructures.  
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3.3.3 Options for ANSP cooperation 
In order to be able to fully exploit the possibilities for cooperation and integration, the 
FABEC feasibility study investigates the various options of establishing new institutional-
ized structures for air navigation service provision in the FABEC area. Five possible lev-
els of cooperation between ANSPs – increasing from one level to the next – were defined 
(FABEC 2008a: 75ff.): 
Level of 
coop. 
Institutional 
model 
Legal and financial 
status of ANSPs 
Decision-making 
status of ANSPs 
Level of functional 
cooperation 
1 Exchange of in-formation Independent Autonomous 
Mutual exchange of 
information in all rele-
vant areas 
2 Coordination Independent Autonomous Joint coordination of plans 
3 Contractual co-
operation Independent 
Cooperation and joint decision-making in speci-
fied areas 
4 
Integration  
(‘alliance 
model’) 
Creation of joint organizations in specified areas 
5 Consolidation Single supranational air navigation service provider 
Table 5: Possible options for ANSP institutional models in FABEC 
As shown in table 5 above, full financial, legal and decision-making autonomy is retained 
at cooperation levels 1 and 2. At the third level of cooperation, ANSPs agree to take joint 
decisions in specific areas, while still remaining autonomous organizations. No formalized 
joint structures are created here. However, at the fourth cooperation level ANSPs establish 
common organizational structures in specified domains, resulting in a partial loss of 
autonomy in those areas. The study refers to this level as the ‘alliance model’. The number 
and/or quality of functional areas integrated within such joint structures may gradually in-
crease. Finally, the ‘consolidation’ level corresponds to a single air navigation service 
provider, or to a supranational organization that owns the national air navigation service 
providers. Hence, no autonomy rests with individual ANSPs. However, it is possible that 
certain ATS functions may not be integrated into FABEC, such as local aerodrome control 
services.  
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As the formation of institutionalized cooperation structures is only necessary for levels 3 
to 5, only these three cooperation levels were further analyzed by the FABEC feasibility 
study (FABEC 2008a: 76). The study concludes that most of the improvement areas iden-
tified do not necessarily require the establishment of centralized executive units, but can 
be implemented by each individual ANSP following a joint decision. However, there are 
exceptions, such as air traffic flow and capacity management (ATFCM), or when intend-
ing to centralize ancillary and support functions or to establish joint ATS units, namely 
common air traffic control centers. Consequently, the alliance model would support all 
improvement opportunities, as it is able to allow for both pure joint decision-making and 
institutional integration of specific functional areas. The feasibility study thus proposes a 
gradual increase of cooperation, beginning with a contractual cooperation situation to gen-
erate first improvement possibilities, and to subsequently move towards an alliance model 
that would enable a continuous development of the number and quality of functional areas 
managed centrally. Finally, a single ANSP may add to the potential for increasing overall 
ATM performance and hence might become an optional final step of this evolutionary 
process. Given the vast institutional changes associated with the single ANSP model, it is 
not considered realistic as an immediately available scenario. The study displays a rough 
roadmap of a possible integration process and suggests attaining a functional alliance 
structure for FABEC by 2013.        
The study develops three possible options for military ANSP involvement in a co-
operation structure as previously described: a ‘minimum’ model, based on harmonization 
of rules and procedures; a ‘pragmatic’ model, involving close partnership between civil 
and military ANSPs; and a rather visionary ‘optimum’ model, where civil and military air 
traffic management are integrated in one ANSP (FABEC 2008a: 84). According to the 
study, military ANSPs would consider any of these options feasible as long as the military 
requirements can be fulfilled in accordance with state obligations. 
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3.3.4 State governance 
Any ANSP cooperation model needs to be embedded in a formalized governance structure 
at nation state level as air traffic management remains a sovereign function, especially 
when considering military involvement. This implies the establishment of a high level pol-
icy body composed of civil and military state representatives related to air traffic man-
agement. This body shall, amongst others, be responsible for coordinating approval of 
changes to airspace design, or defining common policies on airspace management, air traf-
fic flow and capacity management, and airspace classifications (FABEC 2008a: 92). For 
the ANSP alliance model, the study envisages a coordination structure of the following 
kind (ibid., 85):114 
  
Figure 2: Possible coordination structure assumed for an ANSP alliance model  
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Further elements have been identified as enablers and preconditions to be ascertained by 
FABEC states (FABEC 2008a: 92f.). To allow for transnational air traffic services, states 
are advised to approve cross-border ATS delegation agreements between designated na-
tional air navigation service providers and to permit military ANSPs to enter such agree-
ments. A liability regime needs to be established to cover for damage from accidents and 
incidents in delegated airspaces. National license specifications for ATS staff require har-
monization. A FABEC-wide harmonized supervisory regime has to be implemented, im-
plying increased cooperation between national supervisory authorities. Moreover, a com-
mon ‘Just Culture’ philosophy should be pursued to provide a sound basis for sharing ex-
periences and learning from safety relevant incidents.  
3.3.5 Performance assessment for FABEC and conclusions of the feasibility study 
Expected FABEC performance was assessed and compared against the objectives stated 
earlier.115 In addition, a cost-benefit analysis was carried out, taking into account a refer-
ence case where integration in the framework of FABEC would not be realized, but cur-
rent improvement initiatives continue. Overall, the study concludes that all the FABEC 
long-term objectives can be met in all areas if pursued. This particularly applies to the ar-
eas of capacity and flight efficiency and thus in regard to environmental impact reduction. 
Also the cost-benefit analysis is positive. Airspace users are expected to benefit indirectly 
from synergies and general defragmentation in air navigation service provision, and di-
rectly from increased capacity and reduced delays brought about by FABEC (FABEC 
2008a: 98ff.). The final conclusion of the feasibility study is that FABEC is “feasible and 
necessary” (ibid., 113).   
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3.4 Implementation of FABEC (as of October 2011) 
3.4.1 Organizational and institutional framework 
After completion of the feasibility study end of June 2008, the FABEC project setup es-
tablished for the purpose of elaborating the study was adapted to be able to continue the 
work along the proposed implementation plan. This organizational structure has been par-
tially amended as of 19 October 2011 (see below). Until then, overall strategic direction 
for FABEC development was provided by the High Level Implementation Board (HLIB), 
composed of the national directors general of civil aviation and their military counterparts, 
as well as of the chief executive officers of the air navigation service providers. The HLIB 
was politically guided by the States Strategic Board (SSB), which only included the re-
spective state representatives. The FABEC Project Steering Group (FPSG) consisted of 
the relevant strategic advisors at state and ANSP level and had both a coordination and 
support function on behalf of the HLIB. Several task forces were created to address the 
various topics in the project; specialized state task forces were concerned with those as-
pects related to sovereignty, such as ANSP supervision or liability. They worked under the 
authority of the 6 States FABEC Group (6SFPG), involving the strategic advisors at state 
level only. The technical and operational task forces and working groups have not been 
replaced by the new structure. They report to Standing Committees (SC) established for 
each relevant ANSP management domain (safety, environment, operations, technical, hu-
man resources, finance, and legal/institutional). These, in turn, are subordinate to the 
ANSP Strategic Board (ASB), which is composed of the CEOs of the participating air 
navigation service providers, and offers strategic guidance in these areas.   
On 18 November 2008, the civil and military state representatives signed a declara-
tion of intent116 to establish a functional airspace block in accordance with the proposals 
made in the feasibility study and with the aim of improving the overall ATM situation in 
the FABEC area. It stipulates the intention to draft an agreement between FABEC mem-
                                                        
116
  See FABEC (2008b). 
The Functional Airspace Block Europe Central 
  
95 
ber states by 2010 in order to create a flexible institutional framework within which the 
continuous and gradual evolution of FABEC in line with commonly agreed steps of inte-
gration should take place (article 13). The declaration of intent stresses the fact that na-
tional sovereignty, with regard to national airspace and the responsibilities of states in re-
spect of supervision, security, and defense matters, remains unaffected (article 2f). On the 
same date, ANSP representatives signed an ANSP Framework Agreement117 in order to be 
able to implement the first step of institutionalized ANSP cooperation as proposed in the 
feasibility study.118 In December 2009, the agreement was complemented by a common 
tendering procedure.119 
The FABEC Treaty120 – as envisaged in the states’ declaration of intent – was signed 
in Brussels (Belgium) on 2 December 2010. This treaty formally establishes the Func-
tional Airspace Block Europe Central and defines a state governance structure in the body 
of the FABEC Council. The treaty explicitly does not create an international organization 
with international legal personality (article 2.2) and does not intend to affect the sover-
eignty of contracting states (article 4). However, it places an obligation upon states to 
commit themselves to cooperation in all areas considered to be relevant for the successful 
implementation of a functional airspace block.121 It further defines the framework for in-
stitutional, technical and operational arrangements in regard to air navigation service pro-
vision. It does not, however, define any specific options to be followed in this respect. In a 
more concrete manner, article 30 of the treaty establishes a liability regime and regulates 
the relevant compensations in case of damage sustained in the course of air navigation 
service provision. Disputes between contracting states relating to the provisions in the 
treaty are to be referred to the FABEC Council, or, if no solution can be found, to arbitra-
tion (article 32). The FABEC Treaty is currently undergoing the ratification process, the 
completion of which is expected by 2012. 
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On 27 January 2011, the national supervisory authorities of the six FABEC states signed a 
memorandum of cooperation122 with the aim of strengthening their cooperation and ena-
bling proactive exchange of information, particularly with regard to oversight over inte-
grated and cross-border functions within FABEC. 
In May 2011, the directors general of civil aviation of the six FABEC states adopted 
the Declaration of Matterhorn,123 requiring the ANSPs to deliver a common ‘Airspace 
Plan’ to increase ATM performance in the upper and lower airspace, particularly between 
major hub airports. ANSPs are also requested to address the diverting evolution of ANSP 
operating costs and to define measures to minimize the differences. Moreover, the declara-
tion announces the establishment of a provisional FABEC Council until the FABEC 
Treaty comes into force and the introduction of a financially and functionally independent 
FABEC States Bureau, including a Permanent Secretary, to support the Council.  
The FABEC Council, the governing body of FABEC established by the treaty, is 
tasked to ensure the implementation of the treaty and the fulfillment of the general FA-
BEC objectives (article 22 of the FABEC Treaty). It is composed of one civil and one 
military representative of each contracting state. Decisions in the FABEC Council have to 
be carried by all states (unanimous vote according to article 23.2). Four standing commit-
tees, the Airspace Committee, the Harmonization and Advisory Committee, the Financial 
and Performance Committee, and the National Supervisory Authorities Committee, assist 
the Council in its work. An Air Navigation Service Consultative Board provides the link 
to the air navigation service providers in the FABEC area. As noted above, this organiza-
tional structure was implemented on 19 October 2011 on a provisional basis, in anticipa-
tion of the final ratification of the FABEC Treaty.124 The new bodies have replaced the 
SSB, the HLIB, and other committees with state involvement. In addition, the FABEC 
States Bureau was established. The organizational setup at ANSP level remains un-
changed for the moment.  
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3.4.2 Technical work 
In the framework of the various task forces established by the project organization, work 
is being pursued in the operational, technical and institutional domains which are to be 
further developed within FABEC. On the operational side, a strong focus is put on air-
space redesign, also with a view to enabling short-term benefits to airspace users (see fig-
ure 3). The cross-border high complexity hotspots originally identified in the feasibility 
study were redefined and the scope of work broadened to include, for example, the Chan-
nel interface towards airspace of the United Kingdom and a simplified and more effective 
airway network during the night with lower traffic volumes.125 The latter was imple-
mented in 2010. One important element with regard to civil-military cooperation is the 
endeavor to establish large-scale cross-border military training areas (CBAs) that will pos-
sibly allow removing those which are currently located in less favorable positions in terms 
of civil traffic flows. ‘Most penalized city pairs’ have been determined with the objective 
to introduce more direct routings between major airports, where airlines today have to face 
significant detours due to inefficient route structures. First improvements have been 
achieved for the city pair of Paris and Munich.126 Based on the state mandate of the Decla-
ration of Matterhorn to develop a common Airspace Plan, the FABEC ANSPs presented a 
respective concept in September 2011.127 According to this, a ‘free-route airspace’ shall be 
established over the greatest possible FABEC area, connected to the fixed-route network 
by a ‘transition airspace’, particularly linking the ‘top 5’ terminal control areas of Paris, 
Frankfurt, Amsterdam, London, and Munich. The framework conditions for implementa-
tion of this airspace strategy are yet to be defined and will touch on a number institutional, 
legal and financial issues related to cross-border operations. Furthermore, the harmonized 
application of the Flexible Use of Airspace concept between civil and military airspace 
users, including priority rules, will be required. All current and future airspace design pro-
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jects are to be evaluated against the new strategy. The detailing of the framework condi-
tions and of the implementation roadmap is expected by February/March 2012. 
 
Figure 3: Current FABEC airspace redesign projects (source: FABEC 2011d) 
In the technical domain, work is ongoing in the areas of voice and data-link communica-
tion, surveillance, and data management; this includes efforts towards a common FABEC 
data and information infrastructure and towards enhanced interoperability of flight plan 
data processing systems. For example, the French provider DSNA and Maastricht UAC 
are introducing a common voice communication system based on common FABEC speci-
fications.128 In mid-2010, a cooperation agreement on basic training for air traffic control-
lers was established, offering the possibility to jointly provide training in line with com-
mon training standards and to coordinate available training capacity.129 Another relevant 
area of work is the possible implementation of a common FABEC air traffic flow and ca-
pacity and airspace management (ATFCM/ASM) function. A live trial was conducted in 
summer 2011; however, despite several lessons learned in terms of procedures and tool 
functionalities, it is still unclear whether establishing a separate ATFCM function for FA-
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BEC beneath the respective Eurocontrol structure is appropriate, as it only may constitute 
an additional coordination layer.130 In March 2011, FABEC received a €13.8 million fund-
ing in the framework of the European Union TEN-T (Trans-European Transport Network) 
fund to financially support specific FABEC activities. 
In compliance with the Single European Sky Performance Regulation, a FABEC 
performance plan was elaborated, setting performance targets in the key performance ar-
eas of ‘capacity’, ‘environment’, and partially ‘safety’. As no single unit rate is established 
within FABEC, the cost-efficiency KPA was addressed by the respective national per-
formance plans (see figure 4). The assessment by the Performance Review Body of the 
Single European Sky established that the FABEC delay target is not sufficiently consistent 
with the EU-wide capacity target for 2014 and lacks the specification of accountabilities 
of individual air navigation service providers as to their contribution to capacity perform-
ance; moreover, capacity improvement potentials through cooperation within FABEC 
were not addressed.131 The plan will have to be revised accordingly.  
 
Figure 4: Determined target unit rates (in €) of FABEC members in RP1 (source: FABEC 2011a: 44) 
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  See Genao (2011). 
131
  See Eurocontrol (2011). 
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3.4.3 Overall implementation status of FABEC 
According to the FABEC newsletters132 and internal progress reports,133 main achieve-
ments with regard to cooperation in the FABEC context can in particular be observed in 
the domains related to technical developments and training (see above). On the other hand, 
most issues blocking further advancement appear to be present in the areas of airspace de-
sign and in terms of concrete steps of functional integration. According to the recent pro-
gress reports, the two airspace redesign projects that are close to the implementation phase 
show a ‘red’ project status. No additional thrust is visible from the ‘free-route’ airspace 
strategy, which is still in a very conceptual stage of development.  
 
                                                        
132
  Available online at www.fabec.eu. 
133
  Available from the author; no public dissemination.  
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4 METHODOLOGICAL APPROACH 
Chapter introduction and summary 
In order to be able to establish the most influential variables affecting the development of 
FABEC integration, the hypotheses stipulated in section 1.4 are subjected to empirical test-
ing. The corresponding research design is described in this chapter. It also includes both the 
operationalization of theoretical concepts and the instructions of how to acquire the relevant 
data sets to conduct the analysis. While testing of the ‘liberal-intergovernmentalist’ hy-
potheses is based on inter-state comparisons at one specific point in time, referring to the 
period at and after the date of signing the FABEC Treaty (including present time), the ‘su-
pranationalist’ hypothesis requires the comparison of timeframes that are defined by the 
two main legislative packages SES I and SES II. It is believed that by assessing controver-
sial theoretical approaches and thus influencing factors, internal validity of the study is suf-
ficiently high, whereas the specificity of the domain under investigation limits the generali-
zation of findings. Due to their multi-dimensionality, operationalization of the various theo-
retical concepts partially bears a significant complexity. Because a major part of indicators 
is perception-based, data acquisition is largely conducted through an online interview with 
those stakeholders that are by their role generally accredited substantial influence on the 
progress of FABEC integration. On the other side, European Union treaties and legislation 
are the sources of information examined to determine EU competences and activities in the 
field of air traffic management. 
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4.1 Research design 
4.1.1 Procedure for hypothesis evaluation 
To develop the research design for this study, an assessment is required as to whether the 
theoretical concepts put in relation by the hypotheses are to be measured at the national, re-
gional or European level, and whether the proposed relationships can be evaluated by cross-
sectional or longitudinal analysis. In respect of the two liberal-intergovernmental hypothe-
ses 1a and 1b, domestic societal influence and governmental bargaining power are situated 
at the level of nation states. Consequently, the evaluation of these hypothetical relationships 
can be conducted by inter-state comparison between FABEC members at a single point in 
time. In other words, the national status in terms of domestic group influence and govern-
mental bargaining position are simultaneously assessed in selected FABEC states and com-
pared against the measured values of the respective dependent variables, governmental 
preference intensity and level of FABEC integration. As was shown earlier, only a FABEC 
Treaty is available for the time being, without any subsequent functionally relevant steps of 
integration. Thus the level of integration can at present only be determined from an institu-
tional perspective. Hence, the obvious moment of comparison is the timeframe encompass-
ing the signing of the FABEC Treaty. To obtain more clarity about the reasons behind a 
specific institutional outcome, the different stakeholders’ functional views on how much in-
tegration in terms of consolidation of ANSPs, air traffic control infrastructure, and ANS su-
pervision they would like to see, are also appraised. This should enable the estimation and 
prediction of the integrative potential present in FABEC. 
The European Union is the unit of analysis in the third hypothesis derived from su-
pranationalist theory, as it represents the supranational organization setting the regulatory 
framework for the functional airspace block initiatives, and consequently also for FABEC. 
Hence, supranational influence on the integration process at FAB level can only be evalu-
ated over time. Hypothesis testing will therefore be conducted by comparing variables in 
two subsequent timeframes. As was shown earlier, the Single European Sky has seen two 
major regulatory output phases: the initialization of the program by the SES I package in 
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2004, and an adaptation and intensification phase following SES II legislation in 2009. It 
appears practical to choose these two legislative peaks as basis for comparison as they mark 
the beginning of periods with increased regulatory activity in favor of integration. The hy-
pothesis suggests that the advancement of integration by the European Union is amplified 
even without adding competence or autonomy to the supranational organization. This 
means that, with regard to the independent variable, regulatory autonomy of the European 
Union needs to be assessed at the time of agenda setting and adoption of the respective SES 
regulations;134 the dependent variable, i.e. the density of supranational regulation, will be 
looked at within the timeframe covering the entire validity period of the SES I legislative 
package until the SES II legislative package came into force, and the validity period of SES 
II legislation from this point until present time.      
The result of this hypothesis evaluation is expected to demonstrate whether the pro-
posed relationships are valid in the context under analysis, and which attitudes and posi-
tions – including go or no-go factors in respect of FABEC integration – appear to be most 
salient. These positions can subsequently be put in relation to and assessed against the 
Commission’s integrative intentions, which ultimately permits an evaluation of the feasibil-
ity and efficacy of the FABEC initiative.   
4.1.2 Internal validity 
As the analysis of empirical data is based on past situations and events, a non-experimental 
ex-post-facto design is applied, combining cross-sectional and longitudinal analysis. The 
main shortfall of ex-post-facto designs is their potential lack of internal validity. Internal 
validity refers to the possibility to eliminate influencing factors which may have an effect 
on the dependent variable under study, other than those already taken into account. Unlike 
experimental designs, ex-post-facto studies do not allow for the systematic exclusion of 
third variables. It is therefore difficult to assess whether a determined effect can in fact be 
attributed to the examined circumstances.        
                                                        
134
 Note that regulatory autonomy of the Commission during SES implementation is based on respective SES 
regulations. 
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Processes of political integration are highly complex and subject to a large variety of differ-
ent influencing factors. This becomes apparent when considering the numerous theoretical 
strains which try to explain this phenomenon. Influencing variables may also differ from 
issue area to issue area. In order to obtain the results required to be able to respond to the 
research question, it is essential to cover as many integrative factors as possible that are 
relevant in the domain of European air traffic management. As stated earlier, not only the 
variables favoring integration are thereby to be taken into account, but especially those that 
may be hindering to the progress of integration. 
Political integration is the result of a series of political decisions that are taken at the 
national as well as at the inter- or supranational level. Since integration always implies the 
transfer of national competences to a supranational body, there is a requirement for gov-
ernments of respective nation states to, at some point, agree to specific integrative steps. In 
pluralist democracies, which constitute the prevailing political system in the geographical 
area relevant to this study, a domestic preference building process will precede government 
decisions related to an international topic. This process of preference formation will mainly 
involve those societal actors who have an interest or stake in the policy area under discus-
sion. In the very specialized field of air traffic management, a certain expert knowledge is 
required to understand the specific needs, conditions, and implications of cooperation and 
integration. There is thus a high probability that those actors who combine interests and 
specialized knowledge in the domain of ATM will be most active in attempting to control 
policy decision outcomes. The research design employed here allows for full consideration 
of relevant stakeholders. It also intends to differentiate between actors in terms of influenc-
ing capability, which is supposed to provide an indication as to the most prominent inter-
ested party in this domain. Consequently, it is important to make good use of this design 
capacity. Selection of stakeholders to be subjected to analysis is critical to obtain significant 
and comprehensive results.           
Next to domestic civil society, the proposed research design also takes the nation 
states’ governmental level into account, where first political decisions are taken in terms of 
international cooperation and integration. Comparison with the civil society level allows for 
the evaluation of domestic interest groups’ factual impact on these processes and compen-
sates for potential differences between nations in that regard. Government positions may 
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also be expected to reflect any previous decisions taken by a national legislative or judicial 
body that are pertinent to the respective cooperation/integration initiative, as well as addi-
tional societal influences or nationally relevant interests not incorporated in the study. Na-
tional governments can thus be seen as aggregation points of domestic opinions and there-
fore promise to be an efficient and valid source of information. Moreover, by considering 
the negotiation power of nations, governmental positions on integration are qualified in 
terms of their potential of finding their way into international cooperation or integration 
agreements, adding a further potential element of influence. 
Finally, the research design also puts in focus the supranational organization and its 
contingent capacity to advance integration independently from national influences. The ob-
jective is to examine to what extent the European Union can be seen as an autonomous ac-
tor promoting functional and community interests towards international policy coordination 
and integration. The third hypothesis135 suggests that the EU does not necessarily require 
additional competences transferred by member states in order to bring about an enhanced 
level of integration in the field of air traffic management. It is thus based on the assumption 
that there are in fact other variables at work, however none that is directly influenced by na-
tional governments. These variables would include existing path dependencies in the deci-
sion-making process as well as other factors emanating from the supranational level. A fur-
ther specification of such factors is not required as they are not relevant, particularly since 
this analysis is based on the notion that the European Union is always a promoter of inte-
gration. Any obstructive trends are therefore expected to appear at the level of nation states 
and/or domestic actors. In sum, the proposed research design covers an extensive number of 
potential influencing factors and thus enjoys a high degree of internal validity.  
4.1.3 External validity 
The assessment of external validity aims to determine whether the results of this study are 
universally applicable. As the present analysis involves a specific case study, it will not be 
possible to gain any insights from a statistical viewpoint that would be open for generaliza-
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  Hypothesis 2; see section 1.4. 
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tion. Moreover, the specificity of the policy domain and the actors involved will exclude 
generalized conclusions.  
Air traffic management is a policy area with several potentially conflicting perspec-
tives. On one hand, there appears to be general agreement that today’s ATM system is too 
fragmented and requires far-reaching harmonization and integration in order to cope with 
the future air traffic demand. Air transport is a highly important economic factor, ensuring 
global mobility of persons and goods. Even temporary interruptions of air transportation 
over a larger geographical area have an immediate and substantial impact on worldwide 
economy, as could be seen after the eruptive activity of Iceland’s volcano Eyjafjalla-
jökull.136 Air traffic management thus needs to be able to continuously fulfill its task as one 
of the basic enablers of air travel. On the other hand, due to its sovereign nature, the control 
of airspace is a politically sensitive issue. Besides, it is based on an infrastructure which has 
grown historically within a national context. Integration and cooperation at European level 
may require breaking up traditional structures, which may create defensive reactions 
amongst the actors and organizations concerned. In addition, as stated before, the policy 
area of ATM is a very specialized domain, which is generally not open to the public and re-
quires in-depth expertise to be fully apprehended in all its facets. It is of noticeably high 
complexity and of a safety critical nature. Any solutions need therefore to be exceedingly 
reliable and functionally realizable. This implies that normally only those actors who have 
the required knowledge and expertise at their disposal will be implicated.   
Both societal actors’ influencing and governmental negotiation power and the regula-
tory autonomy of the European Union largely depend on the characteristics of the issue area 
under examination. Furthermore, negotiation power is up to the nation states involved. The 
same applies to the influencing potential of interest groups. It is very unlikely that any other 
policy area will feature the same conditions and specific properties as the air traffic man-
agement sector. They may also differ between functional airspace blocks, whereas certain 
similarities between stakeholders’ positions are still to be expected. It is therefore advisable 
to mainly restrict the final conclusions of this study to FABEC, but to use them indicatively 
for other FAB initiatives. 
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  See Oxford Economics (2010). 
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4.2 Operationalization and methods of data acquisition 
In this section, the dependent and independent variables incorporated in the hypotheses out-
lined in section 1.4 are operationalized and thus defined in measurable terms. Operationali-
zation of the independent variables is based on the theoretical concepts specified in section 
1.3. Alongside, the methods by which the respective indicators are measured will be de-
scribed. 
4.2.1 General considerations on methods of data acquisition applied in this study 
The two principal methods used to acquire data relevant to this analysis are the qualitative 
examination of legal documents (treaties, international agreements, and EU law) and struc-
tured stakeholder interviews by means of an online questionnaire (see Appendix) with sub-
sequent qualitative analysis of responses. The main reason for the latter choice is that the 
theoretical concepts used in this study put a strong focus on the relevant actors involved in 
processes of integration. This applies in particular to liberal-intergovernmentalism where 
domestic societal actors and their preferences stand to the fore. As will be shown during 
operationalization, most of the dimensions of the independent variables heavily depend on 
individual perceptions. The best way to capture these perceptions is to retrieve them di-
rectly at the source. However, the challenge of this research project is that continuous de-
velopments are taking place in the process of this study. Although an ex-post-facto design 
is applied, the reference point chosen is always only an intermediate step of an ongoing 
evolution. The difficulty is to find the ‘correct’ point of measurement. Yet, if information 
about perceptions and positions is made available, they may be expected to remain stable 
over a longer period of time. National or organizational interests will normally not change 
overnight. Moreover, political integration is a long-term process requiring a clear strategy 
and vision of stakeholders if intending to shape respective outcomes in accordance with 
their own conceptions. This permits a certain predictability of developments although the 
examination is focused on past and present events. The same advantage applies using legal 
frameworks as basis for analysis. Current laws lay the foundation and provide the direction 
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for future progression in a specific regulated domain. As a consequence, the basic data 
sources and acquisition methods chosen for this study to some extent promise to accommo-
date the dynamic nature of the object under investigation. 
Nevertheless, stakeholders may – for different reasons – be reluctant to provide in-
formation on matters that have not reached final settlement yet, or which, in their eyes, may 
be too sensitive to be communicated at this stage of development. In respect of hypothesis 
testing, this study thus aims at obtaining the corresponding information from at least three 
FABEC nations of which one of larger size, one smaller EU member state, and Switzerland, 
a non-EU member, are taken into account to attain some degree of variance between com-
pared nations and to enhance overall representativity. This particularly applies to hypothesis 
1a referring to domestic stakeholders and national preferences. Obviously, the best would 
be to acquire the respective information from all FABEC states in order to be able to cap-
ture the full picture as to involved actors’ opinions. However, as will be shown later, not all 
stakeholders have provided their views during the data acquisition phase. This can be par-
tially compensated for by the consolidated national preference intensities relevant for hy-
pothesis 1b, which ultimately are of greater interest to the present study. Consequently, bar-
gaining power should be assessed for as many FABEC nations as possible to get a complete 
basis for comparison with regard to the FABEC level of integration. Minimally, preference 
intensities of France, Germany, the Netherlands, and Switzerland must be obtained, as nei-
ther Belgium nor Luxembourg are expected to outweigh the other FABEC states in respect 
of bargaining power considering their size, location, and situation in respect of ATM; it 
therefore does not seem problematic to be missing their views. Where necessary and possi-
ble, information is complemented by analyzing official documents or secondary data from 
which the position or line of action of national governments can be derived. 
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4.2.2 Level of integration 
In the context of this study, the ‘level of integration’ relates to the Functional Airspace 
Block Europe Central (FABEC) and constitutes the most pertinent dependent variable. 
When introducing the term political integration it was maintained that integration processes 
involve the transfer of decision-making power from individual nation states to a suprana-
tional organization, and that this transfer may take effect along three separate dimensions: 
vertically (the degree of decision-making power), sectorally (the number of policy areas), 
and horizontally (the geographical scope).137  
Vertical dimension 
The vertical dimension includes the procedural aspects of decision-making as well as the 
enforceability of decisions. Decisions at the supranational level to be taken unanimously al-
low every member state to veto a specific outcome. Consequently, supranational policy will 
only be successful if consensus exists between states as to its content, taking into considera-
tion each nation’s individual interests. Normally, decisions with implications of greater 
magnitude will be difficult to achieve under such circumstances, especially if national in-
terests differ significantly, and will result in the lowest common denominator. On the other 
hand, decisions based on the majority principle require member states to compromise, since 
a majority of members is able to impose a decision on the minority. There is thus an incen-
tive to find solutions conforming to the interest of a majority of members. It also implies 
that decisions of a supranational body governing a policy area by majority vote amount to 
an intrusion into national sovereignty of individual states, as the latter’s freedom to define 
policies on their own behalf is compromised. Hence, decision-making power of such an or-
ganization may be considered to be quite substantial. Yet, there is the possibility to restrict 
the majority rule by introducing a qualified majority requiring e.g. a specific percentage of 
majority votes, or a special weighting system of different member states as employed in the 
Council of the European Union.138       
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However, decision-making power of that kind is only effective if respective policies are 
(legally) enforceable within member states. If not, the possibility exists that states may at-
tempt to delay or even refuse implementation of policies. In constitutional societies, this 
problem can be mitigated by the availability of recognized judicial institutions the judg-
ments of which are legally binding to member states. In the EU, the Court of Justice of the 
European Union is the relevant actor able to enforce European law.139 If the opinion pre-
vails that a member state has failed to fulfill its obligations under the treaties, both the 
European Commission and any member state may bring the matter before the Court of Jus-
tice whose judgments have to be complied with by the state concerned. This form of supra-
national jurisdiction with direct applicability in member states represents a very high level 
of integration in the vertical dimension. A second option is to make use of a Court of Arbi-
tration. In an arbitration process, the parties in dispute agree to a binding resolution by a 
third party intermediary who has been selected by the parties themselves (Mcil-
wrath/Savage 2010: 5). The shortfall of arbitration is that respective resolutions are compul-
sory, yet not necessarily compatible with (superior) laws and also not directly enforceable. 
In the case of FABEC, being embedded in the Single European Sky legal framework, com-
pliance with the overarching legal context is important to achieve overall SES objectives. 
Arbitration is therefore considered to be an inferior mean of enforcement. A third option is 
to revert to a mediation process. Mediation is a “diplomatic procedure, which endeavors to 
settle a controversy by assisting the parties to reach a voluntary agreement” (Ross 1968: 
507). As the definition suggests, the outcome of mediation is entirely subject to the disput-
ing parties, and decisions are non-binding. Consequently, mediation is a very weak instru-
ment to enforce policy decisions and international agreements. 
Sectoral dimension 
The sectoral dimension of integration encompasses the decision-making scope of a supra-
national organization, in other words, the number and quality of policy areas or sub-areas 
which are governed at the supranational level. The qualitative aspect refers to the sensitivity 
of a specific issue area subjected to supranational decision-making. As was shown in the 
previous chapter, enhanced cooperation and integration in the following functional areas of 
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air traffic management would allow for an overall improvement of ATM system perform-
ance:  
• ATM regulation and oversight 
• Airspace and route network design (including definition of military air-
space) 
• Harmonization of operational procedures 
• Provision of air traffic control service (civil and/or military) 
• Safety management 
• ANSP performance management 
• Airspace and capacity management 
• Civil - military cooperation 
• Aeronautical information management 
• Harmonization/selection and procurement of ATM technology 
• Definition of air navigation service charges 
• Centralization of various ancillary and support functions (e.g. CNS, ANS 
training, administration) 
Decisions in some of these policy areas will have a more profound impact on a nation state 
(and its domestic actors) than others. If decision-making authority in a sensitive policy area 
is transferred to a supranational body, the level of integration may be considered higher 
than if a less important issue area is concerned. At this point, the question arises as to which 
of the mentioned policy domains in ATM may be considered sensitive. Different aspects 
have to be taken into account here. In accordance with the realist perspective, it is assumed 
that the sensitivity of policy areas increases as more aspects related to the sovereignty and 
security of nation states are affected. Integration in air traffic management involves the ne-
cessity to allow for cross-border functionalities and a high degree of harmonization relating 
to a sphere of considerable national relevance: the airspace. A basic prerequisite of the exis-
tence and identity of a nation state is to ensure and secure territorial independence (Kim-
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minich/Hobe 2000: 74f.). National governments will therefore seek to safeguard sover-
eignty over their territory. This territory, however, does not only encompass the respective 
surface area, but also includes the airspace above that area within the lateral limits of the 
national boundaries (Haller/Kölz 1999: 9f.). Moreover, from a military perspective, air sov-
ereignty is an essential precondition to be able to secure a specified land area, which makes 
national airspace a valuable asset (Stahel 1993). Hence, governments will normally en-
deavor to keep sovereign control over their airspaces. The ability to protect national air-
space requires appropriate air policing and air defense capabilities. Effective air force op-
erations, in turn, raise the need to establish training areas which have to be located in rela-
tively close proximity to the respective military airfields to allow quicker access and to 
avoid excessive fuel burn during transit. This implies that availability, dimensions and loca-
tion of military airspace are of high significance. It is thus fair to consider the definition and 
design of airspace structures and ATS route networks, the regulation of airspace activities, 
as well as the provision of air traffic control service to be nationally sensitive tasks. This is 
especially the case when operational (military) air traffic is concerned. It also highlights the 
importance of keeping the regulatory bodies (supervisory authorities), air navigation service 
providers, and air traffic control infrastructure – in particular civil and military control cen-
ters – under national supervision and control. If decision-making on such issues is trans-
ferred to a supranational organization, its functional scope is considerably expanded.  
Besides this national security point of view, sensitivity can also be looked at from a 
stakeholders’ perspective which is more related to the economic implications of integration. 
Although variations among societal actors may be expected as to the level of perceived 
concernment when losing decision autonomy, any transfer of decision-making power to the 
supranational level may be sensitive to them if subsequent decisions will affect their exis-
tence, functional status, or resources in terms of staff or finances. This applies if the supra-
national organization is given the capacity to modify domestic structures in the suprana-
tional interest and permitted to impose organizational or infrastructural changes, for exam-
ple through centralization of specific ATM related functions. Also, the alteration of mone-
tary flows by deciding on the level and distribution of air navigation service charges, or the 
setting of performance targets for air navigation service providers are significant intrusions 
into domestic actors’ prerogatives. Certain decisions may even become nationally relevant, 
such as the centralization of personnel-intensive tasks or the selection and procurement of 
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ATM technology, as national economies might be affected. Economic sensitivity may be 
presumed to be less salient compared to the sensitivity of matters directly affecting national 
security and sovereignty. However, when acting on the liberal-intergovernmentalist as-
sumption that government preferences are mainly shaped by domestic societal actors, both 
national security and economic related sensitivity have to be taken into consideration. Fi-
nally, the consolidation of technical areas such as safety management, ATFCM, and AIM, 
or the pure harmonization of rules, operational procedures and technology without any 
structural changes will only have limited impact on the sovereignty over national airspace 
or on the status of domestic stakeholders. To sum up, the following areas related to air traf-
fic management are presumed as sensitive, implying a higher level of integration if respec-
tive decision-authority is transferred to a supranational organization: 
Sensitivity Policy areas in ATM 
Definition of airspace and route network design (including military airspace) Very 
high Definition of location & area of responsibility of military area control centers 
Definition of airspace and route network design (excluding military airspace) 
Definition of (civil) supervisory authorities’ institutional setup 
Definition of ANSP institutional setup/model 
Definition of location & area of responsibility of civil area control centers N
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High 
Definition of principles for civil-military cooperation 
Definition of charging policy / air navigation service charges Economic  
Perspective Definition of ANSP performance objectives  
Table 6: Sensitive policy areas in the domain of air traffic management 
Horizontal dimension 
Finally, the horizontal dimension of integration refers to the number of states subject to su-
pranational regulation and decision-making. This dimension is not taken into consideration 
in the present study, as the object of interest – the Functional Airspace Block Europe Cen-
tral – is composed of a defined number of states (and one international organization). This 
composition is not expected to change in the near future, since the neighboring states 
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around FABEC already are part of other functional airspace block initiatives.140 It is con-
ceivable that in the long run shifts in state participation may occur, or that the integration 
process will continue beyond FAB boundaries. This possibility is not reflected yet in the 
framework of the present analysis. 
Institutional vs. functional integration 
Apart from the institutional definition of integration, relating to the decision-making power 
transferred to the supranational level, it is the functional perspective which is ultimately 
relevant when it comes to assessing the effectiveness of an integration project. This pros-
pect refers to the already mentioned functional areas of air traffic management that may or 
will in fact be subjected to integration. Normally, integration in functional terms follows 
formal institutional integration concluded by a multilateral agreement or treaty. However, 
the possibility exists that an international agreement reflects functional integrative steps al-
ready taken, as was partially the case during the development of Eurocontrol.141 The diffi-
culty with the current case study is that FABEC is presently based on a formal agreement 
and has until now seen only marginal steps of functional implementation.142 In the context 
of this study, therefore, the attained level of integration can only be assessed from an insti-
tutional perspective. 
Prioritization of dimensions 
Analysis will consequently be limited to the three aforementioned institutional dimensions: 
decision-making power, enforceability of policy decisions, and decision-making scope of 
the supranational organization. To be able to bring combinations of different parameter 
values into a ranking order, the respective dimensions have to be prioritized. A key compe-
tence of a supranational organization is its ability to take decisions based on a majority rule. 
Without this, the organization does not possess any relevant autonomy at all and will not be 
able to act in the interest of the community, since nation states will always use their veto 
power to foster individual interests. Considered second in order is the capacity to enforce 
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policy decisions, the only ability granting supranational policymaking a chance of being ef-
fective. If the necessary enforcement mechanisms are available, the functional scope in 
terms of quality and quantity of policy areas under supranational rule is the third relevant 
dimension. Any other ranking than the one proposed is not advisable, as the mentioned di-
mensional characteristics only take effect based on their superior dimension. It may seem 
peculiar that the functional scope is considered to be of less importance than decision and 
enforcement rules. The purpose of integration is seen here in the opportunity to enhance the 
capacity to solve transnational problems and to act for the good of the community and its 
participating states in a coordinated way. This is only possible if supranational rulemaking 
remains effective and is not undermined by individual nations. Ineffective regulation at su-
pranational level cannot be expected to bring about the benefits of integration, even when 
covering a large functional scope. Therefore, the latter is considered secondary only. Based 
on the previous explanations, the level of integration is operationalized as follows: 
Dimension Operational definition Lvl of measurement 
supranational organization’s voting procedure Ordinal scale 
Vertical 
degree of enforceability of decisions/rules Ordinal scale 
Sectoral 
Weighted  
combination of 
the extent and sensitivity of the supranational organi-
zation’s decision-making scope, whereas sensitiv-
ity is assessed in accordance with table 6 
Ordinal scale 
Table 7: Operational definition of ‘level of integration’ (in order of priority) 
Data acquisition 
Since the level of integration correlates with the extent to which a supranational organiza-
tion is granted decision-making authority by its member states in certain functional issue 
areas, there is a need to focus on international state agreements by which this kind of trans-
fer is officially effected. As already mentioned, the FABEC Treaty, signed on 2 December 
2010, constitutes the first formal step towards establishing the Functional Airspace Block 
Europe Central. It will thus serve as the basis for this analysis. The legal text of the treaty 
will hence be subjected to a qualitative content analysis. The respective coding agenda used 
is based on the categories defined for the three dimensions of ‘level of integration’ during 
operationalization. Units of analysis are the legal provisions contained in the treaty. Provi-
sions corresponding to a specific category are subsequently assigned to it. 
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Dimensions Categories 
Voting procedure in executive/    
legislative body of a supranational 
organization 
• Unanimity 
• Qualified majority 
• Majority 
• No binding vote / consultative only 
Enforcement of policy decisions 
• Appeal to European Commission / European Court of Justice 
• Appeal to a Court of Arbitration 
• Use of a mediation procedure 
• No enforcement mechanism 
Functional scope of decision-making 
Very high sensitivity from a national security perspective: 
• Definition of airspace and route network design (including mili-
tary airspace) 
• Definition of location & area of responsibility of military area 
control centers 
High sensitivity from a national security perspective: 
• Definition of airspace and route network design (excluding mili-
tary airspace) 
• Definition of supervisory authorities’ institutional setup 
• Definition of ANSP institutional setup/model  
• Definition of location & area of responsibility of civil area con-
trol centers 
• Definition of principles for civil-military cooperation 
Sensitivity from an economic perspective: 
• Definition of charging policy / en-route unit rates 
• Definition of ANSP performance objectives 
Functional scope of decision-making 
Low sensitivity: 
• Definition of safety management policies 
• Definition of airspace and capacity management (including air 
traffic flow management) principles 
• Definition of ATM operational standards and procedures 
• Definition of ATM technological standards for the FABEC area 
• Definition of aeronautical information management standards 
• Definition of ANS training standards 
Table 8: Coding agenda for ‘level of FABEC integration’ related to institutional integration 
As the source for analysis is an objective legal text, both test-retest and parallel-forms reli-
ability may be assumed. Also, the defined categories leave little room for interpretation, so 
no significant divergences should emerge if different researchers code the source content. 
Hence, inter-rater reliability should also be assured. 
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4.2.3 Influencing power of domestic societal actors 
The independent variable of the first hypothesis ‘influencing power of domestic societal ac-
tors’ in the context of political integration is next to be operationalized. This concept was 
specified in sub-section 1.3.1 by the following dimensions: organizational capabilities, de-
gree of individual concernment of group members, specificity and homogeneity of group in-
terests, and the ability to interfere with vital societal functions. Where necessary, each di-
mension was further divided into sub-dimensions, determining the respective elements in a 
specific order of priority. Operationalization will be conducted along the various sub-
dimensions, as they ultimately constitute the overall theoretical concept. 
Organizational capabilities 
The first dimension, the organizational capabilities of a societal group, was further speci-
fied by three sub-dimensions. The first to be addressed is the level of organization. This 
sub-dimension originates from the notion that any kind of influencing action, be it political 
lobbying or in particular the interference in essential functions of society, necessitates effi-
cient and strict leadership in order to be carried out successfully. This implies a hierarchical 
organizational structure composed of a steering committee (e.g. an executive board), coor-
dinating respective activities, sub-divisions in case of larger organizations, and established 
communication channels in order to be able to pass instructions and directives to subordi-
nate group members. Inferior to this (ideal) situation would be a less hierarchic structure 
where executive functions are carried out, but no discretionary power can be exercised over 
members of the group. Here, leadership is based on democratic principles and persuasive 
power, which may be less effective at first sight, but still can develop a powerful dynamic if 
group members can be convinced of taking action. However, a loose organizational struc-
ture with only informal, or even no institutionalized leadership, and only limited access to 
group members, will either dissipate or strongly exacerbate the effectiveness of activities. 
This will most probably be the case also if a group displaying a non-hierarchical organiza-
tion attempts to create an ad hoc structure to execute a specific lobbying or influencing ac-
tivity. Since there are no established structures during daily operation, which also would 
ensure the required routine and interpersonal relations between hierarchical levels, an ad 
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hoc structure will be difficult to run effectively. Hence, the level of structural hierarchy of 
an organization will be assessed and used as the respective indicator.  
The second sub-dimension of a group’s organizational capability is the density of po-
litical networks. This is related to the concept of policy networks, which are defined as 
“clusters of actors, each of which has an interest, or ‘stake’ in a given (…) policy sector and 
the capacity to help determine policy success or failure” (Peterson and Bomberg 1999: 8). 
The policy network concept is normally used as an analytical tool to determine policy out-
comes.143 Instead, for the present study the notion is extracted that political decisions are 
ultimately shaped by contributions from different stakeholders, which are engaged in policy 
networks and include specific interest groups. Such involvement may be more or less for-
malized, ranging from direct involvement in drafting groups or co-decisional structures, of-
ficial participation in consultation processes, to informal meetings between individual rep-
resentatives. Although formal inclusion in decision-making processes may be viewed as the 
most powerful way to influence political decisions, interpersonal connections and relation-
ships to relevant stakeholders and decision-makers can also be very useful for promoting an 
interest group’s arguments and to shape policy. In the latter case, it is important to maintain 
a regular relationship to be able to build a foundation of trust, which promises a better 
chance of getting a positive response to lobbying activities. A minimum of two contacts per 
year should be viewed as the bottom line in order to still consider an interpersonal relation-
ship regular, as it may lose cohesion after a longer period of time. The greater the number 
of significant stakeholders the group has regular relations with, the more effective this 
method of influence is. In turn, the significance of stakeholders depends on their political 
influence in a specific issue area. As steps of political integration require decisions at gov-
ernment and parliament level, relations with respective representatives stand at the fore. 
Since specialized committees usually prepare the policies to be decided in parliament, 
members of such committees should be in focus. At government level, the officials respon-
sible for drafting policy proposals form the second group of addressees for lobbying activi-
ties. In addition, leaders of national political parties are the third group of functionaries that 
play an important role when it comes to shaping the opinion of political parties involved in 
parliamentary decision-making. An interest group’s influencing potential is assumed to be 
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stronger if it has more contacts to the aforementioned individuals available. The two partial 
indicators for the density of political networks shall therefore be: 1) the level of involvement 
in decision-making processes and 2) the number of relevant political stakeholders regular 
contact is maintained with, in this order of priority. With regard to the latter indicator, the 
reference to a number does not necessarily require a quantitative measurement. Particularly 
in those cases, where an organization is in intense contact with a variety of relevant political 
actors, it may be difficult to provide exact numbers. A qualitative assessment of network 
density at an ordinal scale is thus also acceptable. This would imply the appraisal of 
whether several or only single political levels (as specified above) and whether several or 
only few (<5) political individuals are addressed per level or within the entire lobbying-
network. Generally, one may make the criticism that the focus of these indicators is too 
specific with regard to the type of stakeholders addressed. On the other hand decisions 
about complex subjects, such as aviation and air traffic management, require highly special-
ized knowledge. Decision-makers therefore need to rely on experts and on political stake-
holders dealing with these issues at a greater level of detail. It therefore makes sense to re-
strict lobbying activities and thus operational definition to these actors. 
The third sub-dimension to be looked at is the financial strength of an organization. 
This concept partly focuses on the ability of an organization to promote its views and posi-
tions about a specific topic in the public sphere through intensive (and thus costly) public 
relations activities, thereby creating indirect public pressure on the political institutions 
aimed at influencing policy in the intended direction. Again, when dealing with the policy 
domain of air traffic management, thorough expert knowledge is required to be able to un-
derstand all the relevant issues associated with it. Consequently, public framing is firstly 
difficult and secondly may not have the desired effect, as the subject may be too technical 
and hence may not generate the public interest needed to be pursued to the political level. 
Societal actors may thus be expected to revert to direct lobbying activities with political de-
cision-makers, which of course should be more effective if the financial means allow for 
making use of professional lobbyists. The availability of sufficient financial resources is 
also necessary when considering taking legal action to promote or obstruct a specific policy 
decision. Yet, no domestic legal framework normally exists to enforce political integration 
beyond national boundaries. Conversely, it is conceivable that a societal group contesting 
integrative steps could refer to national laws that restrict the achievable level of integration, 
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in particular when associated with institutional change. However, intention to do so implies 
that a corresponding policy decision was taken illegally, which is very unlikely, as govern-
ments and parliaments will presumably adapt the respective legal basis as well. Should a 
revision of the legal framework be required at constitutional level, which usually entails 
submission to a public vote, an opportunity might exist for an opposing party to evoke na-
tional sensitivities against an integration project. Nevertheless, as the ATM domain is a 
very complex issue area, stakeholders will most probably rather concentrate on direct lob-
bying activities to shape policy decisions and hence endeavor to build an extensive network 
with political decision-makers. The density of such networks is addressed by the previous 
sub-dimension and also reflects, to a certain degree, the financial power of an organization 
or interest group. In the context of air traffic management there is thus no necessity to spe-
cifically take into account the financial resources available to a societal group.  
Degree of concernment of the group / group members 
The next dimension of ‘influencing power’, degree of concernment of the group / group 
members, was specified by direct operational, financial, status-related and/or cultural con-
cernment. Several aspects have to be considered here: 1) Are the expected (positive or 
negative) effects of integration certain to materialize? 2) Is there a risk that, without integra-
tion, positive results will not materialize? 3) How many members of the group are directly 
affected by respective implications? 4) How significant are those effects? These questions 
have to be addressed in the operationalization process. It is important to note that – except 
for the third question – objective replies are not viable. Since only expected gains and/or 
losses from policy coordination (or lack thereof) are referred to, their certainty, signifi-
cance, and risk are always subject to the assessment of individual group members. As far as 
the personal appraisal of significance is concerned, it is of little use to quantify financial 
gains or losses, as the evaluation whether a certain amount is significant or not may differ 
from group to group and even from individual to individual. Status-related concernment re-
fers to potential changes in hierarchical or organizational position and/or geographical loca-
tion of a group member. An individual may perceive corresponding changes as incisive, be 
it positive or negative. Lastly, cultural concernment refers to any type of personal con-
cernment other than financial or status-related. Such concernment may be associated with 
ideology, religious beliefs, or other personal convictions that are affected by active (or 
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missing) policy coordination. Evidently, correlation may exist between the different dimen-
sions. This is negligible though, as in the context of this study, overall concernment com-
prising all possible dimensions is of relevance. Based on these deliberations, the extent of 
perceived certainty, significance (of expected operational, financial, status-related, and/or 
cultural gains or losses), and risk will thus be applied as indicator. Finally, the percentage 
of group members subject to individual financial/status-related/cultural benefits and/or 
losses is to be assessed. Since a precise quantitative indication might be difficult for an or-
ganization to provide, an ordinal ranking of estimated size of respective sub-groups is also 
acceptable. The sum of empirical variables explicated above permits operationalizing indi-
vidual concernment. It is obvious though that it would not be practical to measure these 
variables at the level of each individual group member, but to draw upon executive bodies 
or other steering committees who normally manage the organization, aggregate group opin-
ions, and act in their members’ interest. 
Specificity and homogeneity of group interests 
Thirdly, specificity and homogeneity of group interests was defined as the availability of 
specific policy objectives and solutions. It is the underlying argument that tangible and un-
ambiguous policy goals are easier to represent externally and give an indication that opin-
ions of group members are sufficiently homogenous to be able to identify common goals. 
This definition is already usable as an indicator. As the present study refers to political inte-
gration in the area of air traffic management, in particular with regard to FABEC, there is a 
need to examine whether a specific interest group has concrete propositions as to the level 
of integration to be achieved. The more specified and comprehensive its opinion on how the 
future in respect of FABEC and/or air traffic management in Europe should look, the more 
effective influencing activities at the political level are expected to be. This implies that 
‘preference intensity’ of domestic stakeholders needs to be assessed in accordance with the 
respective operational definition provided in the next sub-section.  
Ability to interfere with vital societal functions 
Finally, the ability to interfere with vital societal functions is looked at from an operation-
alization point of view. One of the respective sub-dimensions comprises the legal basis re-
quired to be able to engage in corresponding activities. Some organizations may not be 
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permitted by law or any other applicable legal basis to cease service provision, or are only 
allowed to do so under certain conditions. Hence, the operational definition to be chosen 
here is the extent to which applicable legal provisions allow or prohibit organizations from 
interfering with vital societal functions. 
The ability to successfully interfere with vital societal functions also depends on the 
degree to which the main task of an organization can be substituted by a different organiza-
tion in a timely manner. If public service provision is resumed by a substitute within a short 
period of time, the intended pressure from interference will be lost. The time aspect is diffi-
cult to accommodate, since the immediacy of effects from interference differ between types 
of public service. However, even if a substitute organization is available with a certain de-
lay, the disruptive impact is reduced. Hence, measurement of this sub-dimension will be re-
stricted to the number of alternative groups available to ensure identical service provision. 
If there are more substitutes obtainable, the chances increase that one substitute organiza-
tion will possess the required capacity to fulfill additional tasks on behalf of the organiza-
tion which has discontinued service provision.  
Finally, the magnitude of implications from interference in essential societal functions 
should be taken into consideration. This can be assessed in two dimensions: number of peo-
ple affected during one day of service interruption and time to perceived impact (immedi-
acy). The more people who are concerned by service interruption (and the faster the corre-
sponding impact is felt, leaving little time for individual preparation and compensatory 
measures), the greater the public pressure will become to resume service provision and the 
higher the chance for demands of a disruptive group to be accommodated. As there is no 
value added in performing exact counts of individuals being affected, numbers are to be ex-
pressed in terms of average estimations. Because it is not possible to calculate specific time 
delays until impact, it will suffice to assess whether an impact is immediate or not, and 
therefore delay is expressed in nominal terms. The following table summarizes the previ-
ously explicated operational definitions of ‘influencing power of domestic societal actors’, 
including all its sub-dimensions: 
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Sub-dimensions  
(in order of priority) Operational definition Level of measurement 
Level of organization Level of structural hierarchy  Ordinal scale 
Level of involvement in decision-making 
processes Ordinal scale Density of political net-
works Number of relevant political stakeholders 
regular contacts are maintained with Ratio/Ordinal scale 
Perceived certainty of (positive or negative) 
effects to materialize Ordinal scale 
Perceived risk of positive effects not to mate-
rialize Ordinal scale 
Percentage of group members subject to indi-
vidual financial/status-related/cultural benefits 
and/or losses 
Ratio/Ordinal scale 
Operational, financial, 
status-related, and/or cul-
tural concernment of the 
group /group members 
Perceived significance of expected impact Ordinal scale 
Availability of specific pol-
icy objectives and solutions 
Level of integration to be achieved (according 
to operational definition of preference inten-
sity in sub-section 4.2.4) 
Ordinal scale 
Legal basis for interference 
with societal functions 
Applicable legal provisions allow-
ing/prohibiting societal interference Ordinal scale 
Substitutability of group 
tasks 
Number of alternative groups available to en-
sure identical service provision Ratio scale 
Number of people affected during one day of 
service interruption Ordinal scale Magnitude of implications 
Immediacy (delay of perceived impact) Nominal scale 
Table 9: Operational definition of ‘influencing power of domestic societal actors’ 
Data acquisition 
Before entering the discussion about suitable methods to evaluate ‘influencing power’, it 
has to be determined who the relevant societal actors are that strive to influence the policy 
decisions in the area of air traffic management in general, and in respect of FABEC in par-
ticular. It is evident that the ATM sector is a highly specialized domain requiring extensive 
expert knowledge to fully comprehend the various issues associated with it. Moreover, the 
general public usually has very little knowledge and understanding about air traffic man-
agement and air traffic control, as this particular field is normally not directly visible to out-
siders, even when traveling by air. It is only exceptional delay situations, incidents, or acci-
dents which grant air traffic control increased public attention. Hence, there are only very 
few stakeholders who have a direct link to, or are directly or indirectly affected by air traf-
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fic management activities and who therefore have an interest in shaping the evolution of 
this domain. Even then, the required expert knowledge needs to be available in order to 
contribute in an effective manner to these developments.  
As the ATM sector is characterized by the sovereign nature of its tasks and functions, 
and thus is closely tied to national governments, one could be tempted to question the ap-
plicability of a liberalist approach in terms of Moravcsik, where “private individuals and 
voluntary associations decisively constrain the identities and purposes of politicians and 
governments” (1993: 483). However, despite continuous governmental regulation, control 
and even ownership, the execution of air traffic management functions has gradually moved 
from a structure of government agencies to a system of corporatized or semi-privatized air 
navigation service providers with extensive financial and managerial autonomy. This was 
accompanied by a change in status of air navigation service personnel from government of-
ficials to company employees, syndicating to unions and associations to have their interests 
represented. Hence, air navigation service providers and staff representative bodies, such 
as professional associations and unions, may be regarded as societal actors with individual 
preferences, which they will attempt to make heard in the political system when it comes to 
policy decisions in their area of activity. As these organizations are at the front-line of ATM 
operations, they are both highly affected by respective policies and possess the necessary 
know-how to provide the relevant inputs. Since this study is focused on the transnational 
aspects of air traffic management, it makes sense to limit the analysis to those air navigation 
service providers in the FABEC area operating en-route area control centers. This excludes 
Luxembourg where the ANSP provides aerodrome and approach control services only.144 
The situation with regard to staff representation is somewhat more confusing. In certain 
countries, there is just one organization representing the entire ANS staff community, while 
in other nations several groups are responsible to convey the interests of staff working in 
the air traffic management domain. On one hand, this has to do with the separation of pro-
fessional associations and trade unions, as is the case in France. Specified trade unions 
maintain social relations to employers and negotiate labor contracts, while professional as-
sociations represent the professional interests of the respective occupational category. On 
the other hand, there are numerous active professions in air traffic control, namely air traffic 
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controllers (ATCOs), air navigation services employees (ANSEs), air traffic safety elec-
tronics personnel (ATSEP), instructors, administration staff, and more, which are organized 
in some kind of staff representation body. Definition is required as to which staff associa-
tions and unions should be taken into account for the purpose of this study. As the goal is to 
assess the influencing potential of interest groups, one would prefer to concentrate on those 
groups that generally feature a strong incentive to influence policy decisions in the ATM 
domain. Looking at the various categories of staff there are some with a high degree of spe-
cialization, which cannot, or only in a limited way, make use of their professional skills 
outside the field of air traffic control. This is mainly true for ATCOs, ANSEs, and ATSEP. 
Since there is only one major air navigation service provider per state, alternative job op-
portunities within the same country are limited. One may therefore expect that there is an 
enhanced incentive for these professional groups to shape their working environment as ex-
tensively as possible in their own interest. Secondly, when comparing the three categories, 
the greatest influencing potential can be attributed to the air traffic controller group. They 
are the ones to ensure the very core processes of air traffic control, are specially selected 
and recruited, cannot be replaced easily, and are generally short staffed all over Europe.145 
Hence, with regard to the inter-state comparison being undertaken, it is advisable and per-
missible to focus on associations and unions representing air traffic controllers. For that 
reason, only those organizations will be taken into consideration the membership of which 
consists of at least 50% of active ATCOs, representing at least 50% of all ATCOs in the re-
spective country, as there may be certain transport unions representing several occupational 
categories with only a minority being professionals in ATC. The differentiation of profes-
sional associations and unions is of no relevance here, as FABEC has a potential impact 
both on the social and on the professional sphere. Consequently, both types of staff repre-
sentative bodies will further respective interests in their specific area. 
A third type of organization may also be considered a societal actor in the policy do-
main of ATM, although it even to a lesser extent fits the description of a non-governmental 
pressure group: national defense authorities, or more specifically, the air force. Like any 
civil aircraft operator, the air force is a ‘customer’ of the air traffic management system, 
depending on optimal air traffic control service provision in accordance with their military 
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operational needs. As a customer with very specific interests that sometimes compete with 
the requirements of civil airspace users, the articulation of such interests becomes important 
to secure its own position in the struggle for airspace and other scarce ATM resources. The 
air force is often responsible for providing military air traffic control service to OAT flights 
and thus has the respective knowledge at its disposal. In addition, military authorities (like 
national ministries of defense) usually represent the national security and defense perspec-
tive at the government level. One may argue that these military institutions are such an in-
herent part of a government structure that there is no specific need for political interest rep-
resentation. Nevertheless, comprehension of the specialized requirements with regard to air 
force operations is usually only available inside the respective organizational structure and 
still has to be conveyed to governmental decision-makers. Moreover, in the context of this 
study it is important to understand the dynamics of military and security considerations af-
fecting integration processes related to air traffic management. 
The other major group of customers mainly concerned with the safety and efficiency 
of the air traffic management system are the civil airspace users, predominantly those con-
ducting flights operating under instrument flight rules (IFR) and thus being subjected to air 
traffic control. Yet, the main users of the ATM system in Europe are the scheduled com-
mercial air carriers, operating some 2’800 aircraft on 12’000 daily flights and carrying 
around 340 million passengers per year146 on a tightly interconnected hub-and-spoke net-
work.147 They suffer the most from inefficiencies in the system, as ATM fragmentation is 
per se expensive, produces delays, increases fuel consumption due to extensive holdings 
and inadequate flight profiles, and as a consequence leads to higher overall costs for the air-
lines. Moreover, since the deregulation of the air transportation sector, European airlines 
are operating in a highly competitive environment which leaves little margin for benefits. 
These carriers thus have a strong interest in a functioning and cost-efficient air traffic man-
agement infrastructure and will beyond doubt actively promote any step in that direction, 
even without necessarily having any expertise in the field of ATM. This applies in particu-
lar to those airlines home-based within the FABEC area, as they execute the majority of 
flights in that region and therefore would considerably profit from defragmentation. This 
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study will therefore restrict its focus on the so-called ‘flag carriers’ of respective FABEC 
nations, i.e. the relevant major airlines performing the highest number of flight operations 
in these countries. Although several airlines with respectable flight frequencies are located 
in nations such as Germany, it seems unobjectionable to limit the selection to the flag carri-
ers only, given the fact that their opinions and interests can be viewed as profoundly repre-
sentative for the branch. Moreover, these organizations may be expected to traditionally 
feature close ties to the government level in terms of influencing channels. In summary, air 
navigation service providers, unions and associations representing air traffic controllers, air 
forces, and scheduled commercial network carriers in the FABEC area represent the rele-
vant stakeholders to be considered in this analysis. The following tables list these actors per 
category and country (sources: websites). Air forces are not listed specifically, but every 
FABEC nation, except for Luxembourg, possesses an air force. 
Air Navigation Service Providers  
Country Name of ANSP Civil/Military No. of ACCs Website 
Belgium Belgocontrol civil 1 www.belgocontrol.be 
France DSNA civil 5 www.dsna.fr 
Germany DFS civil/military 4 www.dfs.de 
The Netherlands 
LVNL 
MUAC 
civil 
1 
1 
www.lvnl.nl 
Switzerland Skyguide civil/military 2 www.skyguide.ch 
Table 10: ANSPs operating ACCs in the FABEC area  
ATCO staff representative bodies (fulfilling the requirements stated above) 
Country Name of ATCO staff representative body Website 
Belgium Belgian Guild of Air Traffic Controllers (BGATC) --- 
France 
Syndicat National des Contrôleurs du Trafic Aérien (SNCTA) 
French Air Traffic Controllers’ Association (FATCOA) 
www.sncta.fr 
www.fatcoa.com 
Germany Gewerkschaft der Flugsicherung (GdF) www.gdf.de 
Luxembourg Guilde Luxembourgeoise des Contrôleurs de la Circulation Aérienne (GLCCA) www.atc.lu 
The Netherlands Netherlands Guild of Air Traffic Controllers (NGATC) www.atc-gilde.nl 
Switzerland Swiss Air Traffic Controllers’ Associations (SwissATCA) www.swissatca.org 
Table 11: ATCO unions/associations in the FABEC area 
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Major airlines148 
Country Name of Airline Number of aircraft149 Website 
Belgium Brussels Airlines 53 (2011) www.brusselsairlines.com 
France Air France 254 (2011) www.airfrance.com 
Germany Lufthansa 361 (2010) www.lufthansa.com 
Luxembourg Luxair 17 (2011) www.luxair.lu 
The Netherlands KLM 118 (2011) www.klm.com 
Switzerland Swiss Intl. Airlines 68 (2011) www.swiss.com 
Table 12: National main carriers based in the FABEC area 
For practical reasons, and to accommodate the fact that not all stakeholders within FABEC 
have provided the information required to conduct this analysis, inter-state comparisons 
will not be effected between all FABEC states, but between a selection of states which are 
deemed to be representative. As stated earlier, Germany, one of the two bigger states in the 
FABEC area, the Netherlands as a smaller EU member, and Switzerland, as non-EU mem-
ber, will be chosen for analysis of influencing power. When deriving the operational defini-
tion it was shown that ‘influencing power’ is a complex, multi-dimensional concept that re-
quires a differentiated operational definition. There are five partial indicators which are re-
lated to the individual perceptions of societal groups: the level of integration to be achieved 
in FABEC (preference intensity), measured to assess the availability of specific policy solu-
tions and further operationalized according to the instructions in sub-section 4.2.4; as well 
as the perceived certainty, risk, and significance of potential positive and/or negative im-
pacts of integration. Apart from the aspired level of integration, which can be a formally es-
tablished position and may also be available in the form of an official position paper, per-
ceptions of concernment are best captured by interviews with the respective members of the 
organization. As it would not be viable to assess all individual opinions of group members, 
this study instead approaches formalized or informal leadership structures to provide their 
assessment on behalf of the whole group by means of the abovementioned online question-
naire. Notwithstanding the fact that views may significantly vary across membership and 
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that group opinion thus may not be correctly reflected in its entirety, the management per-
ception usually is the basis for activity of an organization. Moreover, in democratically or-
ganized groups such as unions and associations, executive boards will normally represent 
their members’ opinions if available to them. In larger organizations, the questionnaire will 
usually not be replied to by members of management personally, but by those experts in-
volved in the relevant topic. There is thus a certain risk that expert opinions are acquired in-
stead of official positions, particularly when evolution is ongoing and the attitude of an or-
ganization is not fully consolidated yet. On the other hand, as these experts normally play a 
significant role in providing advice to the management boards on how to proceed, expert 
and official positions may not be too far from each other in the end. Hence, this possible 
shortfall is acceptable.  
In order to be able to clearly distinguish between different group perceptions but at 
the same time support the evaluation of responses, the structured interview method is ap-
plied, using ordinal response categories. The same is used for the partial indicator measur-
ing the percentage of group members subject to individual benefits or losses, which will be 
based on subjective estimations rather than an objective assessment, as explicitly the per-
ceptions stand at the fore. To obtain an overview about the expected positive and negative 
effects of FABEC integration, respondents are also given the opportunity to further explain 
their specific perceptions in a free text field. The remaining partial indicators of the influ-
encing power concept concerning organizational features, substitutability, or the legal 
framework for societal interference, can be considered as more objective and thus may be 
accessible by alternative means and through other sources. Nevertheless, since stakeholder 
interviews have to be carried out anyway, this research method is made use of to survey the 
other relevant indicators. This economizes efforts and ensures currency of information with 
regard to the indicators. With the exception of the mainly ratio-scaled indicator (number of 
alternative groups), response categories are again ranked ordinally as provided during op-
erationalization.  
In respect of measurement of the level of integration to be achieved, it should be 
added that a specific policy objective and/or solution is considered to be available if more 
than 90% of the questions related to the level of integration in institutional and functional 
terms are replied to in an unambiguous manner. If less than 25% of the questions are an-
Methodological Approach 
  
130 
swered, the indicator will be rated ‘not available’, in all other cases ‘partially available’. 
This is done in accordance with the notion that only comprehensive positions and opinions 
on a specific matter will most probably make an organization be heard at the political level. 
Other sub-dimensions of influencing power requiring further discussion with regard 
to their measurement are those related to societal interference. Given the fact that, out of the 
selected societal actors, the possibility to revert to respective measures can only be realisti-
cally attributed to the air traffic controller staff unions. The legal capability to perform such 
activities as well as the substitutability by other organizations thus need only to be assessed 
in respect of this actor category. Moreover, it can be expected that service interruptions by 
air traffic controllers working in area control centers or at major airports will have consid-
erable repercussions on the aviation system of the concerned nation state and even beyond; 
because aircraft will no longer be able to operate in the airspace affected by air traffic ser-
vice disruption, a significant number of flights will have to be cancelled or diverted, and a 
large number of passengers will be stranded at airports. Depending on the level of interfer-
ence, these consequences can take effect within a very short period of time. Consequently, 
even if more than one ATCO union is present in one country, there is no need for a domes-
tic comparison. The impact dimension of societal interference will therefore not be meas-
ured in the framework of this study. In summary, the various indicators for ‘influencing 
power of domestic societal actors’ are measured applying a standardized online question-
naire and using the response categories as shown in the following table: 
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Operational definition Categories Instrument of 
measurement 
Level of structural         
hierarchy  
• Institutionalized governance body (e.g. formal leader, 
executive board) 
• Institutionalized governance body with democratic 
structure 
• Informal leadership (ad hoc or permanent) 
• No leadership structure 
Level of involvement in  
decision-making processes 
• Co-decision on all relevant matters 
• Co-decision on selected matters as decided by the or-
ganization 
• Co-decision on selected matters as decided by gov-
ernment 
• Formal consultation on all relevant matters 
• Formal consultation on selected matters 
• Informal consultation initiated by government 
• Informal consultation initiated by the organization 
• Informal contacts to individual government officials 
• No involvement 
Number of relevant politi-
cal stakeholders regular 
contacts are maintained 
with 
• Several stakeholders on several political levels  
• Few stakeholders on several political levels  
• Several stakeholders on single political level  
• Few stakeholders on single political level  
• No contacts  
Perceived certainty of  
(positive or negative) ef-
fects to materialize 
• Certain  
• Likely  
• Unlikely  
• No effect  
• Not assessable/no opinion  
Perceived risk of positive  
effects not to materialize 
• Very high  
• High  
• Low  
• No risk  
• Not assessable/no opinion  
Percentage of group mem-
bers subject to individual 
financial/status-
related/cultural benefits 
and/or losses 
• Majority benefit  
• Majority loss  
• Equal share of benefits and losses  
• Not assessable/no opinion 
Standardized  
online 
questionnaire 
Methodological Approach 
  
132 
 
Operational definition Categories Instrument of 
measurement 
Perceived significance of  
expected impact 
• Very significant  
• Significant  
• Low significance  
• Insignificant  
• Not assessable/no opinion  
Availability of specific 
policy objectives and solu-
tions as to the level of in-
tegration to be achieved  
• Available 
• Partially available 
• Not available  
Applicable legal provi-
sions prohibiting societal  
interference 
• Interference permitted 
• Interference permitted under conditions 
• Interference prohibited 
Number of alternative 
groups available to ensure 
identical service provision 
Number 
Standardized 
online 
questionnaire 
Table 13: Coding agenda for ‘influencing power’ 
As to the reliability of using an online questionnaire, one may assume inter-rater reliability, 
as it is irrelevant by which researcher the questionnaire is administered to the respondent. If 
the positions and perceptions of respondents’ organizations do not dramatically change over 
time, which is not likely in the field under investigation, test-retest reliability is ensured. 
With regard to parallel-forms reliability, questions may arise as to the suitability of using an 
online questionnaire as opposed to conducting a personal interview. It is obvious that prac-
tical considerations have led to the decision to use the former method. The difficulty with 
an online questionnaire is the fact that there may be misunderstandings or misinterpreta-
tions of research questions, since there is no possibility for direct clarifications or explana-
tions. Furthermore, the impersonal nature of an online interview may render respondents 
more cautious as to the completeness of their replies. The study attempts to compensate for 
these deficits by initial telephone contacts to the individual respondents, explanatory intro-
ductions to the research questions, and, where necessary, by a short debriefing with respon-
dents after having filled in the questionnaire.  
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4.2.4 Preference intensity in respect of cooperation/integration 
‘Preference intensity’ constitutes the dependent variable of the first hypothesis and is also 
one of the relevant dimensions of a nation state’s bargaining power in international negotia-
tion settings.150 In the realm of the present study, this concept refers to the degree to which 
a nation state perceives a requirement to engage in policy coordination and/or to achieve an 
integrated solution within the domain of air traffic management, specifically in the frame-
work of FABEC. Hence, the government preferred level of integration in respect of FABEC 
may be used to conceptualize the preference intensity of an individual nation state. The 
higher the level of integration a national government strives to attain, the greater its prefer-
ence intensity towards an integrated solution. The ‘level of integration’ concept as opera-
tionalized earlier can be used respectively. However, when determining preferences, it 
makes sense not only to consider the institutional decision-making perspective, but also the 
national governments’ (and domestic actors’) viewpoints regarding the functionally desir-
able level of integration.151 In doing so it will be possible to better assess attitude discrep-
ancies between governmental and domestic societal actors, which in turn may provide a 
clearer explanation for a specific outcome of an integrative process. The operational defini-
tion for ‘preference intensity’ thus needs to be supplemented by the functional dimension in 
accordance with the areas of cooperation and possibly integration listed in the ‘level of in-
tegration’ sub-section.  
The functional/operational aspect of integration 
Air navigation service providers and their air traffic control facilities represent the core ac-
tivity of air traffic management, being at the front-line of respective processes. Integration 
or cooperation in most of the functional areas listed in sub-section 4.2.2 will thus either de-
pend on, or at least be facilitated by an integrated institutional model of air navigation ser-
vice provision as well as by an integrated solution with regard to the main ATM infrastruc-
ture, namely the area control centers. Only close cooperation or integration between ANSPs 
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will remove potential individual obstacles to operational integration, among them concerns 
about the dimension of their area of responsibility and airway network, which are linked to 
the distribution of route charges. In the wake of a more transnational ANSP structure, other 
management and support functions will be integrated as well. It may even pave the way for 
a consolidation of air traffic control centers in terms of a reduction of the number of cen-
ters. This, however, is not a necessary precondition for greater efficiency of the ATM sys-
tem, as a multiple center structure has its advantages (see below).  
As was elaborated in sub-section 3.3.3, the FABEC feasibility study identified three 
cooperation scenarios for air navigation service providers which involve different degrees 
of centralization and integration of functions: the contractual cooperation model, the alli-
ance model, and the single ANSP model. These three models are also seen as possible 
stages through which the current ANSP landscape in the FABEC area could evolve over 
time. A governmental preference for either the single ANSP or the cooperation model pro-
vides a clear indication towards the aspired level of overall integration in air traffic man-
agement, since these models involve either full centralization of corresponding functions or 
no centralization at all. On the other hand, a governmental choice in favor of the alliance 
model allows for various options as to which functional areas should be centrally managed 
at FABEC level, especially when considering the degree of nationally or economically 
relevant sensitivity of integrated areas. National governments may even actually prefer a 
single ANSP structure, but would like to approach this state not by means of a ‘big-bang’ 
scenario, but rather in a gradual manner. It can be expected that governments in favor of a 
single ANSP structure will communicate this from the beginning, or at least try to prepare 
the alliance structure for a later transformation into a single provider. It thus makes sense to 
focus the assessment of governmental preference intensity in functional terms on establish-
ing their preference regarding the ANSP institutional model and to determine the functional 
areas to be centrally managed, should the alliance model be the preferred one.  
During the introduction it was indicated that the rather large number of air traffic con-
trol centers in Europe play a contributory role in respect of air traffic management fragmen-
tation. The main concerns here are high overall infrastructural costs, the lack of technologi-
cal interoperability between the different centers, and a considerable amount of interfaces 
that do not accommodate traffic flows. Comparison with the situation in the United States 
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of America shows that the U.S. system is able to handle a larger number of aircraft with 
fewer en-route centers than Europe, although one has to take into consideration that the 
United States operate 27 so called TRACONs (Terminal Radar Approach Control facilities) 
in addition to their en-route centers, some of them comparable to the European lower ACCs 
in respect of their size and dimensions.152 Nevertheless, there is certainly room for optimi-
zation, of which a lot might already be achievable by ensuring interoperable technology, 
e.g. in the form of a ‘virtual center’.153 Obviously, this concept would only marginally ad-
dress the issue of infrastructure cost. However, it must also be noticed that a multiple center 
structure has its advantages. Despite today’s manifold redundancies of technical equipment, 
a system breakdown or any other type of contingency can always occur. The availability of 
several centers mitigates the impact of a contingency event and allows partial compensation 
for the loss of one facility. In addition, the social costs for transferring a large number of 
staff from one location to another must not be underestimated. In any case, the desire to 
consolidate area control centers is a relevant partial indicator for (functional) preference in-
tensity and will be surveyed in the framework of this study. However, results must be inter-
preted with caution as respective stakeholders may also make the previous considerations. 
Up to this point, focus was mainly put on civil air traffic control facilities. It should be 
noted that FABEC member states also operate military air traffic control centers with dif-
ferent levels of integration between civil and military ATC.154 Should governments be in 
favor of including the military part in their center consolidation plans, the preferred level of 
integration would be significantly enhanced.    
In order to not only give attention to the operational side of air traffic management, 
but also to the regulatory level, this study will also assess the governmental preference with 
regard to the institutional setup of the national supervisory authorities, the regulatory bodies 
at national level. As ATM regulation and oversight is one area where more uniformity can 
contribute to better cooperation and increased integration, the preferred future organization 
of today’s nation-based supervisory and regulatory system shall be assessed. In light of the 
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  FAA (2011). 
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  A ‘virtual center’ is composed of a number of physically existing control centers that are equipped with the 
same ATM technology and work with identical procedures based on a coordinated sector structure, thereby 
conducting ATS operations basically as if only one single center existed. See also MOSAIC (2008): 3-
53ff. 
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  See table 4. 
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integration efforts in the FABEC framework, it could be conceivable to have one single su-
pervisory authority for the entire FABEC airspace instead, which of course would signify a 
relevant step towards integration as this may also be considered a very sensitive area.155 To 
conclude, the following composite indicator is chosen to measure ‘preference intensity’:    
Operational definition Level of measurement 
Preferred level of integration:  
• Institutional: Operational definition of ‘level of integration’ accord-
ing to sub-section 4.2.2 applies 
• Functional: Level of preferred de facto integration with regard to 1) 
ANSP institutional model (including preferred functional centraliza-
tion in the framework of an alliance model); 2) consolidation of area 
control centers (excluding or including military ATC); and 3) SA in-
stitutional setup 
Ordinal scale 
Table 14: Operational definition of ‘preference intensity’  
Data acquisition 
When intending to measure ‘preference intensity’ the first step is to ascertain which gov-
ernmental authority or unit has to be targeted to be able to acquire the relevant indicators. 
As the idea is to obtain an ‘official’ government position on the subject of air traffic man-
agement development in the framework of FABEC, one will have to approach the respec-
tive expert organization within the government structure. Civil aviation matters are nor-
mally dealt with by ministries of transport (MoT), where the civil aviation authorities 
(CAAs), the regulatory and supervisory bodies at national level, are also allocated. It can be 
assumed that official governmental positions on aviation related matters will be established 
by CAAs / ministries of transport and ultimately formally adopted by the national legisla-
tive and executive bodies. However, when it comes to supranational integration projects 
such as FABEC, the military dimension is extensively concerned as well. The correspond-
ing ministries of defense may therefore also be expected to form an opinion on the issue. As 
was explained in the previous chapter, military aviation requirements will usually be articu-
lated by the authority carrying out respective tasks within the defense system, namely the 
air force. The possibility exists that conflicting or contradictory positions could emerge be-
tween civil and military authorities at government level. As FABEC may be considered a 
                                                        
155
  See table 6. 
Methodological Approach 
  
137 
‘civil’ project (as part of the Single European Sky, which is an integral component of the 
EU Transport Policy156) with intense participation of the military, this study assumes that 
the MoTs and/or CAAs aggregate the different perceptions and consolidate them to an offi-
cial state position. When assessing the influence of societal actors, ensuring the inclusion of 
the ministry of defense / air force perspective will accommodate the military view.157 Thus 
the evaluation of data will show whether the above assumption is correct. In conclusion, the 
national ministries of transport or civil aviation authorities are the actors to be addressed 
when ascertaining governmental preference intensity with regard to FABEC. The following 
table lists the respective authorities per FABEC state: 
Country Name of MoT / CAA Website 
Belgium Federal Public Service Mobility and Transport www.mobilit.fgov.be 
France Direction General de l’Aviation Civile www.dgac.fr 
Germany Federal Ministry of Transport, Building and Urban Develop-
ment www.bmvbs.de 
Luxembourg Direction de l’Aviation Civile www.dac.public.lu 
The Netherlands Ministry of Infrastructure and the Environment www.rijksoverheid.nl 
Switzerland Federal Office of Civil Aviation www.bazl.admin.ch 
Table 15: Ministries of Transport / Civil Aviation Authorities of FABEC member states 
According to the operational definition of this concept the official nation state preference 
with regard to institutional (decision-making) and functional (de facto) integration in the 
framework of FABEC has to be assessed. One possibility is to look for government position 
papers that cover the respective indicators; these are made use of where available. How-
ever, the interviews with relevant experts of the ministries of transport / civil aviation au-
thorities are the main source of information. Besides being an effective means to acquire 
up-to-date information, another advantage of this method is the opportunity to gather addi-
tional data about potentially perceived (negative) effects from FABEC integration, in order 
to obtain an additional supportive dimension of the preference intensity concept and to 
compare the government view with the domestic stakeholders’ perceptions. The relevant 
ordinal categories of the institutional dimensions of integration were already defined in sub-
                                                        
156
  See European Commission (2001a): 36f. 
157
  See sub-section 4.2.3. 
Methodological Approach 
  
138 
section 4.2.2 and will be referred to in the interview questions. In addition, the categories of 
the functional dimension have to be specified. This is done in accordance with the dimen-
sions explored during operationalization of ‘preference intensity’, taking into consideration 
the sensitivity aspects according to table 6. This results in the following ordinal response 
categories (categories with increased sensitivity in terms of national security, sovereignty, 
or economy are printed in bold). Economically sensitive areas in the perspective of air 
navigation service providers are not highlighted, as they depend on the level of physical in-
tegration and compensatory distribution of functions among FABEC ANSPs. 
Dimensions Categories 
Institutional model for        
Supervisory Authorities (SAs) 
• Status quo (one SA per state) 
• One Supervisory Authority for the entire FABEC 
Institutional model for air 
navigation service providers  
(ANSPs) 
• Contractual cooperation model (no centralized management) 
• Alliance model (centralized management only in selected functional 
areas; see below) 
• Single ANSP (fully centralized management) 
In case of Alliance model: 
Centralized management of 
functions 
• Safety management 
• Performance management 
• Airspace and capacity management (including Air Traffic Flow Man-
agement) 
• Civil air traffic control service (GAT) 
• Military air traffic control service (OAT) 
• Collection of charges 
• Selection and procurement of ATM technical systems  
• Aeronautical information management 
• ANS staff training 
• Relations with social partners (including negotiation of labor con-
tracts) 
Area control center (ACC)    
scenario  
• Status quo 
• Status quo with harmonized ATM technical systems and procedures 
• Status quo, but ‘virtual center’ with fully interoperable technology 
• Reduced number of control centers (possibly also with ‘virtual center’ 
technology); number of ACCs to be specified per country 
• Single control center for the entire FABEC area (excluding military 
ATC) 
• Single control center for the entire FABEC area (including military 
ATC) 
Table 16: Category system related to functional integration in the area of ATM 
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Because this survey is conducted in an international context, an online questionnaire is 
again used to collect the required material. After identification of the relevant contacts with 
the necessary expert knowledge at the ministries of transport / civil aviation authorities of 
FABEC member states, the respective online link is provided to these individuals. Reliabil-
ity of this data acquisition method was discussed in the previous sub-section. 
4.2.5 Bargaining power in international negotiation settings 
The ‘bargaining power of a nation state’ when placed in an international negotiation setting 
relating to policy coordination and integration was specified by the following four dimen-
sions (in the order of priority): 1) a nation state’s capacity for unilateral policy definition; 
2) a low preference intensity; 3) its ability to form alternate coalitions; and 4) the possibil-
ity for compromise, issue linkage, and side payments. The first dimension, the capacity for 
unilateral policy definition, was explained as the ability of a nation state to define its own 
uncoordinated policies in a specific issue area without facing negative policy externalities. 
As every nation state is sovereign and therefore has the basic capacity to pursue its own 
policies, the main question is whether a state wants to make use of this capacity. This in 
turn depends on the extent to which negative policy externalities are apprehended in case of 
an uncoordinated policy situation. Obviously, according to liberal-intergovernmentalist the-
ory, negative policy externalities are predominantly experienced by societal actors, which 
will subsequently be reflected in their individual group preference intensities conveyed to 
government. Then again, a national government may conduct its own assessment as to po-
tential negative effects from non-integration, which could partially determine its motivation 
for policy coordination. Consequently, the indicator to measure the capacity for unilateral 
policy definition shall be the assessment by national governments as to potential negative 
externalities from non-coordination, whereupon an increased perception of negative exter-
nalities signifies a low unilateral capacity to act. When interpreting theory, no direct posi-
tive correlation should exist between this operational definition and the indicator for ‘pref-
erence intensity’, since the latter is supposed to be determined through aggregation of pref-
erences of influential societal actors and not by governmental assessment of policy exter-
nalities. Ideally, but not necessarily, the two opinions will coincide. The separate acquisi-
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tion of both indicators thus provides an opportunity to partially assess the validity of the 
first hypothesis.158 
The second dimension of a nation’s negotiation power, preference intensity, was al-
ready operationalized in the previous sub-section. The respective operational definition ap-
plies.  
The third and fourth dimensions, the ability to form alternate coalitions to achieve 
identical policy objectives and the possibility for compromise, issue linkage, and side pay-
ments, are both to a large extent subject to the evaluation by national governments. As far 
as the forming of coalitions is concerned, there are certain objective restrictions when it 
comes to the availability of respective options in the field of air traffic management. Func-
tional airspace blocks make sense only between adjacent countries, since the main goal of 
these constructs is to create an airspace continuum across national boundaries. The same 
applies to procedural and technical harmonization, the benefits of which will only material-
ize across direct interfaces. Therefore, only nations at the periphery of respective FABs 
would have a choice of alternate cooperation. Naturally the possibility exists for states to 
seek policy coordination in other sub-domains of ATM that are not automatically connected 
to geographical vicinity, such as training and ATM technology. However, it can generally 
be said that in order for policy coordination to be effective, the one-continuum requirement 
applies to the entire field of ATM, and minimally to the European core area with its high-
density air traffic. Nevertheless, it is ultimately up to the governments to consider feasible 
alternative coalitions. The same is valid as far as room for compromise, side payments, or 
issue linkage is concerned. Governments (and parliaments) will have to decide on possible 
exchange options within or across issue areas. The chosen indicators for these two dimen-
sions are the assessment by national governments as to the possibility to form alternate 
coalitions and/or to establish compromises, issue linkages, or side payments, respectively. 
Criticism may arise because these operational definitions only make reference to govern-
mental evaluations and do not cover the de facto opportunities resulting from the actual ne-
gotiation process. However, it may be expected that a nation state is aware of its potential 
‘give-aways’ that could be of interest to a negotiation partner. And even in the case of non-
response to a respective offer, it is an indication of the relatively stronger position of the 
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negotiation counterpart, which should already be reflected by the previous dimensions of 
higher priority.          
Dimensions  
(in order of priority) Operational definition Level of measurement 
Capacity for unilateral pol-
icy definition 
Assessment by national governments as to po-
tential negative externalities from non-
coordination  
Ordinal scale 
Low preference intensity According to sub-section 4.2.4 Ordinal scale 
Ability to form alternate        
coalitions 
Assessment by national governments as to the 
possibility to form alternate coalitions Ordinal scale 
Possibility for compromise,    
issue linkage, and side pay-
ments 
Assessment by national governments as to the 
possibility to establish compromises, issue 
linkages, or side payments 
Ordinal scale 
Table 17: Operational definition of ‘bargaining power in international negotiation settings’ 
Data acquisition 
The indicator for ‘bargaining power in international negotiation settings’ is intended to 
measure features pertaining to a nation state or national government that promote a strong 
position when negotiating international accords relating to the establishment of functional 
airspace blocks, such as the FABEC Treaty. A relatively strong position implies that the na-
tion’s own interests can be accommodated in the respective agreement. Apart from prefer-
ence intensity, which is appraised in accordance with the previous sub-section, measure-
ment of all other dimensions listed above is based on governmental assessments about the 
negative impact of non-integration and their ability to enter coalitions, to compromise, link 
issues, or make side payments as back-up strategies for negotiation. As these operational 
definitions are perception based and cannot be presumed to appear in any official docu-
ment, the study makes use of the online interview method already employed to ascertain 
governmental preference intensity, which is a component of the present concept. The ques-
tionnaire is thus supplemented by questions relating to the remaining concept dimensions 
and by ordinal response categories, allowing the respondents to state to what extent they 
expect negative impacts from non-coordinated policies and whether they have any back-up 
options at their disposal. However, the questions do not ask governments to specify which 
concrete alternate possibilities they recognize, as this is not relevant to this investigation 
and most probably would not be answered due to the potentially sensitive nature of this 
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kind of information. The reliability discussion about the online interview method held in 
sub-section 4.2.3 applies.  
Dimensions  Categories 
Capacity for unilateral policy 
definition 
• Very significant  
• Significant  
• Of little significance  
• Insignificant 
• Not assessable / no opinion 
Preference intensity According to sub-section 4.2.4 
Ability to form alternate         
coalitions 
• Yes 
• No 
• No opinion 
Possibility for compromise, issue 
linkage, and side payments 
• Yes 
• Yes, but limited options 
• No 
• No opinion 
Table 18: Coding agenda for ‘bargaining power in international negotiation settings’ 
4.2.6 Regulatory autonomy of a supranational organization 
The ‘regulatory autonomy of a supranational organization in the policy domain of air traffic 
management’ constitutes the independent variable of the third hypothesis.159 In the theoreti-
cal chapter this concept was specified by the regulatory scope and the degree of independ-
ence from national influences in the agenda setting and decision-making phase during the 
process of policymaking.160 Evidently there is a close analogy to the theoretical/operational 
specification of the ‘level of integration’ concept. It would therefore seem logical to apply 
the same operational definition. However, theory puts an increased focus on the aspect of 
agenda setting, which was not explicitly considered a relevant issue when operationalizing 
‘level of integration’. Agenda setting becomes particularly important when a supranational 
organization covers a wide area of different issue areas that are not yet regulated in detail 
and require further specification. The European Union, assigned rather broad scopes ac-
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cording to the respective treaties, often enjoys a fairly large ‘freedom’ of regulation in re-
lated policy areas. In this case, the definition of what should be on the agenda and who de-
fines it suddenly becomes a paramount issue. On the other hand, a supranational organiza-
tion regulating a relatively narrow functional scope, as would be true for an integrated func-
tional airspace block like FABEC, is limited in terms of the topics subject to agenda setting 
and subsequent decision-making. It is thus permissible to exclude the agenda setting aspect 
when analyzing concrete integration projects in the field of air traffic management, but to 
include it when concentrating on the EU level. 
Hence, as the European Union is the focus of the respective hypothesis, it needs to be 
analyzed whether and to what extent agenda setting and decision-making on this level are 
influenced by member states. With regard to the first part, the degree of involvement of 
states in the agenda setting process will be subject to investigation. As far as the independ-
ence of the decision-making process from national influences is concerned, it seems practi-
cal to apply the same operational definition as for ‘level of integration’, being the suprana-
tional decision-making procedure in terms of majority, qualified majority, or unanimous 
voting in the various bodies and different stages of the decision process related to ATM in-
tegration. Although supranational decision-making will never be completely without the in-
fluence of member states, the options of individual states to superimpose national interests 
become strongly limited as soon as majority voting comes into play. Finally, the scope of 
issues that can be added to the supranational agenda and for which decisions are possible 
fully corresponds to the functional decision-making scope as part of the ‘level of integra-
tion’ specification. The respective operational definition including sensitivity assessment 
applies.161  
The various dimensions of definitions used to operationalize ‘level of integration’ 
were put in a priority order to permit differentiation between combinations of diverging at-
tributes. The same order of priority shall apply here. In addition, however, the issue of 
agenda setting needs to be included. Because agenda setting constitutes the starting point of 
decision-making, all other dimensions will be without effect if during the agenda setting 
phase supranational independence is low. It thus will be rated first priority. In conclusion, 
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the following set of definitions is used to operationalize the regulatory autonomy of a su-
pranational organization in this order of priority: 
Dimension Operational definition Lvl of measurement 
degree of involvement of member states during 
supranational agenda setting Ordinal scale 
Vertical 
supranational organization’s voting procedure in 
the different regulatory bodies Ordinal scale 
Sectoral 
Weighted 
combination of 
the 
extent and sensitivity of the supranational organi-
zation’s functional decision-making scope, where 
sensitivity is determined according to table 6 
Ordinal scale 
Table 19: Operational definition of ‘regulatory autonomy of a supranational organization’ 
Data acquisition 
Regulatory autonomy is linked to the competences available to the institutional bodies of a 
supranational organization provided to them by international agreements. In the case of the 
EU, the legal foundation is the system of treaties establishing the European Union. As the 
corresponding hypothesis does not assume an automatic correlation between density of 
regulation and EU regulatory autonomy in respect of SES I and SES II, measurement of the 
latter needs to take place in the respective timeframes that have been defined above.162 
Moreover, since the first dimension of the operational definition alludes to the agenda set-
ting process, the relevant period is to be extended forward compared to the timeframe for 
the dependent variable. As was shown earlier, formal initiation of SES I and SES II regula-
tory packages was effected by communications from the European Commission on 6 De-
cember 1999 for SES I,163 and on 25 June 2008 for SES II.164 Obviously, the related items 
were put on the agenda at least several months before issuance of these communications.165 
Consequently, the consideration of developments of EU treaties has to cover the entire 
timeframe from mid-1999 until adoption of the SES II legislative package. This rather ex-
tended time span has seen a significant evolution of the treaty system of the European Un-
ion. This system mainly consists of two treaties, the Treaty on European Union (TEU) and 
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the Treaty establishing the European Community (TEC), the title of which was changed in 
2009 to Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU). The Treaty on European 
Union contains the principal provisions as well as the overall objectives of the EU and es-
tablishes the respective institutions. It defines the privileges of member states and regulates 
the common foreign and security policy of the Union, as well as the police and judicial co-
operation in criminal matters. The Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union goes 
into further detail and in particular lists those policy areas where the European Union en-
joys regulatory competences, and governs the functioning of the various EU institutions. 
This is also the treaty that aims at establishing a common market and economic and mone-
tary union, and implementing common policies in order for that goal to be achieved.166 As 
far as the civil aviation sector – the focus of the present study – is concerned, the relevant 
provisions are expected to be largely contained here, as a common market issue is ad-
dressed. There may, however, be restrictions with regard to security related aspects which 
mainly rest under national control of member states. In that respect, the Treaty on European 
Union may also be applicable and subject to analysis.  
Two major amendments revised the mentioned treaty system during the timeframe 
relevant for this study. They were brought about by the Treaty of Nice, effective from 1 
February 2003, and by the Treaty of Lisbon, effective from 1 January 2009. From May 
1999 until February 2003, the EU legal system was based on the Treaty of Amsterdam. 
Hence, the consolidated versions of the Treaty on European Union (TEU) and the Treaty 
establishing the European Community (TEC) / Treaty on Functioning of the European Un-
ion (TFEU) as amended by the Treaties of Amsterdam, Nice, and Lisbon respectively are 
the appropriate sources to determine the agenda setting and decision autonomy of the EU. 
The following table shows the relevant phases of the policy cycle related to the Single 
European Sky and, alongside, the respective amending treaties in effect during these 
phases:  
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  See article 2 TEC (as amended by the Treaty of Amsterdam). 
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SES package Policy cycle phase Amending treaties in effect 
Agenda setting (1999) 
(1st Communication: 06/12/1999) 
1st Commission Proposal (30/11/2001)167 
Amsterdam 
Adoption (10/03/2004) 
Implementation (2004-2007) 
I 
Post-implementation Evaluation (2007) 
Agenda setting (2007-2008) 
Commission Proposal (25/06/2008) 
Nice 
Adoption (21/10/2009) 
II 
Implementation (2009-today) 
Lisbon 
Table 20: Amending treaties in effect during SES related policy cycles  
The sections of the treaties (TEU and TEC/TFEU) referring to competences and decision-
making procedures of European Union institutional bodies, as well as all aviation and air 
traffic management related content, will be subjected to a qualitative examination using re-
spective treaty articles as units of analysis. After a description of the relevant policy-making 
processes, the following coding agenda will be applied to assess (in accordance with the 
operational definition of the theoretical concept) the values of the variables under investiga-
tion, taking into account the different bodies of the European Union. As far as the decision 
scope is concerned, one may expect that EU law will not address the level of detail in terms 
of ATM relevant functional areas. It is nonetheless of significance whether the European 
Union possesses the authority to regulate areas which have a direct impact on these fields. 
The sensitivity assessment is thus of importance as well. Method reliability is assumed to 
exist in accordance with the respective discussion in sub-section 4.2.2. The only limitation 
may be seen in terms of inter-rater reliability, as it may be difficult for someone not very 
familiar with the air traffic management domain to recognize a possible connection between 
a general EU policymaking competence and the rather specific ATM-related areas. Respec-
tive awareness is required when acquiring data based on this indicator. 
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  See European Commission (2001b). 
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Dimensions Categories 
Degree of member state involvement 
in agenda setting process 
• Full agenda setting competence with member states 
• Co-decision of member states and supranational institutions 
• Advisory competence of member states 
• No formal agenda setting competence of member states 
Supranational organization’s voting 
procedure 
• Unanimity 
• Qualified majority 
• Majority 
• No binding vote / consultative only 
Very high sensitivity from a national security  perspective: 
• Definition of airspace and route network design (including mili-
tary airspace) 
• Definition of location & area of responsibility of military area 
control centers 
High sensitivity from a national security perspective: 
• Definition of airspace and route network design (excluding 
military airspace) 
• Definition of Supervisory Authorities’ institutional setup 
• Definition of ANSP institutional setup/model 
• Definition of location & area of responsibility of civil area con-
trol centers 
• Definition of principles for civil-military cooperation 
Sensitivity from an economic perspective: 
• Definition of charging policy / en-route unit rates 
• Definition of ANSP performance objectives 
Functional scope of decision-making 
Low sensitivity: 
• Definition of safety management policies 
• Definition of airspace and capacity management (including air 
traffic flow management) principles 
• Definition of ATM operational standards and procedures 
• Definition of ATM technological standards for the FABEC area 
• Definition of AIM standards 
• Definition of ANS training standards 
Table 21: Coding agenda for ‘regulatory autonomy of a supranational organization’ 
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4.2.7 Density of supranational regulation promoting ATM integration 
The final theoretical concept requiring an operational definition is the dependent variable 
included in hypothesis 2.168 As this hypothesis does not suggest a causal relationship be-
tween variables on the level of the specific integration project under study (FABEC) but 
rather on the level of the overarching supranational organization (the European Union), the 
focus lies on the regulatory backbone of the Single European Sky, which subsequently may 
promote steps of integration at the regional, or more specifically at FABEC level. This im-
plies that the rules to be looked at are those which are either directly aimed at harmoniza-
tion or integration in the framework of a functional airspace block, or which indirectly at-
tempt to incentivize member states to engage in corresponding integrative activities. If 
regulation affects areas that are considered to be of increased sensitivity,169 it implies an 
additional relevance of the respective regulatory content. Hence, density does not only in-
clude a quantitative, but also a qualitative dimension that needs to be taken into account.  
As far as the quantitative dimension is concerned, legal obligations in the European 
Union are normally defined through Regulations (directly applicable in all EU member 
states), Directives (binding as to the result to be achieved but open in respect of the method 
applied) or Decisions (binding for those they are addressed to).170 These enactments are ei-
ther issued in the framework of the ordinary legislative procedure, where a regulatory pro-
posal is initiated by the European Commission and subsequently treated both by the Coun-
cil and the European Parliament, to be adopted in both legislative bodies; or by means of a 
non-legislative act, where the Commission regulates the implementation of an issue based 
on a delegated authority from Council and Parliament (so called implementing rule).171 
Hence, the density of regulation in quantitative terms will increase as more legislative and 
non-legislative acts are (directly or indirectly) aimed at advancing the creation of FABs. 
Consequently, the present study will assess the number of EU legal enactments which are 
                                                        
168
  See section 1.4. 
169
  See table 6. 
170
  See article 288 TFEU (as amended by the Treaty of Lisbon). 
171
  According to article 289ff. TFEU (as amended by the Treaty of Lisbon); see also sub-section 2.2.2. 
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related to the promotion of harmonization and/or integration in the framework of func-
tional airspace blocks. There is little purpose in counting single provisions or articles as 
normally they are logically interconnected and thus need to be appreciated as a whole. On 
the qualitative side, the degree of impact on sensitive areas is analyzed in accordance with 
table 6. This should provide a comprehensive overview of the regulatory activities by the 
European Union in the area of ATM and FABs and also give an indication of how far su-
pranational regulation is able to overcome potential areas of sensitive national interest, es-
pecially when compared to the results derived from the analysis of domestic preference 
formation and national preference intensities. The following table summarizes the intended 
operationalization for ‘regulatory density’: 
Dimension Operational definition Level of measurement 
Quantitative 
Number of EU legal enactments related to the promotion of 
harmonization and/or integration in the framework of       
functional airspace blocks 
Ratio scale 
Qualitative Degree of impact on sensitive areas according to the defini-tion in table 6 Ordinal scale 
Table 22: Operational definition of ‘density of EU regulation promoting ATM integration’  
Data acquisition 
The objective is to ascertain legal enactments at the level of the European Union which 
promote harmonization and particularly integration in the field of air traffic management, 
specifically the creation of functional airspace blocks. As FAB development was originally 
initiated by the SES legal framework, the latter continues to be a decisive factor in influenc-
ing respective results, especially in those cases where a complex and fragmented interest 
structure prevails at the level of nation states. Consequently, European Union law is the ob-
ject of investigation, which implies application of the content analysis method in order to 
measure the operationalized concept. As the evolution of the EU legal context related to 
SES is in focus here, the indicator is assessed in two succeeding time periods that display 
different intensities in terms of SES regulatory activities. As mentioned earlier, they are re-
ferred to as SES I and SES II regulatory packages. The formulation and adoption of both 
packages extends to a longer timeframe, as legislative procedures are time-consuming and 
do not produce results over night. The following table lists the relevant regulatory acts con-
tained in these two packages and their respective time periods:  
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SES Framework        Regulation Enactments / Implementing Rules 
Framework Regulation (EC) No 549/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 10 
March 2004 laying down the framework for the creation of the single European sky 
Commission regulation (EC) No 2096/2005 of 20 December 2005 laying 
down common requirements for the provision of air navigation services  
Commission Regulation (EC) No 1794/2006 of 6 December 2006 laying 
down a common charging scheme for air navigation services  
Commission Regulation (EC) No 1315/2007 of 8 November 2007 on 
safety oversight in air traffic management and amending Regulation (EC) 
No 2096/2005  
Commission Regulation (EC) No 668/2008 of 15 July 2008 amending An-
nexes II to V of Regulation (EC) No 2096/2005 laying down common re-
quirements for the provision of air navigation services, as regards working 
methods and operating procedures 
Service Provision 
Regulation  
(EC) No 550/2004  
 
Commission Regulation (EC) No 482/2008 of 30 May 2008 establishing a 
software safety assurance system to be implemented by air navigation ser-
vice providers and amending Annex II to Regulation (EC) No 2096/2005  
Commission Regulation (EC) No 2150/2005 of 23 December 2005 laying 
down common rules for the flexible use of airspace  
Airspace Regulation  
(EC) No 551/2004  Commission Regulation (EC) No 730/2006 of 11 May 2006 on airspace 
classification and access of flights operated under visual flight rules above 
flight level 195  
Commission Regulation (EC) No 1032/2006 of 6 July 2006 laying down 
requirements for automatic systems for the exchange of flight data for the 
purpose of notification, coordination and transfer of flights between air 
traffic control units  
Commission Regulation (EC) No 1033/2006 of 4 July 2006 laying down 
requirements on procedures for flight plans in the pre-flight phase for the 
single European sky 
Commission Regulation (EC) No 633/2007 of 7 June 2007 laying down 
requirements for the application of a flight message transfer protocol used 
for the purpose of notification, coordination and transfer of flights between 
air traffic control units  
Commission Regulation (EC) No 1265/2007 of 26 October 2007 laying 
down requirements on air-ground voice channel spacing for the single 
European sky  
Commission Regulation (EC) No 29/2009 of 16 January 2009 laying down 
requirements on data link services for the single European sky  
Commission Regulation (EC) No 30/2009 of 16 January 2009 amending 
Regulation (EC) No 1032/2006 as far as the requirements for automatic 
systems for the exchange of flight data supporting data link services are 
concerned  
I 
Interoperability   
Regulation  
(EC) No 552/2004  
 
Commission Regulation (EC) No 262/2009 of 30 March 2009 laying down 
requirements for the coordinated allocation and use of Mode S interrogator 
codes for the single European sky  
 
Methodological Approach 
  
151 
 
SES Framework        Regulation Enactments / Implementing Rules 
Regulation (EC) No 1070/2009 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 October 2009 
amending Regulations (EC) No 549/2004, (EC) No 550/2004, (EC) No 551/2004 and (EC) No 
552/2004 in order to improve the performance and sustainability of the European aviation system 
(Proposal via COM(2008)388 of 25JUN2008) 
Commission Regulation (EU) No 691/2010 of 29 July 2010 laying down 
a performance scheme for air navigation services and network functions 
and amending Regulation (EC) No 2096/2005 laying down common re-
quirements for the provision of air navigation services 
Commission Regulation (EU) No 1191/2010 of 16 December 2010 
amending Regulation (EC) No 1794/2006 laying down a common charg-
ing scheme for air navigation services 
Commission Regulation (EU) No 176/2011 of 24 February 2011 on the 
information to be provided before the establishment and modification of 
a functional airspace block 
Service Provision 
Regulation 
Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) No 1034/2011 of 
17 October 2011 on safety oversight in air traffic management and air 
navigation services and amending Regulation (EU) No 691/2010 
Commission Regulation (EU) No 255/2010 of 25 March 2010 laying 
down common rules on air traffic flow management  
Airspace Regulation Commission Regulation (EU) No 677/2011 of 7 July 2011 laying down 
detailed rules for the implementation of air traffic management (ATM) 
network functions and amending Regulation (EU) No 691/2010 
Commission Regulation (EU) No 73/2010 of 26 January 2010 laying 
down requirements on the quality of aeronautical data and aeronautical 
information for the single European sky  Interoperability   
Regulation Commission Regulation (EU) No 929/2010 of 18 October 2010 amend-
ing Regulation (EC) No 1033/2006 as regards the ICAO provisions re-
ferred to in Article 3(1)  
Council Decision of 30 March 2009 endorsing the European Air Traffic 
Management Master Plan of the Single European Sky ATM Research 
(SESAR) project 
Commission Decision of 29 July 2010 on the designation of the Perform-
ance Review Body of the Single European Sky [C(2010)5134] 
II 
Decisions 
Commission Decision of 07 July 2011 on the nomination of the Network 
Manager for the air traffic management (ATM) network functions of the 
single European sky [C(2011)4130] 
Table 23: Legal enactments related to the Single European Sky (October 2011) 
As noted before, the indicator is split into a quantitative and a qualitative dimension. The 
quantitative dimension refers to the number of EU legislative and non-legislative acts that 
have been issued in the respective time periods and are related to promoting the establish-
ment of functional airspace blocks. The qualitative dimension intends to measure whether 
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corresponding acts have an impact on sensitive areas in terms of national security and sov-
ereignty. The effect on the domestic societal actors’ perspective of economic sensitivity is 
also included. To obtain the information in these two dimensions, the relevant enactments 
related to SES have to be qualitatively examined in terms of their content, using individual 
articles as basis for analysis. The coding of articles begins with the assessment of whether a 
specific legal act has the potential of promoting harmonization and/or integration in the 
framework of functional airspace blocks, by which a first triage is conducted. This step al-
lows the quantitative dimension of the indicator to be determined. In a second step, it will 
be established whether a legal act is directly or indirectly related to the creation of FABs. In 
other words, does the law mandate member states to harmonize or integrate in a certain 
FAB-relevant area, or does it define specific requirements that can only be satisfactorily 
achieved by means of increased integration, and thus try to incentivize the evolution of 
functional airspace blocks? In a third step, the nationally and economically relevant sensi-
tivity of the ATM policy areas affected by EU law is ascertained in accordance with table 6. 
Test-retest, parallel-forms and inter-rater reliability may be assumed. 
Dimensions Categories 
Potential to promote FAB      
integration  
• Yes 
• No 
Relation to FAB integration 
• Direct 
• Indirect 
Very high sensitivity from a national security perspective: 
• Definition of airspace and route network design (including military 
airspace) 
• Definition of location & area of responsibility of military area con-
trol centers 
Nationally relevant sensitivity of 
affected policy areas  
High sensitivity from a national security perspective: 
• Definition of airspace and route network design (excluding military 
airspace) 
• Definition of Supervisory Authorities’ institutional setup 
• Definition of ANSP institutional setup/model  
• Definition of location & area of responsibility of civil area control 
centers 
• Definition of principles for civil-military cooperation 
Economically relevant sensitiv-
ity of affected policy areas 
• Definition of charging policy / air navigation service charges 
• Definition of ANSP performance objectives  
Table 24: Coding agenda for ‘density of EU regulation with regard to FAB integration’ 
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5 EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 
Chapter introduction and summary 
This chapter presents the empirical results retrieved from data acquisition, which was car-
ried out in accordance with the methodology detailed in the previous chapter. The level of 
integration achieved hitherto in the context of FABEC has not advanced beyond an inter-
governmental cooperation structure. In particular the unanimous voting rule precludes any 
supranational character of the Council, FABEC’s governance body. In respect of influenc-
ing power of domestic societal actors, analysis of the selected FABEC member states 
shows that unsurprisingly the military component – as a governmental institution – is ex-
pected to have the strongest impact on policymaking related to FABEC, followed by the 
ANSPs, which face strong concernment from integrative processes in air traffic manage-
ment and are involved to a large extent in the concrete development process. Airlines are 
less affected on the organizational level, but generally expect a positive operational impact 
from FABEC integration. Still, the involvement of airlines in respective decision-making 
processes is limited to consultation only. Finally ATCO staff associations, although poten-
tially highly affected even at the level of the individual, enjoy only marginal influence op-
portunities at the national level and therefore have unionized in the framework of a trans-
national interest group. Preference intensity towards FABEC integration is assessed as 
highest in the Netherlands, followed by Switzerland, France, and then Germany, where for 
the time being only a cooperative approach is aspired to in certain functional areas. This 
corresponds reciprocally to the assessment of bargaining power, which is estimated as 
lowest for the Netherlands, followed by Switzerland and highest for France and Germany. 
As to the supranationalist concepts, EU regulation that is potentially able to indirectly 
promote FAB development has significantly intensified from SES I to SES II, whereas is-
sue areas of higher sensitivity to nation states still remain unaffected. On the other hand, 
general regulatory competences of the EU in the domain of ATM have not increased. 
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5.1 Liberal-intergovernmentalist concepts 
5.1.1 Level of FABEC integration 
As described in sub-section 4.2.2, the level of integration refers to the vertical and sectoral 
decision-making competence deferred by the FABEC Treaty to the FABEC Council, con-
stituting the relevant (future) governance body of this integration project. Recall that the 
treaty has not yet come into force, as the ratification process is still ongoing. Analysis of 
the FABEC Treaty along the defined indicator dimensions yields the following results: 
Dimensions Categories 
Voting procedure in the FABEC 
Council • Unanimity (article 23.2) 
Enforcement of policy decisions 
• Appeal to a Court of Arbitration (application of the Permanent 
Court of Arbitration optional Rules for arbitrating disputes be-
tween two States; article 32.2) 
Very high sensitivity from a national security  perspective: 
• Definition of airspace and route network design (including mili-
tary airspace; article 8) 
High sensitivity from a national security perspective: 
• Definition of principles for civil-military cooperation (articles 
9.1-9.3, 17) 
Sensitivity from an economic perspective: 
• Definition of charging policy / en-route unit rates (article 18) 
• Definition of ANSP performance objectives (article 20) Functional scope of decision-
making (derived from all treaty arti-
cles, but in particular article 22.2) 
Low sensitivity: 
• Support implementation of a common safety management sys-
tem (article 10.3) 
• Ensure establishment of common airspace and capacity man-
agement (including air traffic flow management) function (arti-
cle 9.4) 
• Ensure harmonization of ATM operational standards and proce-
dures (articles 10.1, 10.2, 10.4) 
• Ensure harmonization of ATM technical systems (article 13) 
• Ensure coordination of aeronautical information service provi-
sion (article 14) 
Table 25: Analysis of the FABEC Treaty with regard to its level of integration 
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Findings 
Analysis of the FABEC Treaty demonstrates that the level of FABEC integration is fairly 
low at this stage of development. The main reason for this blunt assessment is the applica-
bility of the unanimity rule for FABEC Council decisions. Unanimity implies that each 
individual contracting state has the possibility to veto and thus block any decision in the 
Council, should the result of that decision not be satisfactory to the respective govern-
ment. The unanimous voting principle could be problematic, as it has the potential of en-
dangering progress in FAB evolution and risks outcomes on the level of the lowest com-
mon denominator. Consequently, the FABEC Treaty does not actually establish a govern-
ance body with supranational character, but leaves all decision-making authority with in-
dividual nation states. As mutual agreement is required for any Council resolution, policy 
enforcement – as addressed by the second dimension – should be a minor issue. States are 
expected to fulfill the requirements and obligations they have agreed to. In case of a dis-
pute between contracting states as to the interpretation of a defined measure, the option 
exists to first address the issue to the FABEC Council, and if the issue cannot be resolved 
on that level, they may refer the question under dispute to an arbitral tribunal, which has 
the power to inflict a binding award on the states under arbitration.172 This kind of en-
forcement mechanism appears reasonable in order to ensure uniform application of treaty 
provisions. Moving on to the third dimension, the functional scope of the FABEC Council 
seems to be quite extensive, particularly when it comes to ensuring the harmonization of 
procedures, services, and infrastructure. This includes the establishment of a common 
safety management system as well as the implementation of common technical equipment. 
A common airspace management function and the coordination of AIS and meteorological 
services are also part of the treaty. All these fields can still be considered to be of low sen-
sitivity. Most of the high sensitivity topics are not even covered by the treaty, despite the 
requirement for consensus on all issues. This concerns institutional questions such as the 
definition of governance models for supervisory authorities and air navigation service 
provision, or of control center locations. It must be presumed that although an institutional 
consolidation of air navigation service providers and national regulators could have syner-
getic and thus cost-reducing effects and would facilitate functional integration in general, 
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  According to article 32 (2) of the Permanent Court of Arbitration optional Rules for arbitrating disputes 
between two States. 
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national obstacles are still too high to take this route. The only more sensitive areas gov-
erned at FABEC level are airspace design as well as matters of civil-military cooperation. 
The contracting states are to establish written arrangements to promote the implementation 
of cross-border training areas and to foster the flexible use of airspace between civil and 
military traffic. Moreover, these arrangements even allow for tactical control of OAT by a 
unit in a neighboring state. It is evident that these are crucial matters to enable an air traf-
fic management system with increased operational performance. As was shown earlier, 
benefits for civil aircraft operators such as shorter and more direct routes as well as im-
proved system capacity can only be brought about by reorganizing the airspace and airway 
structure and by finding optimized provisions for civil/military airspace use. Another im-
portant instrument at FABEC level to enhance ATM system performance is the compe-
tence of the Council to define common performance targets based on a FABEC perform-
ance plan. Notwithstanding the need to be consistent with EU-wide target settings, it pro-
vides the FABEC Council with a tool to introduce binding performance requirements 
across all FABEC member states. The FABEC Treaty also states the intention to establish 
a single unit rate for en-route traffic within the entire FABEC area. A single unit rate 
could alleviate today’s ‘competition between airspaces’, where airlines choose the cheap-
est routings for their flights and – obviously depending on fuel prices – even accept a de-
tour. It may therefore assist in optimizing the airway network. Yet, in spite of quite a sig-
nificant functional scope placed at FABEC level, the unanimity principle still allows con-
tracting states to put their individual interests to the fore at any time if deemed necessary, 
and so it remains uncertain whether the FABEC Council will in fact be able to find con-
certed yet effective solutions in the areas of competence assigned to it.   
5.1.2 Influencing power and preferences of domestic stakeholders  
As the concept of ‘influencing power’ takes effect at the domestic level, measurement and 
analysis of respective indicator data acquired from stakeholders is conducted per nation 
state. Examination of different dimensions is performed in accordance with the priority 
rule defined in table 2. The following results were obtained during data acquisition: 
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Germany 
Indicator Military ANSP ATCO Staff Airline 
Level of structural       
hierarchy  
Institutionalized 
governance body 
Institutionalized 
governance body 
Institutionalized 
governance body 
with democratic 
structure 
Institutionalized 
governance body 
Level of involvement in 
decision-making       
processes 
Co-decision on 
all relevant   
matters 
Formal consulta-
tion on all rele-
vant matters; full 
involvement in 
FABEC working 
groups 
Formal consulta-
tion on selected 
matters, but no 
involvement re-
garding FABEC 
Formal consulta-
tion on all rele-
vant matters; 
weak consulta-
tion regarding 
FABEC during 
initial phase 
Number of relevant     
political stakeholders 
regular contacts are         
maintained with 
--- 
Several       
stakeholders on     
several political 
levels 
Several       
stakeholders on     
several political 
levels 
Several       
stakeholders on     
several political 
levels 
Perceived certainty of 
(positive or negative)  
effects to materialize 
Likely 
(positive and 
negative) 
Certain 
(positive and 
negative) 
Certain 
(positive and 
negative) 
Certain 
(positive) 
Perceived risk of positive 
effects not to materialize High High High Very high 
Percentage of group 
members subject to indi-
vidual financial/status-
related/cultural benefits 
and/or losses 
Not assessable Not assessable 
Benefits and 
losses are 
equally shared 
50% will benefit 
Perceived significance of 
expected impact Significant Very significant Significant Very significant 
Availability of specific 
policy objectives (level 
of integration to be 
achieved; see below*) 
Available Available Available Available 
FABEC Council voting 
rule Unanimity Qual. Majority Qual. Majority Qual. Majority 
Decision scope includes 
mil airspace No Yes Yes Yes 
Decision scope includes 
civil airspace No Yes Yes Yes 
Decision scope includes 
center locations / AoR Yes (civ.+mil.) No Yes (civ.+mil.) Yes (civ.+mil.) 
ANSP institutional model 
Alliance 
(incl. civ. ATS) 
Alliance 
(excl. ATS) Single ANSP 
Highly integrated 
alliance 
(incl. ATS) 
Number of centers Reduced Reduced Status quo Reduced 
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Indicator Military ANSP ATCO Staff Airline 
Applicable legal provi-
sions prohibiting societal 
interference of staff     
association 
--- --- 
Interference  
permitted under 
conditions (no 
political strikes) 
--- 
Number of alternative 
groups available to en-
sure identical service 
provision 
--- --- None --- 
Score 4 3 1 2 
* Only the most relevant categories are shown in this table 
Table 26: Results for ‘influencing power’ in Germany 
Findings 
All four selected organizations in Germany possess the necessary organizational capabili-
ties to engage in potentially successful influencing activities. As for the involvement in 
decision-making processes it appears that the air force, by its institutional status within the 
national government, has the best means to impact the integration process; the military en-
joys co-decision rights on all matters related to FABEC. According to its representative, 
the Ministry of Defense (MoD) was involved in all stages of FABEC development, which 
also included drafting the treaty as well as airspace design projects. Although all the other 
relevant German stakeholders are also formally consulted on matters related to their area 
of activity prior to governmental decision-making and dispose of several contacts to vari-
ous political levels, the German ANSP DFS – with its direct involvement in FABEC 
working groups – is considered to have the second best opportunity to shape decision out-
comes with regard to FABEC. Lufthansa, the German airline, has been involved in FA-
BEC consultation workshops at the initiation of the program, but subsequent influencing 
activity was mainly limited to providing comments on activities in the FABEC context. 
GdF, the German ATCO association, reports that it is lacking inclusion in FABEC devel-
opments at national level and thus attempts to have its views incorporated in the frame-
work of a transnational interest group called MARC (MOSAIC ATM Regional Coordina-
tion). MARC is composed of trade unions and professional associations representing staff 
employed by FABEC air navigation service providers. The objective of MARC is to en-
sure representation of operational staff in FABEC meetings and proceedings related to in-
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formation and consultation and to present a single social dialogue partner towards FA-
BEC, but does not intend to replace the local or national social partners.173  
In terms of the motivational factors to engage in influencing activities, both the in-
terviewed DFS expert and the GdF representative are certain that integration in the 
framework of FABEC will have both positive and negative effects on their organizations. 
For the DFS expert, FABEC would provide the opportunity to enhance performance be-
yond national possibilities, whereas on the negative side there is a risk for ANSPs to lose 
independency and that supranational compromises will have to be made, which could be 
less effective. GdF recognizes opportunities for cost savings through synergies in various 
areas, such as training and common procurement of systems, as well as the facilitation of 
airspace design. However, increased financial pressure, the loss of decision-making 
power, and unmanageable structures are seen as possible risks. Lufthansa anticipates only 
positive effects from FABEC integration, such as improved flight efficiency, enhanced 
punctuality, reduced fuel burn and emissions, as well as reduced air traffic control 
charges. The airline respondent has certain doubts whether this will be achieved, though, 
as the risk of FABEC failure is considered to be very high. The German Ministry of De-
fense assesses the impact of FABEC integration as likely. Its representative emphasizes 
the improved possibility to implement cross-border training areas as a positive aspect, as 
this meets the growing demand for larger training airspace. In contrast, such cross-border 
operations may generate a certain degree of “noise-import”, which may result in counter-
acting political pressures by the local population in respective areas. In addition, the ca-
pacity demand of the civil aviation sector is continuously expected to challenge the unre-
stricted use of training airspace by the air force. The MoD, DFS, Lufthansa and GdF re-
spondents consider the impact of FABEC integration on their organizations to be signifi-
cant to very significant, the latter being the assessment of the ANSP and airline represen-
tatives. In line with Lufthansa, which is even more skeptical, the three other stakeholders 
assess the risk for failure as high. Only the question related to individual group member 
concernment caused some difficulties. Neither the MoD nor DFS were able to offer an es-
timate in this respect. While the airline estimates that 50% of its employees may profit 
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from FABEC, the GdF member replied that all staff would benefit and lose in the same 
way. Overall, perceived concernment seems to be similarly high for all organizations.  
To summarize the assessment of influencing power of German stakeholders, it can 
be stated that its co-decisional power on FABEC matters provides the Ministry of Defense 
with the highest score. It is followed by DFS, which not only perceives a very significant 
impact by FABEC on its organization, but also possesses the necessary political contacts 
and voices within the FABEC working group structure to be able to effectively influence 
FABEC evolution. Lufthansa is next in order as it lacks institutionalized involvement, al-
though it is a very active lobbyist. Finally, GdF is considered to have the least influencing 
potential at the national domestic level, since the association has not been at all involved 
in FABEC matters. Instead, GdF has chosen a transnational course via the MARC group 
to attempt conveying its interests. Moreover, the staff organization cannot make use of 
any potential industrial action privileges in this regard; these may not be employed for po-
litical reasons.  
In respect of institutional and functional integration to be aspired to at FABEC level, 
the opinions of stakeholders differ. As to supranational decision-making, only the Minis-
try of Defense favors unanimity votes in the FABEC Council for sovereignty reasons. For 
the Lufthansa, DFS and GdF experts, a qualified majority would suffice, whereas the 
ANSP representative specifies that a solution would have to be found to ensure that the 
smaller FABEC states could not outvote the larger states.174 Despite his preference for a 
qualified majority voting rule in the Council, the GdF respondent does not perceive the 
necessity for a policy enforcement mechanism within FABEC, as the implementation of 
measures should not be based on coercion. The DFS expert adds that he could not con-
ceive of any effective tool to ensure the agreed application of decisions in case a state is 
reluctant to cooperate; after all, the potential loss of a state’s reputation is the best means 
to ensure compliance. Only Lufthansa would welcome the possibility of appeal to EU ju-
dicial institutions to support policy implementation.  
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  According to the German ANSP representative, the introduction of a qualified majority model was de-
cided for the FABEC ANSP Strategic Board (ASB) in September 2011; according to this, a matter for 
which no consensus can be reached is submitted to a majority vote; each state enjoys a veto right, al-
though this requires written justification. 
Empirical Analysis 
  
161 
Regarding the regulatory scope of the Council, representatives from the MoD, Lufthansa, 
and GdF all agree that the locations and areas of responsibility of civil and military air 
traffic control centers should be determined at FABEC level. The MoD respondent speci-
fies that due to today’s co-location of civil and military ATC facilities in Germany, the 
placement of such facilities is irrelevant to the air force as long as the required services are 
provided. However, it is undesirable to the MoD that military airspace and the civil air 
route network as well as the NSA or ANSP institutional models should be decided outside 
the national scope, as the air force may no longer have direct access to respective elements 
and thus may not have its requirements fulfilled. The same applies for en-route unit rates 
since, according to the MoD representative, the air force is the second largest customer of 
DFS in terms of respective payments. Lufthansa is also in favor of maintaining national 
unit rates to foster (cost) competition between air navigation service providers. DFS, Luf-
thansa, and GdF could agree that both the definition of the ANSP institutional model and 
airspace design (including military areas) should be effected at FABEC level. Further-
more, they can imagine a single national supervisory authority for the entire FABEC area. 
For DFS, though, the alliance model is the clearly preferred ANSP institutional setup, 
whereas the execution of air traffic services should continue to remain at the national 
level. There may be the possibility to set up joint ventures between all or some FABEC 
ANSPs for the common provision of specific services. Such joint areas could include 
safety management, or selection and procurement of technical systems, but should exclude 
AIM, training, or the relationship to social partners. The MoD shares the DFS view re-
garding the alliance model, but could conceive of additional tasks to be centrally managed, 
with the exception of military ATS. Lufthansa advocates “true operational integration” of 
ANSP tasks, which should be more than an alliance, but rejects full integration into a sin-
gle ANSP to avoid a monopolistic structure. Ultimately, for DFS, Lufthansa, and the 
MoD, the number of centers within FABEC should be reduced; for DFS it is too early to 
specify according to which criteria this should be carried out. The MoD representative 
proposes that the civil-military integration of en-route ATS should be aimed for. On the 
other hand, GdF is striving for a single ANSP, which is consistent with the view of the 
MARC group that is in favor of a state-owned, fully integrated ANSP for FABEC.175 This 
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single ANSP should operate ‘virtual centers’176 to avoid forced re-locations of ATM staff, 
whilst ensuring seamless ATM operations through interoperable technology, as well as re-
dundancy in case of center breakdown or other contingencies.177   
The Netherlands 
Indicator Military ANSP ATCO Staff Airline 
Level of structural       
hierarchy  
Institutionalized 
governance body 
Institutionalized 
governance body 
Institutionalized 
governance body 
Institutionalized 
governance body 
Level of involvement in 
decision-making       
processes 
Co-decision on 
all relevant   
matters 
Formal consulta-
tion on selected 
matters, strong 
involvement in 
FABEC 
Informal consul-
tation by organi-
zation, no do-
mestic involve-
ment in FABEC 
Formal consulta-
tion on selected 
matters, only 
consultative in-
volvement in 
FABEC 
Number of relevant     
political stakeholders 
regular contacts are 
maintained with 
--- 
Several       
stakeholders on 
several political 
levels 
No political   
contacts 
Several       
stakeholders on 
several political 
levels 
Perceived certainty of 
(positive or negative)  
effects to materialize 
Likely 
(positive and 
negative) 
Certain 
(positive and 
negative) 
Likely 
Certain 
(positive) 
Perceived risk of positive 
effects not to materialize High Low High Very high 
Percentage of group 
members subject to indi-
vidual financial/status-
related/cultural benefits 
and/or losses 
Majority benefit Majority loss Not assessable Not assessable 
Perceived significance of 
expected impact Not assessable Very significant Significant 
Not significant 
for airline or-
ganization, but 
very significant 
for operations 
Availability of specific 
policy objectives (level 
of integration to be 
achieved; see below*) 
Available Available Available Available 
FABEC Council voting 
rule Unanimity Unanimity Unanimity Majority 
Decision scope includes 
mil airspace Yes Yes Yes Yes 
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Indicator Military ANSP ATCO Staff Airline 
Decision scope includes 
civil airspace Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Decision scope includes 
center locations / AoR No No No Yes (civ.+mil.) 
ANSP institutional model Single ANSP 
Alliance 
(excl. ATS) Single ANSP 
Most cost-
efficient solution 
Number of centers Reduced Reduced (one 
center in NLD) Status quo Reduced 
Applicable legal provi-
sions prohibiting societal 
interference of staff  as-
sociation 
--- --- 
Interference not 
permitted for   
political issues 
--- 
Number of alternative 
groups available to en-
sure identical service 
provision 
--- --- None --- 
Score 4 3 1 2 
* Only the most relevant categories are shown in this table 
Table 27: Results for ‘influencing power’ in the Netherlands 
Findings 
In terms of the dimensions of influencing power, the situation in the Netherlands is com-
parable to Germany. The Ministry of Defense of the Netherlands is obviously systemati-
cally involved in decision-making with regard to FABEC issues and also took full part in 
determining the contents of the FABEC Treaty. LVNL, the Dutch air navigation service 
provider, also feels intensely involved in matters related to FABEC as several FABEC 
working groups are chaired by representatives of LVNL. Yet, consultation of LVNL re-
garding the treaty took place on an informal basis only. A very different situation is per-
ceived with KLM, the national main carrier. Although KLM is usually formally included 
in consultations on selected political issues and has several contacts on a political level, 
the airline feels “consistently excluded” from FABEC. It would generally like to see more 
institutional involvement of airlines in the FABEC context. Its representative reports that 
KLM has repeatedly attempted to influence FABEC progress and to push for improve-
ments and tangible results. As for the Netherlands Guild of Air Traffic Controllers 
(NGATC), political influence opportunities generally appear to be very rare. Consultation 
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on political matters is effected on an informal basis and only on the initiative of the asso-
ciation itself. Societal interference is not seen as an option, although the basic right does 
exist. Like its German counterpart, the Dutch ATCO guild is a member of the MARC 
group and seeks to influence FABEC at the transnational level.  
When looking at organizational and individual concernment of stakeholders in the 
Netherlands, the air navigation service provider LVNL seems to be affected to a high de-
gree according to respective perceptions. This is explained by the fact that LVNL antici-
pates job losses or transfers of half its staff as LVNL is expected to become part of a lar-
ger ATC center upon completion of FABEC integration. LVNL anticipates that certain 
ATM and support functions such as AIM, CNS, human resources, or legal departments 
might be progressively centralized in the framework of joint ventures between ANS pro-
viders. As a consequence, LVNL considers the impact on its organization to be very sig-
nificant should FABEC successfully materialize. On the positive side, the Dutch ANSP 
believes that air traffic management will be more customer focused and performance ori-
ented: FABEC airspace design is expected to be more responsive to customer needs, and 
air navigation services will become cheaper while safety levels are predicted to remain 
unchanged and the environment is seen to benefit from shorter air routes. It is interesting 
to note that LVNL – as almost the only stakeholder – assesses the risk of such positive ef-
fects not to materialize as low, but then adds the comment that these effects will ultimately 
take a while to materialize, and when they do, it will be to a lesser extent than expected. 
KLM, the Dutch main air carrier, also anticipates effects from FABEC integration with 
certainty and even perceives them to be positive by majority; this as long as a performance 
driven airspace design remains the objective of FABEC, as today’s system is seen to be 
too fragmented and not cost-efficient. A negative outcome is only expected should ANSPs 
focus on pursuing their individual interests only, e.g. by striving to maximize their area of 
responsibility. Obviously, the airline has serious concerns in that respect, as it estimates a 
very high risk that the mentioned positive effects will not be realized. Although the impact 
of FABEC integration on the very organization of the airline is minimal, the impact on 
operational efficiency for a network carrier like KLM is seen as very significant. The in-
terviewed representative of the ATCO staff association did not decide whether the likely 
effects from FABEC integration will be positive or negative and who within the organiza-
tion may benefit or lose, but obviously feels generally affected as well; impact on the or-
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ganization is considered to be significant, and the risk of FABEC failing to deliver is per-
ceived to be high, but no further comments were made. The Ministry of Defense also be-
lieves that there are likely effects from FABEC integration and anticipates both positive 
and negative implications. On the individual level, the MoD respondent mostly recognizes 
benefits as to the pay scale for the majority of ATM staff, while a few individuals would 
probably face losses due to synergetic effects. On the operational and institutional level, 
the economies of scale and standardization generated by FABEC will, according to his as-
sessment, positively affect military and civil airspace users. On the negative side, deci-
sion-making could become more complex than is currently the case. The MoD representa-
tive is also concerned that the Single European Sky might be focused too much on the in-
terests of civil airspace users, which may be problematic in view of the prevailing differ-
ences between civil and military requirements. For the time being though, he is unable to 
assess the significance of FABEC integration from a Dutch military perspective, as this 
highly depends on the end state of FABEC – which is hard to predict at present; a high 
risk is perceived that individual national interests might negatively affect the final out-
come.  
Although the military perception of (negative) concernment from FABEC integra-
tion appears to be rather low, the MoD must still be considered as the institution that pos-
sesses the highest capabilities when it comes to influencing national governmental policy. 
LVNL is placed as number two, since the negative effects anticipated for its organization 
may provide them with an additional motivation to make extensive use of their available 
input channels. Moreover, the ANSP is also strongly involved in the concrete project 
teams and thus able to shape developments from there. Ranked as number three is the na-
tional flag carrier KLM, which sets high expectations in FABEC to improve the air traffic 
management system but is less concerned organization-wise and not as deeply involved in 
FABEC proceedings. Finally, the staff associations have to be rated last as their policy 
network is virtually non-existent and industrial power is not an option to domestically 
promote their interests in respect of FABEC. 
With regard to institutional steps of FABEC integration, the picture presented is 
rather fragmented. The Dutch Ministry of Defense, LVNL, and the Netherlands Guild of 
Air Traffic Controllers favor the unanimity voting principle on the FABEC Council. 
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LVNL could imagine a majority rule at a later stage in FABEC evolution, but is of the 
opinion that any transfer of functions to the FABEC level can only be effected under the 
condition of unanimous decision-making at the present stage of development. The Dutch 
ANSP does not specify at what point in time a move towards a majority rule would be 
conceivable. In agreement with the two other organizations, LVNL would also transfer the 
definition power on the NSA and ANSP institutional setup, as well as civil and military 
airspace design to the FABEC Council, but exclude the right to determine the location of 
respective air traffic control centers. Moreover, the representative of the Netherlands 
Guild of Air Traffic Controllers believes that civil-military cooperation principles might 
be difficult to decide beyond the national level. He is also of the opinion that defining per-
formance objectives is not appropriate in the area of air traffic management, as this gener-
ates a competitive situation between ANSPs that could be detrimental to safety. KLM is 
the only stakeholder to prefer a majority vote in the FABEC Council immediately; it also 
believes that both airspace design and the location of civil and military control centers 
should be decided there. In contrast, the definition of institutional models for ANSPs or 
supervisory authorities, the setting of en-route unit rates, and the establishment of civil-
military cooperation principles are perceived as national tasks, while operational, technical 
or safety standards should be laid down at EU level. Opinions also diverge as to the en-
forcement mechanisms that should be applied to ensure uniform application of decisions: 
while the MoD advocates a mediation procedure and both LVNL and KLM prefer arbitra-
tion, NGATC could envisage the right to appeal to the EU judiciary system.  
On the functional level, KLM advocates the status quo in terms of NSA setup, 
whereas all other Dutch stakeholders under examination show a preference for a single 
FABEC authority. The reason for the airline’s deviation is its concern that there are na-
tional issues, which will continue to require a national supervisory authority, possibly 
leading to a costly duplication of supervisory structures at national and FABEC level. In 
respect of the ANSP institutional model, both the MoD and the ATCO association picture 
a state-governed single ANSP, while KLM prefers any solution that is cost-efficient and 
capacity creating and provides optimum service to the airlines’ business trajectories with a 
cost-efficient service. LVNL is in favor of an alliance model within which civil ATS 
might be integrated at a final stage in terms of a common operational concept, but it 
should still be executed by independently managed control centers. In the ANSP’s view, 
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AIM and training should continue to be carried out by individual providers based on FA-
BEC standards. All organizations except NGATC would like to see the number of en-
route control centers reduced. For the MoD representative, a functional approach is re-
quired to determine the optimum size of a center before taking into account political con-
siderations; the LVNL respondent could imagine three remaining upper control centers for 
FABEC, while keeping one lower center per state with civil and military ATS integrated 
or co-located. Only the ATCO staff organization prefers the status quo using harmonized 
technical systems and procedures.  
Switzerland    
Indicator Military ANSP ATCO Staff Airline 
Level of structural       
hierarchy  
Institutionalized 
governance body 
Institutionalized 
governance body 
Institutionalized 
governance body 
with democratic 
structure 
Institutionalized 
governance body 
Level of involvement in 
decision-making       
processes 
Co-decision on 
all relevant    
matters 
Formal          
consultation on 
all relevant   
matters 
Formal consulta-
tion on selected 
matters, also in 
respect of the 
FABEC Treaty 
Formal          
consultation on 
all relevant   
matters 
Number of relevant po-
litical stakeholders regu-
lar contacts are         
maintained with 
--- 
Several       
stakeholders on 
several political 
levels 
Few stakeholders 
on single        
political level 
Several        
stakeholders on 
several political 
levels 
Perceived certainty of 
(positive or negative)  
effects to materialize 
Likely 
(positive) 
Certain 
(positive) 
Certain 
(positive and 
negative) 
Certain 
(positive and 
negative) 
Perceived risk of positive 
effects not to materialize Very high High Very high Very high 
Percentage of group 
members subject to indi-
vidual financial/status-
related/cultural benefits 
and/or losses 
Benefits and 
losses are 
equally shared 
over time 
Not assessable 
Benefits and 
losses are 
equally shared 
Not assessable 
Perceived significance of 
expected impact Very significant Significant Significant 
Low significance 
(for airline       
organization) 
Availability of specific 
policy objectives (level 
of integration to be 
achieved; see below*) 
Available Available 
Partially 
available 
Available 
FABEC Council voting 
rule Unanimity Qual. majority (Qual. majority) Qual. majority 
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Indicator Military ANSP ATCO Staff Airline 
Decision scope includes 
mil airspace No Yes --- Yes 
Decision scope includes 
civil airspace Yes Yes --- Yes 
Decision scope includes 
center locations / AoR Yes (civ.) Yes (civ.) --- Yes (civ.+mil.) 
ANSP institutional model 
Alliance  
(incl. civ. ATS) 
Alliance  
(excl. ATS) 
Single ANSP 
(step by step) 
Single ANSP 
(private law un-
der state control) 
Number of centers Reduced (1-2 in CHE) 
Status quo  
(initially) 
Status quo 
(‘virtual center’) Reduced 
Applicable legal provi-
sions prohibiting societal 
interference of staff    
association 
--- --- 
Interference  
permitted under 
conditions (only 
contract related) 
--- 
Number of alternative 
groups available to en-
sure identical service 
provision 
--- --- None --- 
Score 4 3 1 2 
* Only the most relevant categories are shown in this table 
Table 28: Results for ‘influencing power’ in Switzerland 
Findings 
Unsurprisingly, the Swiss Air Force – representing the Department of Defense in FABEC 
matters – is fully involved in the national decision-making processes with regard to insti-
tutional questions and also put down its signature on the FABEC Treaty. Skyguide, the 
Swiss air navigation service provider, reports that it is deeply involved in the evolutionary 
process of FABEC as well. Not only was Skyguide formally consulted during the drafting 
of the treaty, it also provided strong support during that process, contributing in particular 
to the liability aspects. Furthermore, Skyguide holds the chair of the FABEC ANS Strate-
gic Board (ASB) and has available the necessary expertise to exert direct influence on the 
development of FABEC. Since the arrival of the new CEO, Skyguide has also considera-
bly increased its number of contacts to political stakeholders at all relevant levels. The na-
tional main air carrier of Switzerland, Swiss International Airlines, also possesses a tight 
political network and, in respect of FABEC, has been involved on a consultative basis and 
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providing comments. However, the airline is neither institutionally included in any FA-
BEC working groups, nor does it take part in FABEC decision-making bodies, although it 
requested to do so. Finally, the influencing channels of SwissATCA, the organization rep-
resenting the civil air traffic controllers in Switzerland, are fairly limited in comparison to 
the other stakeholders, as involvement in political decision-making is limited to consulta-
tion on selected matters and because only very few contacts to the political level exist. 
However, SwissATCA was consulted on the FABEC Treaty and submitted respective 
comments in written form.178 Some members of SwissATCA are directly involved as ex-
perts in FABEC operational working groups, but they do not officially represent the asso-
ciation. Moreover, any industrial action needs to be related to the collective labor agree-
ment and could only be given consideration in the case where contractual elements are af-
fected by FABEC. Instead, SwissATCA is also a member of MARC and attempts to make 
use of the influencing potentials offered by this transnational interest group. 
As to concernment, all stakeholders with the exception of the air force expect an im-
pact from FABEC integration with a high degree of certainty. For Skyguide, the antici-
pated outcome is by the majority positive, but a specification of positive and possible 
negative effects is not provided. Skyguide believes that integration in the framework of 
FABEC should be based on a ‘give and take’-principle: ANSPs give up certain functions 
in exchange for other areas in which they are recognized to possess a “specific competi-
tive advantage”. This implies that the assessment of positive/negative impact depends on 
the ability of FABEC air navigation service providers to find the correct balance in this 
exchange process. A future FABEC structure featuring centralized services and functions 
with different providers will obviously have a significant impact on the Skyguide organi-
zation as a whole. Although convinced that FABEC will yield positive results, Skyguide is 
aware that, due to the complexity of a multinational project of this kind, the final outcome 
may be different and also materialize later than originally expected. In any case it is evi-
dent that the Swiss ANSP is particularly concerned with any potential change brought 
about by FABEC, as the provider is relatively small compared to the German and French 
counterparts and because a major part of its area of responsibility (and thus partial reve-
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nue) covers foreign airspace.179 Swiss Intl. Airlines anticipates both positive and negative 
effects from FABEC: on one hand, the airline hopes for operational improvements in 
terms of increased flight efficiency and reduced ATM costs if the FABEC targets are met; 
on the other hand, there is a risk that the monopolistic character of air traffic management 
is exacerbated, with all negative implications thereto. Although FABEC impact is seen as 
significant in respect of a potential reduction of ATM related costs, only little significance 
is attributed to FABEC as to the impact on the airline organization or operation. The pos-
sibility that FABEC development will take a very long time, or ultimately never achieve 
the necessary level of integration, is rated as very high. Focusing on the ATCO associa-
tions under the roof of SwissATCA, positive and negative effects are expected to emanate 
by integrating ATM in the context of FABEC. On the positive side, increase of overall 
performance, the development of common standards in ATM, enhanced flexibility with 
regard to the choice of working location, and the opportunities for cultural exchange are 
mentioned. On the negative side, an increased pressure on ATCO working conditions, as 
well as potential forced relocations of staff, are seen as the biggest threats. In terms of in-
dividual concernment, those individual members working as ACC en-route controllers are 
expected to benefit, as opposed to those working in tower/approach control environments; 
with today’s charging system, en-route traffic generates the main income for ANSPs.180 
The comment has been made that the current uncertainties regarding the further evolution 
of FABEC are difficult to cope with. Consequentially, impact of FABEC is considered to 
be significant. SwissATCA perceives a very high risk that real operational improvements 
and cost-reducing synergetic effects will not materialize due to lack of FABEC integra-
tion, and that cost pressure is instead shifted onto the air traffic controllers. It thus would 
seem that the Swiss civil ATCOs feel concerned by FABEC on a very personal level. Fi-
nally, the air force anticipates only likely effects from FABEC integration, which are 
mainly seen in a positive light. Specifically emphasized is the opportunity for a common 
approach and legal framework for ATM, as well as enhanced interoperability, cost-
efficiency, and performance, while respecting the defense interests of states. On the nega-
tive side, the emergence of a potentially heavy governance structure is apprehended. At 
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the individual level, the setup phase of FABEC is expected to see an increase in adminis-
trative costs, such as travel expenses. At a later stage, when new FABEC structures are 
implemented, a (rather small) chance is anticipated that workload at the national level may 
be reduced by synergies. In any case the air force assesses the impact of FABEC to be 
very significant, and the risk that positive effects will not materialize as very high, due to 
the large number of stakeholders and interests involved in the process.  
When comparing the different actors relevant to the field of ATM in Switzerland, it 
becomes evident that they share a similarly high level of concernment, albeit for different 
reasons. The only stakeholder which could be considered less affected is Swiss Intl. Air-
lines, as FABEC integration does not directly impact the organization as such. Influencing 
power is therefore assessed mainly by comparing institutional influence opportunities 
available to the organizations, as discussed above. Due to its governmental status and thus 
direct impact on institutional outcomes, it seems obvious that the highest influencing po-
tential should be attributed to the air force. Second-rated is the Swiss air navigation ser-
vice provider, Skyguide, which possesses the necessary input channels and – even more 
importantly – expertise to make its voice heard, and shows very strong concernment as to 
the prospective organizational impact of FABEC. Although Swiss Intl. Airlines enjoys 
similar opportunities to access the political level, direct influence on FABEC matters is 
limited to consultation only. Moreover, air traffic management is only one of several other 
factors affecting an airline, which may produce less overall efforts to advance its prefer-
ences. It is therefore ranked number three. The staff association must once more be attrib-
uted the least influencing power at the domestic level, based on its marginal policy net-
work and due to the fact that industrial pressure cannot be brought to bear to shape politi-
cal decisions, even though (individual) concernment may be high. 
Moving on to the specific preferences of stakeholders with regard to functional and 
institutional integration in the FABEC context: The Swiss Air Force prefers unanimous 
decisions in the FABEC Council due to sovereignty, independence and defense considera-
tions and thus does not recognize a necessity to implement an enforcement mechanism 
within FABEC, whereas Skyguide and Swiss Intl. Airlines would like to see qualified ma-
jority voting in the Council. SwissATCA has no official position on this matter, but states 
in its commenting letter on the FABEC Treaty that “it remains to be seen whether the ob-
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jective of an increased level of integration will be achieved, since the detailed harmoniza-
tion plans still have to be agreed on by each individual Contracting State”, which may be 
interpreted as an indirect criticism of the unanimous voting rule.181 According to Swiss 
Intl. Airlines, EU institutions should ensure the correct and uniform application of respec-
tive decisions, while Skyguide would leave this in the hands of FABEC partners by apply-
ing a mediation procedure.  
At the functional level, the Swiss Air Force would allow the FABEC Council to 
regulate all aspects except those related to military and security issues. This would ex-
clude the definition of military airspace, military center locations, and civil-military coop-
eration principles. For Skyguide, only the definition of the ANSP institutional model 
should be exempted. The allocation of control centers at FABEC level is seen in a context 
of “controlled competition”, by which centers are assigned to the best-performing ANSPs. 
In the opinion of Swiss Intl. Airlines, decision-power on the supervisory setup should re-
main a national prerogative. SwissATCA has no formal opinion on which regulatory func-
tions should be transferred to the FABEC level, yet displays a clear preference for a state-
owned single FABEC ANSP with managerial autonomy. However, the control center con-
figuration should remain status quo, whereas all facilities should be integrated into a ‘vir-
tual center’. As a result, SwissATCA would expect operational benefits, whilst avoiding 
extensive social costs from staff relocations. Swiss Intl. Airlines, which is also in favor of 
only one ANSP for the FABEC area, opts for a state-controlled company under private 
law (corporatized model) to avoid a civil servant status of employees. Furthermore, the 
number of centers should be reduced in accordance with the best economic and opera-
tional solution. The other two stakeholders, Skyguide and the Swiss Air Force, prefer an 
ANSP alliance. The Skyguide respondent emphasizes that his ANSP supports a model that 
“assumes the creation of a FABEC Entity in charge of providing central functions for the 
FABEC.” A respective structure could be based on joint ventures between service provid-
ers. According to Skyguide all relevant ATM and support functions, with the exception of 
civil and military ATS and the relationship to social partners, could be centralized in the 
framework of such a FABEC Entity. In agreement with the ATCO staff, Skyguide sup-
ports an initial ‘virtual center’ setup but could envisage reducing the number of centers in 
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the longer run. From the Swiss Air Force perspective, only military ATS and AIM would 
be exempted from centralization in the framework of the ANSP alliance. A cut-down of 
the number of centers based on operational and functional considerations is preferred, but 
one or two centers should remain in Switzerland. Finally, in terms of the supervisory 
setup, the Skyguide representative prefers a single authority, while the military would like 
to maintain national NSAs cooperating with each other under a common governance 
structure. Swiss Intl. Airlines is in favor of the status quo, demanding mutual respect as to 
individual NSA decisions. 
Addendum: Received positions of domestic stakeholders in France, Belgium, and 
Luxembourg 
Although not all domestic stakeholders in France, Belgium, and Luxembourg have pro-
vided their replies via the online questionnaire, which precludes the empirical analysis of 
relative influencing power in these countries, the positions of those stakeholders who pro-
vided answers shall be presented briefly. Unfortunately, the data received from the air 
navigation service providers of Belgium and Luxembourg was not utilizable for technical 
reasons.  
France 
Replies were provided by the air navigation service provider, DSNA, and by one of the 
professional associations representing air traffic controllers, FATCOA. The DSNA re-
spondent perceives both positive and negative effects from integration in the framework of 
FABEC. On one hand, he recognizes the potential to improve the performance of air traf-
fic management for the benefit of airspace users. On the other hand, there is a need to 
share with FABEC partners what is national for the time being. As to FABEC decision-
making, he could envisage a qualified majority voting principle in the FABEC Council, 
applied in a way that consensus is strived for at first and, if not achievable, a two-third 
majority would be required for a decision, but the option of justified veto would be re-
tained. Under this rule basically all regulatory functions, with the exception of defining 
military control center locations, could be carried out at FABEC level. Functionally, a 
progressively implemented single FABEC supervisory authority is envisaged. Air naviga-
tion service provision should also be gradually integrated in the context of an alliance, ex-
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cluding civil and military air traffic services and the relationship to social partners. There 
might still be a future option to move towards a single ANSP; however, this involves sen-
sitive social issues and would require a co-decisional structure on all matters. As to the 
control center configuration, the DSNA representative would personally prefer the status 
quo, using ‘virtual center’ technology. 
The representative of FATCOA also sees positive and negative impacts from in-
creased integration of ATM. On the positive side, it could lead to a harmonization on 
working conditions throughout FABEC. On the negative side, there is a threat that the cur-
rent status of French ATCOs as civil servants, which involves certain privileges, could be 
changed to an employment status on a private contract basis. The respondent would also 
agree to a qualified majority rule in the FABEC Council, and to a strong enforcement 
mechanism via European Union institutions. In respect of those areas which could be 
regulated at FABEC level, the FATCOA respondent would exclude the definition of air-
space design or control center locations as these are very operational and sometimes sensi-
tive issues. Furthermore, although he could agree to the setting of performance objectives 
by the Council, the level of adherence to these objectives should be decided nationally. 
Also the function of air traffic flow and capacity management is seen as better situated at 
the level of Eurocontrol and nation states. The FATCOA representative prefers an alliance 
model, whereas performance management, civil and military ATS, AIM, and training 
should be executed at the national level. A ‘virtual center’ concept with interoperable 
technology is preferred over other more integrated options. Finally, supervision should 
continue to be carried out by a national authority.  
Belgium 
Utilizable replies were received from the Belgian Air Component (COMOPSAIR) of the 
Belgian Armed Forces, and from Brussels Airlines, the largest airline based in Belgium. 
The COMOPSAIR representative recognizes mainly positive effects from integration 
through FABEC, as all decisions will have to be based on a positive cost-benefit analysis. 
One of the FABEC key performance areas is ‘Military Mission Effectiveness’,182 ensuring 
that state interests such as military access to airspace are guaranteed. In addition, the al-
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ready very efficient multinational upper area control center of Maastricht will, in his view, 
provide examples of best practice. Regarding the FABEC Council, decisions should be 
taken unanimously to assure the sovereignty of states. Solutions and improvements are to 
be found in a manner that none of the partners faces any disadvantages, which is consid-
ered possible albeit politically difficult. The respondent also believes that no decision 
should be forced upon a state by some kind of enforcement mechanism. As to the Coun-
cil’s regulatory competence, all relevant areas except for defining military air traffic con-
trol center locations could be transferred to the FABEC level. Yet, airspace design re-
quires military approval, and certain standardizations should be developed at a higher 
level than FABEC to ensure the interoperability between different functional airspace 
blocks. As far as supervision is concerned, the COMOPSAIR representative prefers a co-
operative approach between NSAs in terms of sharing specialists and procedures at FA-
BEC level. In respect of air navigation services, a single provider would be favored, how-
ever, this is not expected to happen soon and will require overcoming different cultures 
and ways of working. A ‘virtual center’ is perceived as a cost-reducing option that does 
not necessitate difficult social negotiations. As this is not so much an issue for the military 
though, a move to another location is conceivable if it were financially more attractive. 
The representative of Brussels Airlines generally expects positive effects from FA-
BEC integration, such as more direct routes, improved predictability of traffic flows, en-
hanced safety through better coordination, and a decrease of en-route charges by review-
ing the organization of air traffic management as a whole and by reducing control centers. 
Yet to achieve this, respective technology and training is required, and the social risks im-
plied need to be addressed, similar to the situation when cockpit crews were gradually re-
duced from five to two crew members. The airline respondent is in favor of a majority vot-
ing principle in the FABEC Council, including a strong enforcement mechanism to ensure 
the correct application of policy decisions. With exception of the ANSP institutional 
model and the location of civil and military control centers, for which states are expected 
to require a certain leeway for implementation based on a common goal, all areas could be 
regulated at FABEC or EU level. While a single supervisory authority is preferred for 
FABEC, an alliance structure is seen to be best suited for ANSPs to allow for differences 
in implementation following best practices. Such an alliance should mainly centralize 
safety, performance and capacity management, as well as the selection and procurement of 
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technical systems. A reduction of centers is appreciated, but this should be based on the 
principle of pursuing one goal, while maintaining flexibility in implementation.    
Luxembourg 
The only evaluable position on FABEC integration was received from the ATCO staff as-
sociation of Luxembourg, GLCCA. Although the Luxembourg guild expects a certain im-
pact from FABEC integration, its respondent is not yet able to decide whether it will be 
positive or negative, as the direction of FABEC evolution is still unpredictable. In any 
case the unanimous vote is preferred for FABEC Council decisions but the full functional 
scope should be covered, with the exception of defining the location of military control 
centers. In respect of functional integration, the GLCCA representative favors both a sin-
gle supervisory authority and a single ANS provider, fully in line with the principles of the 
MOSAIC project, which is supported by the ATCO association.      
The position of Eurocontrol 
Eurocontrol, as an international organization which, besides its strong involvement in Sin-
gle European Sky affairs, is considerably affected by the developments in the context of 
FABEC, also needs to be recognized as a relevant stakeholder in the process. Although 
Eurocontrol cannot be considered a domestic interest group in the sense of liberal-
intergovernmentalist theory, certain influence capabilities are assumed to exist. These are 
used to address those national governments constituting the members of either the entire 
European ANS organization, or of Maastricht UAC, which is made up of Belgium, Ger-
many, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands. During data acquisition those stakeholders 
within Eurocontrol on which FABEC is expected to have most impact were taken into ac-
count. They include the Maastricht UAC itself, the Trade Union Eurocontrol Maastricht 
(TUEM), representing all MUAC staff, as well as the professional association of the 
Maastricht air traffic controllers, EGATS. 
Maastricht UAC 
The representative of the Maastricht UAC expects both positive and negative effects from 
FABEC. In his eyes, FABEC provides an opportunity to expand the MUAC model (a mul-
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tinational ‘success story’ in terms of performance, capacity, and safety) to cover a wider 
area of responsibility and additional ANSPs for the benefit of the overall performance of 
the European ATM network. However, the formal creation of FABEC (which may entail 
uncoupling MUAC from the Eurocontrol organization) could also change today’s efficient 
functioning of MUAC in a more negative direction and might have social implications on 
staff and current working conditions. As to decision-making in the FABEC Council, con-
sensus decisions are preferred. If this is not achievable, a voting procedure should exist 
based on a (qualified) majority with veto possibility. All issue areas relevant to air traffic 
management, in the view of the MUAC respondent could be subjected to the Council’s 
decision-making competence. Moreover, both a single ANSP and a single supervisory au-
thority for FABEC as well as an overall reduction of ATC centers would be preferred.      
TUEM (Trade Union Eurocontrol Maastricht) 
From the perspective of the Maastricht trade union, the effects from FABEC integration as 
it is currently underway are expected to be mostly negative. The reason stated for this is 
the abovementioned possibility that the multinational control center may be removed from 
the Eurocontrol structure and integrated into a FABEC Entity, which would most certainly 
lead to a deterioration of working conditions for Maastricht staff. TUEM, as one of the 
initiators of the MOSAIC/MARC project, is therefore striving to influence respective de-
velopments on a transnational level in order to foster a state-owned, single air navigation 
service provider for FABEC, analogous to today’s Eurocontrol/Maastricht model.183 Con-
sequently, the FABEC Council should be able to take decisions by qualified majority cov-
ering all ATM-related areas except military control center locations. It is emphasized 
though, that almost all of the Council decisions have to be agreed upon together with the 
unions, as tangible achievements can only be reached with the involvement of staff and 
their expertise. The TUEM principle, ‘one airspace, one service provider’, also implies a 
single supervisory authority for FABEC. At least to start with, the status quo with regard 
to the control center configuration should be maintained, but technology harmonized. 
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EGATS (Eurocontrol Guild of Air Traffic Services) 
The professional ATCO association also anticipates that, in the context of FABEC, 
MUAC will be detached from the Eurocontrol agency and integrated into a FABEC En-
tity, which would only see positive results if this entity were to be constructed in accor-
dance with the Eurocontrol model. Otherwise, EGATS expects serious negative effects on 
employees, also in the case where controllers have to move to a different location due to 
consolidation of centers. Respective developments are currently unknown. EGATS prefers 
unanimity in the FABEC Council to protect the right of the smaller FABEC member states 
whilst being aware that the integration process might be stalled for a prolonged period of 
time. Except for the definition of the supervisory authority institutional setup, decision au-
thority in all relevant issue areas could be allocated to the FABEC level. Again, one su-
pervisory authority and one single ANSP are seen as the most suitable functional solution 
for FABEC. It is emphasized that, from a staff perspective, keeping the status quo center 
setup and upgrading it with harmonized technology would be ideal; however, this is not 
seen as a realistic option as only a reduction of centers might deliver the required benefits 
for the ATM system. A single control center would be impractical as it entails high costs 
for staff transfer and poses the risk of a widespread ATM system failure in the event of a 
center contingency. 
5.1.3 Preference intensities of national governments as to FABEC integration 
As elaborated in sub-section 4.2.4, the preference intensity of governmental authorities in 
respect of FABEC integration is measured at the level of national ministries of transport or 
civil aviation authorities respectively, and both in institutional and in functional terms, the 
latter relating to the preferred (de facto) integration of ATM functions. Because the ex-
amination of the relationship proposed in hypothesis 1b is effected based on the four FA-
BEC nations France, Germany, the Netherlands, and Switzerland, they are in focus here. 
Due to lack of responses to the online questionnaire, the preferences of Belgium and Lux-
embourg could not be retrieved; however, this does not pose a problem as to the validity 
of the overall study, as stated in the operationalization section. The following results were 
obtained:     
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Dimensions France Germany The Netherlands Switzerland 
Council vote Unanimity Unanimity Unanimity Unanimity 
Enforcement 
of FABEC 
policy deci-
sions 
Appeal to a Court 
of Arbitration 
No enforcement 
mechanism as deci-
sions are based on 
common commit-
ment 
Appeal to a Court 
of Arbitration 
No enforcement 
mechanism (arbitra-
tion as last resort) 
Functional 
scope of FA-
BEC Council 
(very high 
sensitivity) 
Definition of  
• airspace and 
route network 
design (includ-
ing mil. air-
space) for cross-
border areas 
--- 
Definition of  
• airspace and 
route network 
design (includ-
ing military air-
space) 
 
--- 
Functional 
scope of FA-
BEC Council 
(high sensitiv-
ity) 
Definition of     
• principles for 
civil-military 
cooperation 
Definition of 
• airspace and 
route network 
design (exclud-
ing military air-
space) 
• location & area 
of responsibility 
of civil ACCs 
• principles for 
civil-military 
cooperation 
Definition of 
• SA institutional 
setup 
• location & area 
of responsibility 
of civil ACCs 
• ANSP 
institutional 
model 
• principles for 
civil-military 
cooperation 
Definition of 
• airspace and 
route network 
design (exclud-
ing military air-
space) 
• principles for 
civil-military 
cooperation  
Functional 
scope of FA-
BEC Council 
(economic 
sensitivity) 
Definition of  
• ANSP perform-
ance objectives 
Definition of 
• charging policy / 
en-route unit 
rates 
• ANSP perform-
ance objectives 
Definition of 
• charging policy / 
en-route unit 
rates 
• ANSP perform-
ance objectives  
Definition of 
• charging policy / 
en-route unit 
rates 
• ANSP perform-
ance objectives  
Functional 
scope of FA-
BEC Council 
(low sensitiv-
ity) 
 
Definition of 
• airspace and ca-
pacity manage-
ment ATM op-
erational stan-
dards and proce-
dures in cross-
border areas 
• ATM techno-
logical standards  
Definition of 
• safety manage-
ment policies 
• airspace and ca-
pacity manage-
ment  
• ATM opera-
tional standards 
and procedures 
• ATM techno-
logical standards  
• AIM standards 
• ANS training 
standards 
Definition of 
• safety manage-
ment policies 
• airspace and ca-
pacity manage-
ment 
• ATM opera-
tional standards 
and procedures 
• ATM techno-
logical standards 
• AIM standards 
• ANS training 
standards 
Definition of 
• safety manage-
ment policies 
• airspace and ca-
pacity manage-
ment  
• ATM opera-
tional standards 
and procedures 
• ATM techno-
logical standards  
• AIM standards 
• ANS training 
standards 
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Dimensions France Germany The Netherlands Switzerland 
Institutional 
model for Su-
pervisory Au-
thorities 
Status quo (one 
NSA per country), 
but cooperation 
Status quo (one 
NSA per country), 
but single virtual 
authority by       
cooperation 
One SA for the en-
tire FABEC, but 
national access 
must be ensured 
due to sovereign 
tasks 
NSA for regula-
tion, FABEC     
authority for     
oversight 
Institutional 
model for air 
navigation 
service pro-
viders 
(ANSPs) 
Single ANSP 
would be sup-
ported; gradual ap-
proach based on 
consensus 
Alliance model 
(stepwise devel-
opment based on 
added value, but 
ATS to remain  
sovereign task) 
Single ANSP 
(step by step) 
Initially alliance 
model, maybe later 
single ANSP (de-
pending on govern-
ance model) 
In case of alli-
ance model: 
Centralized 
management 
of functions 
--- 
• Safety man-
agement 
• Performance 
management 
• Airspace and 
capacity man-
agement 
• Selection and 
procurement of 
ATM technical 
systems  
• Aeronautical 
information 
management 
• Air Navigation 
Services (ANS) 
staff training 
 
--- 
• Safety man-
agement 
• Performance 
management 
• Airspace and 
capacity man-
agement  
• Collection of 
charges 
• Selection and 
procurement of 
ATM technical 
systems  
• Aeronautical 
information 
management 
• Air Navigation 
Services (ANS) 
staff training 
Area control 
center (ACC) 
scenario  
Status quo with 
harmonized techni-
cal systems and 
procedures, possi-
bly virtual center if 
concept works; 
functionally bene-
ficial redistribution 
of airspace con-
ceivable 
No opinion as cri-
teria still undefined 
Reduced number of 
control centers 
(2 upper ACCs, 1 
per state, civ./mil. 
co-located) 
Reduced number of 
control centers  
(min. 1 per state 
incl. military) 
Score 2 1 4 3 
Table 29: Results for ‘governmental preference intensity’ in selected FABEC member states 
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France 
According to the interviewed expert from the French civil aviation authority (DGAC), de-
cisions in the FABEC Council are to be taken by unanimous vote. Qualified majority was 
reportedly discussed in the initial phase of drafting the FABEC Treaty, but was difficult to 
align with the fact that there are only few states involved and that some FABEC issues are 
close to the sovereignty of states. The uniform application of commonly agreed decisions 
should be assisted by an arbitration procedure, in case other means of dispute resolution 
prove to be inadequate.  
As to the regulatory scope of the FABEC Council, the design of civil and military 
airspace structures may, in the view of the French expert, be decided at the level of FA-
BEC if related to the cross-border areas between states. The scope of Council compe-
tences also includes definition of ANSP performance objectives, cooperation for safety 
oversight among national supervisory authorities (NSAs), as well as civil-military coop-
eration and ATFCM principles, and may encompass regulatory harmonization (where not 
already provided by SES rules). Other ATM-related technical or operational standards, 
such as for AIM or training, are not seen as regulatory issues for the Council to decide and 
thus are to be commonly addressed by the FABEC ANSPs or at EU level. The definition 
of charging policy/en-route unit rates would, in the French view, only make sense if a sin-
gle unit rate was adopted, which will require more time and might possibly be linked to 
the creation of a single ANSP.  
France is in favor of the status quo in terms of the organizational setup of supervi-
sory authorities, but advocates close cooperation between NSAs. As far as the institutional 
model for air navigation service providers is concerned, France initially promoted an “in-
tegrated organization of air navigation services within FABEC, on the basis of a public 
service which is not subject to competition and cannot be privatized” (Savary 2010: 14), 
in short, a single public ANSP. In February and March 2010, this ambition created indus-
trial disputes with those French trade unions that are against a full integration of air navi-
gation service providers.184 Knowing also that the single ANSP model is challenged by 
other contracting states of FABEC, France is at present taking a more careful stance in this 
respect. In principle, the French government would still support a single ANSP, which 
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remains a long-term option, but wishes to approach the matter progressively through con-
crete cooperation initiatives between ANSPs according to functional and operational re-
quirements. With regard to the number of air traffic control centers, France prefers to 
maintain the status quo, but could envisage the redistribution of airspace in cross-border 
areas where there is an operational requirement based (for example) on traffic flows. In 
parallel, ANSPs should aim at more harmonized systems through joint specifications or 
joint procurement, and at a lesser number of major systems. The respective DGAC expert 
argues that in view of the economic pressures emanating from the performance scheme 
and of the substantial investments in the modernization of air traffic control systems, par-
ticularly in the context of SESAR, the attempt to consolidate centers would for the time 
being be too costly and energy-consuming from a political, financial and social point of 
view. A ‘virtual center’ architecture could become an option if this concept is proven to 
offer the opportunity to save resources by enabling the temporary transfer of specific ATS 
functions to another center, for example during periods of low traffic.  
Germany 
The representative of the German Ministry of Transport emphasizes that he is providing 
his own personal expert opinion on the matter. However, for the reasons stated earlier, this 
opinion may still be assumed to correlate to a high degree with the available official posi-
tion of Germany. As to the decision-making procedure in the FABEC Council, the re-
spondent maintains that there is no other choice than reverting to the unanimous voting 
principle at this point in time, due to the sovereignty aspects involved in the domain of air 
traffic management. Consequently, since all FABEC Council members commit them-
selves to implement the measures commonly agreed upon, there should be no need for a 
mechanism to enforce policy decisions.  
With regard to the regulatory scope, nationally sensitive issues such as NSA and 
ANSP institutional setup, military airspace structure, or military control center locations, 
are to be excluded from Council decisions. However, under the condition of unanimous 
decision-making, civil airspace design as well as the location of civil air traffic control 
centers could be determined at FABEC level. All other areas of lower sensitivity, such as 
en-route unit rates, ANSP performance objectives, or technical and operational standards, 
may also be covered by the scope of FABEC. 
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In respect of functional steps of integration, the German expert advocates upholding one 
national supervisory authority per state for practical reasons, but extending cooperation 
agreements to ultimately operate as a “single virtual supervisory authority” within the 
FABEC area. In terms of the ANSP institutional model, some sort of alliance structure is 
preferred in the long run, whereas a stepwise development is desired by moving through 
cooperative arrangements between ANSPs in keeping with the principle of ‘added-value’. 
According to the German expert, no hard proof has been provided yet that full integration 
of air navigation service providers and consolidation of control centers constitute the nec-
essary precondition to achieve substantial efficiency improvements in European air traffic 
management. Hence, Germany’s position rather is to “identify and perform functions and 
services at FABEC rather than individual [ANSP] level”, which can be “left at ANSPs’ 
discretion with states in a more passive role.”185 This implies that tailored ANSP coopera-
tion should be sought in those areas where economic and operational benefits as well as 
efficiency gains are possible, along with a refined cross-border airspace structuralization 
and the flexible use of civil-military airspace.186 Thus, in the German view it is not neces-
sary to establish a common legal ANS organization of the six FABEC states at the current 
stage of development.187 Possible areas of cooperation and thus centrally manageable 
functions could include safety, performance, airspace and capacity management, the 
common selection and procurement of technical systems in ATM, aeronautical informa-
tion management, and training of ATS staff. However, due to German constitutional con-
straints the provision of (civil and military) air traffic services is for the time being re-
quired to remain a sovereign task. This implies that the German government must be able 
at all times to execute full authority and influence over the organization providing air traf-
fic services within German territory.188 Hence, the transfer of air traffic service functions 
to a centralized FABEC Entity would require intense legal examinations and probably the 
need to elaborate numerous legal ‘precautions’ in order to satisfy the constitutional re-
quirements. Furthermore, the German expert does not express an opinion in respect of the 
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configuration of air traffic control centers in the FABEC area as, in his view, the necessary 
criteria according to which the optimum size and number of facilities would have to be de-
termined are not available yet. Such criteria would have to comprise center performance, 
manageability, and number of staff, as well as contingency procedures in case of a center 
malfunction or failure.  
The Netherlands 
As regards the decision-making procedure in the FABEC Council, the respondent from 
the Dutch Ministry of Infrastructure and Environment also supports the principle of una-
nimity. He acknowledges that a (qualified) majority vote would be much more effective 
and could probably lead to better decisions, but points out that “Europe is a (quite success-
ful) collection of sovereign States which have learned to cooperate.” He adds that air traf-
fic management is closely linked to the instruments applied by states to exercise their sov-
ereignty, and therefore this domain is less suitable for cooperative arrangements by major-
ity decisions. However, this could change in the longer run of the integration process. The 
Netherlands appears to be comfortable with the arbitration procedure to make sure that 
policy decisions taken in unanimity are correctly implemented in accordance with the 
agreement.  
The Dutch assessment of the regulatory functions to be transferred to the FABEC 
Council is based on the precondition of consensual decisions and thus unanimity. The re-
spondent emphasizes that it is vital for a nation state to maintain decision authority over 
its ANS infrastructure in order to exercise the state obligations and responsibilities under 
the ICAO Convention in respect of ATS provision, the more so as the Netherlands only 
possesses one control center completely. In respecting this principle, all ATM-relevant 
regulatory areas, such as both civil and military airspace design, the definition of the insti-
tutional model for supervisory authorities and ANSPs, the definition of the locations of 
civil air traffic control centers, or the definition of charging principles and unit rates, could 
be subject to FABEC Council decisions. The only exception is made with regard to the 
definition of the location and area of responsibility of military air traffic control centers.  
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The ministerial representative would actually prefer a single supervisory authority for 
FABEC. However, due to the fact that NSAs execute a sovereign task when overseeing 
ANSPs, the highest state body (i.e. the parliament) should have direct access to the super-
visory authority. It might be difficult to find a proper arrangement for a multinational 
structure fulfilling all requirements related to sovereignty. The respondent can also envis-
age a single air navigation service provider for the FABEC area as, in his view, only one 
single ANSP will be capable of removing today’s sub-optimal solutions created by local 
and national interests. However, the expert admits that this will only be possible through a 
step-by-step approach. A respective (pragmatic) solution could initially entail joint ven-
tures between national ANSPs in operational areas.189 As to the setup of control centers, 
the Dutch opinion is in favor of an overall reduction of en-route ATS facilities in the FA-
BEC area. Yet, as the control centers also constitute infrastructure of vital importance to 
the exercise of state sovereignty, it would be inconceivable to deprive a FABEC member 
of all its centers. The Dutch representative therefore proposes to keep two upper area con-
trol centers, an expanded MUAC for the northern part and a second facility for the south-
ern part of the FABEC airspace, and to operate five ACCs of similar size and traffic vol-
ume for the lower airspace. Each (larger) FABEC member state should at least have one 
center on its soil. Civil and military air traffic control should be co-located at all times in 
accordance with the model applied by Switzerland.    
Switzerland 
The replies of the Swiss civil aviation authority (FOCA) representative indicate that Swit-
zerland is in favor of the unanimous voting rule in the FABEC Council due to the sover-
eignty issues affected by respective decisions. Because of the principle of unanimity, 
states are expected to commit themselves to the resolutions and measures adopted in the 
FABEC governance body, and thus it should not be necessary to have instruments to en-
force policy decisions. The arbitration procedure is only to be used as a last resort, in case 
all other means of conflict resolution have been exploited without success.  
With regard to the regulatory scope covered by the decision authority of the FABEC 
Council, the entirety of ATM-related areas may be included in principle, as long as the 
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unanimous vote prevails. Exceptions to this principle may be possible if they are previ-
ously adopted by unanimity. Unanimity is particularly required for all issues of greater na-
tional sensitivity. This refers to the design of military airspace structures, the definition of 
civil and military center locations, and the definition of institutional models for supervi-
sion and air navigation service provision.  
On the functional level, the Swiss Federal Office of Civil Aviation could imagine a 
supervisory model where the regulatory part remains with a national-based authority, 
while oversight functions are carried out by a single FABEC body. As to the ANSP insti-
tutional setup, Switzerland is in favor of an alliance structure where operational air traffic 
management functions are centralized step-by-step in the framework of a FABEC Entity. 
Such an entity could comprise all functions with the exception of civil and military air 
traffic service provision. The integration of civil ATS might become an option in the long 
run, which could result in a single ANS provider at the final stage. However, the readiness 
of Switzerland to move in such a direction would depend on the legal form that common 
FABEC provider were to assume: the Swiss government would opt for a state-owned cor-
poration with managerial and financial autonomy, the model applied at the Swiss air navi-
gation service provider Skyguide. As far as the future center configuration is concerned, 
the Swiss civil aviation authority prefers a reduced number of facilities in the FABEC 
area, whereas each FABEC state should have at least one en-route control center also inte-
grating military ATS. The respondent points out that the position of the Federal Office of 
Civil Aviation may change in accordance with the permanent developments and imple-
mentation of FABEC in accordance with EU regulations. 
Findings 
It becomes evident that none of the states under examination is currently willing to endow 
the FABEC Council with supranational authority by permitting (qualified) majority voting 
in decision-making. Moreover, as the regulatory competences transferred to the FABEC 
level are to a large extent subject to the condition of unanimity, a respective comparison 
only provides a limited indication as to the readiness of FABEC member states to progress 
to a higher level of integration. Consequently, the overall assessment of preference inten-
sities will have to be based mainly on the desired steps of functional FABEC integration. 
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When analyzing the results, the Netherlands displays the highest preference intensity to-
wards an integrated ATM structure in the context of FABEC. While pointing to the re-
quirement of maintaining national decision power in respect of its air navigation service 
infrastructure, the Dutch member state reveals a clear intention to move towards a single 
ANSP and supervisory structure for FABEC and could envisage a reduced number of cen-
ters, including two upper ACCs for the entire area. Obviously one needs to take into con-
sideration that the upper airspace of the Netherlands is already controlled by the multina-
tional control center of Eurocontrol, located in the Dutch city of Maastricht. 
The next position in terms of preference intensity should be allocated to Switzer-
land. Although there is an unambiguous statement that military and security issues are to 
remain under the prerogative of nation states, at some point the Swiss seem to be willing 
to subject civil air navigation services to an integrated structure in the FABEC framework, 
with some degree of center consolidation. This may also have to do with the fact that a 
significant portion of airspace currently under control of the Swiss air navigation service 
provider is located over foreign territory of the neighboring FABEC members France and 
Germany. Integrative moves are also imaginable for Switzerland in respect of the supervi-
sory model.    
France is considered to follow Switzerland in terms of their desire to integrate ATM 
within FABEC. On one hand, France initially pushed towards a single ANSP, which may 
still be considered a long-term objective but one to be approached with caution, if at all; 
on the other hand, when it comes to (civil and military) airspace design and operational 
matters, it basically limits regulatory competences of the FABEC Council to the cross-
border areas between states. Moreover the center infrastructure, according to the French 
government, is to remain status quo, with the option to redistribute responsibilities where 
deemed functionally necessary. Therefore, it seems that although institutional integration 
appears to be within the realm of valid options for France, there are still reservations con-
cerning integrative steps with large-scale operational and infrastructural consequences.190     
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Finally, Germany currently displays the lowest preference intensity with regard to a full-
fledged integration of air traffic management in the framework of FABEC, albeit reporting 
to be fully committed to the project. In the current stage of development a cooperative ap-
proach is preferred, which is to be pursued between national air navigation service provid-
ers along the line of tangible benefits and where, for the time being, the provision of air 
traffic services is left out of scope.  
Addendum: Positions of Belgium and Luxembourg 
Even though Belgium and Luxembourg cannot be taken into consideration in the frame-
work of this study due to missing data, their attitude in respect of the Functional Airspace 
Block Europe Central shall be presented in brief. In his report on behalf of the French 
government, Savary (2010: 25f.) offers a sum-up of the positions of these two FABEC 
member states as to the most relevant issues regarding FABEC integration.  
Belgium is willing to look into the possibility of a single ANS provider for FABEC 
in due course, but initially prefers a gradual approach, taking into account the cultural di-
mension of air navigation service bodies and being cautious towards large integrated or-
ganizations that are likely to change political and social power relations. Belgium would 
like to maintain control over its lower airspace and is still supportive of the upper area 
control carried out by MUAC. Belgium is also of the opinion that FABEC offers consid-
erable potential for civil-military cooperation and airspace management.   
Luxembourg is sympathetic to the idea of a single ANSP, but does not wish to “dis-
appear off the map” and hence desires to keep its control tower with an operationally rele-
vant portion of airspace. A single supervisory authority is seen as a logical consequence 
when implementing a single provider, but Luxembourg is aware of the legal problems and 
sovereignty issues raised by such a prospect.  
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5.1.4 Theoretical bargaining power of FABEC member states   
The bargaining power of FABEC member states in an international negotiation setting is 
again measured at the level of national ministries of transport or civil aviation authorities 
respectively. As already indicated, respective replies were received from France, Ger-
many, the Netherlands, and Switzerland. The situations in Belgium and Luxembourg are 
not taken into account as no data was received from respective governments and because 
their opinions and positions do not differ extensively from those displayed by the other 
four states (see above). Moreover, neither Belgium’s nor Luxembourg’s bargaining power 
is expected to outweigh the rest of FABEC members considering their size and organiza-
tional status in respect of air traffic services. Data acquisition in the relevant indicator di-
mensions yielded the following results: 
Dimensions France Germany The Netherlands Switzerland 
Assessment by na-
tional governments as 
to potential negative 
externalities from non-
coordination  
Significant; 
France is com-
mitted to FABEC 
in view of the 
expected institu-
tional, opera-
tional and eco-
nomic benefits 
Significant; repu-
tational risk due 
to pressure from 
the European 
Commission, the 
airlines and the 
public opinion 
Significant; Am-
sterdam hub de-
pends on efficient 
ATM; access 
through air is vital 
Not assessed; 
positive if FA-
BEC materializes 
Preference intensity 
(from previous sub-
section) 
2 1 4 3 
Assessment by na-
tional governments as 
to the possibility to 
form alternate coali-
tions 
FABEC makes 
most sense 
Theoretically 
possible, but no 
option 
Theoretically  
possible, but    
remote 
Theoretically  
possible, but    
improbable 
Assessment by na-
tional governments as 
to the possibility to 
establish compro-
mises, issue linkages 
or side payments 
Possible Possible Not mentioned Possible 
Score 4 4 2 3 
Table 30: Results for ‘bargaining power’ in selected FABEC member states 
Empirical Analysis 
  
190 
France 
In the perspective of the French Ministry of Transport (MoT), the failure to find effective 
cooperative and/or integrative arrangements in the context of FABEC would have a sig-
nificant impact. The functional airspace block concept is fully supported, and France de-
clares itself committed to a successful outcome. The prospect of improved efficiency and 
economic gains from an integrated air traffic management structure is too important to al-
low the project to fail. In theory, there would be options available to join together in alter-
nate coalitions to strive for the same objectives. The French respondent points to the fact 
that earlier attempts have been made to establish a common structure for ANS provision 
together with Switzerland. However, given the current main traffic patterns and traffic 
volumes over the European continent, FABEC is simply seen as the most appropriate so-
lution. In his view, the failure of FABEC is “not an option”. As to the possibility to com-
promise on certain issues, the representative of the French MoT indicates that the creation 
of common functions and services in a balanced way will require compromises by all par-
ties involved, which will most probably also have to include certain issues of greater na-
tional interest.  
Germany 
As far as the German expert of the Ministry of Transport is concerned, a failure of FA-
BEC would create significant negative reputational effects, as the expectations of the air-
lines, the European Commission, and of the general public towards FABEC are already 
very high. Hence, in his opinion no FABEC member state can afford an unsuccessful out-
come. Alternative FAB constellations would be conceivable in theory; however, their im-
plementation would not be less complex than that of FABEC. In any case, the current 
FAB concept is to be considered a starting point and may be subject to modifications in 
the future; traffic patterns may change or a more pan-European approach to air traffic 
management could be envisaged. As far as the national potential for compromises or issue 
linkage is concerned, the German respondent concedes that probably every state has, to 
some extent, respective possibilities at its disposal, but explicitly points out that the use of 
such options was at this time not considered in the context of FABEC.           
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The Netherlands 
The representative of the Dutch Ministry of Infrastructure and Environment also perceives 
the potential negative effects from an unsuccessful cooperation and/or integration in the 
framework of FABEC as significant. This is to be seen against the background of Amster-
dam’s airport as a major European hub, from which a dense air transportation network is 
operated requiring extensive hourly air traffic control capacities and a seamless and effi-
cient ATM system. Moreover, access by air is vital for the Dutch economy, and any re-
striction in this respect could hamper corresponding developments. The respondent could 
envisage an alternative FAB coalition with the United Kingdom and Ireland, but declares 
this a very remote option. Finally, the Netherlands appears not to perceive the necessity to 
exploit any options related to compromise or issue linkage to enhance its negotiation 
power with regard to FABEC.    
Switzerland 
The Swiss government representative does not express any opinion with regard to possible 
negative externalities from non-integration. Instead he recognizes positive effects in the 
case where cooperation materializes in the FABEC framework. However, given the fact 
that over 40% of airspace under control of the Swiss ANS provider belongs to France or 
Germany and that the Swiss government temporarily finances air navigation services pro-
vided by Skyguide in the German portion of airspace,191 one may assume that a certain in-
terest prevails to find a common solution for cross-border air traffic management. This is 
also underlined by the 2010 Skyguide initiative to evaluate the establishment of a tri-
national area control center in the border-triangle region around Basel,192 a project no 
longer pursued as no agreement could be found concerning the size of airspace to be con-
trolled by the common facility. Although Switzerland is at the boundary of two other FAB 
initiatives, FAB Central Europe and BLUEMED, accession to these programs is not seen 
as a viable option for the time being. This may be explained by the strong economic and 
operational interconnection with France and Germany in terms of air transportation and 
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ATM network. However, the Swiss representative recognizes the potential for compro-
mises or issue linkages to promote common solutions with neighboring countries.  
Findings 
Based on the data acquired related to the various dimensions of ‘bargaining power’, it be-
comes evident that a clear differentiation of negotiation strengths between individual 
states is difficult to establish. From a liberal-intergovernmentalist point of view, it would 
be estimated that the Netherlands possess least negotiating power, as the country perceives 
a strong national dependency on a functional and efficient air traffic management system 
and thus displays high preference intensity towards FABEC. Switzerland would have to 
be placed in a similar position, given its operational and institutional situation of air navi-
gation service provision, which includes an extensive part of foreign airspace. According 
to the reported perceptions however, it appears that the potential effects from non-
integration are not considered too negative. This might be linked to the Swiss experience 
as a non-EU member, heavily relying on bilateral and tailored solutions for problems at 
hand. From this viewpoint, (perceived) bargaining power could be slightly higher. As to 
France and Germany, a well-grounded distinction is hardly possible. It is obvious that 
both nations may be presumed to be in a strong negotiating position, simply due to their 
size and economic significance in Europe. Although they are both committed to a positive 
outcome of FABEC and may face a reputational impact in case of failure, their concep-
tions about how to organize air traffic management in the context of FABEC currently do 
not entail a strong integrative approach in terms of operational air traffic service provision. 
This is also true in the case of France, despite its initial proposal to create a single ANS 
provider. Hence, theory would suggest that a very high negotiating potential be attributed 
to both France and Germany.        
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5.2 Rationalist-supranationalist concepts 
5.2.1 Regulatory autonomy of the European Union in the area of ATM 
Policymaking in the European Union 
The process of policymaking in the European Union has evolved over time. Every 
amendment to the system of treaties of the Community has also brought some institutional 
changes, particularly relating to the decision-making phase of the EU policy cycle, which 
resulted in an expansion of Community decision autonomy. The two major cornerstones 
of these developments were the introduction of the qualified majority voting principle in 
the Council and of the so-called co-decision procedure, known today as the ordinary leg-
islative procedure.  
Qualified majority voting (QMV), applied in the Council of the European Union and 
its predecessor institutions, has replaced unanimity in many areas subjected to Community 
policymaking. As was explained earlier, unanimous voting risks blockage of decisions, as 
member states tend to hold on to their individual interests without having an incentive to 
compromise. To counteract this institutional problem of supranational decision-making, 
the qualified majority voting system was put into practice in the early 1980s and gradually 
expanded to include more and more policy areas. From the 50 articles of the Treaty on 
European Union put under qualified majority voting by the Treaty of Amsterdam, the re-
vision of Lisbon has extended this voting principle to a total of 113 articles; only nation-
ally sensitive areas such as taxation, social security, foreign policy, and common defense 
are still governed by unanimity.193 Moreover, the conditions for achieving a qualified ma-
jority were also adjusted over time to accommodate the changing composition of the 
European Union by larger and smaller member states. The latest revision brought about by 
the Treaty of Lisbon will not become effective until November 2014.194  
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The second significant step in EU policymaking was the introduction of the co-decision 
procedure, brought about by the Treaty of Maastricht, effective from 1 November 1993. It 
entailed empowering the Parliament of the European Union to be fully involved in the leg-
islative activities of the European Union. Again, the scope for this kind of involvement 
was progressively expanded, particularly by the Treaties of Amsterdam and Nice. The ‘co-
decision procedure’ became the ‘ordinary legislative procedure’ under the Treaty of Lis-
bon, which provided for its application to almost all issue areas subject to QMV. The de-
velopments described above took place to a large extent during the policy cycle phases re-
lated to the Single European Sky packages I and II. The treaties effective during the re-
spective phases are therefore analyzed in accordance with the procedure described in sub-
section 4.2.6. 
SES I 
As was shown in table 20, agenda setting and policy proposition related to the first pack-
age of the Single European Sky is chronologically situated during the validity phase of the 
EU legal provisions as determined by the Treaty of Amsterdam. It was noted earlier that 
the Treaty establishing the European Community (TEC or EC Treaty) stands to the fore in 
this respect. As the Single European Sky is mainly connected to the issue area of civil air 
transportation (with some security aspects involved as far as military aviation and air de-
fense are concerned), the EU provisions referring to ‘Transport’ are in focus. This policy 
area is predominantly addressed under title V of the EC Treaty, which also corresponds to 
a respective reference made in article 51 (1) TEC relating to the freedom of providing ser-
vices in the field of transport. The general intent of the provisions under this title is to es-
tablish a common transport policy within the Community.195 According to article 80 (1) 
TEC however, title V is applicable to transportation by means of rail, road, and inland wa-
terway, whereas paragraph 2 states that “the Council may, acting by a qualified majority, 
decide whether, to what extent and by what procedure appropriate provisions may be laid 
down for sea and air transport”, while referring to article 71 TEC as to the procedural pro-
visions to be applied in this respect.196 Article 71 (1) TEC, in turn, makes a reference to 
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the regulatory procedure defined in article 251 TEC, in accordance to which the Council 
shall lay down common rules for international transport or measures to improve transport 
safety. This is to be done after consulting the Economic and Social Committee (EESC) 
and the Committee of the Regions (CoR). The procedure described in article 251 TEC is 
initiated by Commission proposal (acting by majority in accordance with article 219 TEC) 
submitted to the European Parliament (EP) and the Council. According to article 250 
TEC, the Council can amend this proposal by unanimous agreement only. After obtaining 
the opinion of the European Parliament, the Council may, acting by qualified majority, 
adopt the proposed act if including the possible amendments made by the EP. Should the 
Council be in disagreement with the proposal, a common position is to be communicated 
to the EP. If – after having obtained the position of the Commission – the EP approves the 
amendments of the Council, the act is also deemed to be adopted. However, the EP can, 
with the absolute majority of its component members, either reject the common position, 
which results in the non-adoption of the respective act, or make proposals of amendment 
and forward them to the Council and to the Commission. Again, the Council can approve 
such amendments by qualified majority, whereas unanimity is required if the Commission 
has submitted a negative opinion. If the Council does not approve all the amendments, a 
Conciliation Committee equally composed of EP and Council members has to be con-
vened to find a common solution which is submitted to a vote in both institutions. If either 
fails to approve the proposal, the act is deemed to be rejected. Pursuant to article 71 (2) 
TEC, the procedure described here is replaced by unanimous agreement of the Council if 
the proposed act could have a serious effect on the standard of living, on employment in 
certain areas, or on the operation of transport facilities. Yet since the Council, according to 
article 80 (2) TEC, may decide on the extent and the procedure to be applied in respect of 
provisions in the domain of air transport, one may assume that this exception is hardly ap-
plicable, the more so as ‘serious effects’ on the mentioned areas should not be expected 
from ATM integration.  
A second policy area with Community competence, which could be applicable to the 
establishment of the Single European Sky, is the development of ‘Trans-European Net-
works’ (TEN), governed under title XV of the EC Treaty. It also relates to networks in the 
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area of transport.197 According to articles 154-156 TEC, guidelines and measures shall be 
taken by the Council to promote the interconnection, interoperability and accessibility of 
national networks, acting in accordance with the procedure in article 251 TEC (see above), 
and after consultation of the EESC and the CoR. However, where the territory of a mem-
ber state is affected by respective projects, the approval of the concerned member state is 
required. 
Based on above considerations and focusing on the aspect of agenda setting one may 
conclude that, with regard to the implementation of a Single European Sky, the Commis-
sion has available the possibility to make agenda proposals necessary to pursue respective 
objectives, albeit it is the Council deciding on whether legislative action is required at all 
in the field of air transport. Furthermore, no direct control by individual member states can 
be determined in the agenda setting process. Nevertheless, in spite of the independency 
rule stipulated in article 213 (2) TEC, agenda setting and formulation of proposals may 
still be expected to be subjected to (informal) lobbying activities to some extent, by vari-
ous stakeholders. These influence channels are not always transparent and therefore diffi-
cult to capture. It must be taken into account that such influences, if there are any, are pre-
sent at all times irrespective of the timeframe under investigation. Obviously, they may 
differ depending on preference intensity. Yet it seems permissible to leave such activity 
outside the scope of this study, as preference intensities of different stakeholders are not 
anticipated to drastically shift over time and thus should not generate significant variance 
between the two timeframes under investigation.    
Moving on to decision-making, it was shown that the first SES regulation package 
was adopted in March 2004 under the procedures laid down in the Treaty of Nice. Content 
analysis of the relevant text discloses that no amendments were made to the respective 
provisions concerning policymaking in the areas of transport and trans-European net-
works. The procedure described above thus still applies. While Parliament decisions are 
taken by absolute majority of the votes cast (if not specified otherwise), the EC Treaty 
stipulates the following conditions for achieving a qualified majority in Council votes: 198 
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• Differentiated weighting of votes across member states (2-10 votes). 
• At least 62 votes in favor, for adopting acts proposed by the Commission.  
• In all other cases, at least 62 votes in favor by at least 10 member states.  
With regard to the functional scope of the European Union, it is apparent that the EU trea-
ties do not cover the specific policy area of air traffic management but provide more gen-
eral provisions related to supranational decision-making competences in the fields of (air) 
transport and trans-European networks (TEN). An important limitation is that any TEN 
guideline or project concerning the territory of a member state requires pursuit of the lat-
ter’s consent. Moreover, the security and military sphere is excluded from EU competence 
with the exception of issues relating to the common foreign and security policy, which re-
quire unanimous decisions by all member states.199 This implies that any large-scale (in-
fra-)structural changes in the domain of air traffic management, be it civil or military, 
have to be agreed upon by every EU member state concerned. Community competence 
may thus only be assumed in those areas where general principles and standards of a tech-
nical and operational nature are to be defined, without having an impact on national ATM 
infrastructure.    
SES II 
The SES II legislative proposal emanated from the shortfalls of the first SES package, 
which proved to be inadequate to foster the changes in the European air traffic manage-
ment system envisaged by the Commission. Agenda setting for this second proposal may 
therefore be seen as having started with the post-implementation review of SES I that took 
place in 2007. The related communication from the Commission was published in June 
2008. Agenda setting was thus effected within the EU regulatory framework as defined by 
the Treaty of Nice. As the respective TEC provisions remained unchanged, the same pro-
cedures applied as described above. However, the main legislative proceedings and the 
adoption of the SES II regulations took place after entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon. 
This treaty brought about substantial changes in several areas, including a re-numbering of 
articles in the two relevant documents: the Treaty on European Union (TEU) and the 
Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU, former TEC). With regard to 
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EU decision-making, a new ordinary legislative procedure was established, replacing the 
previous article 251 TEC.200 Article 100 (2) TFEU, which is the former article 80 (2) TEC 
governing policymaking in the area of air transport, directly refers to this procedure with-
out reiterating the exception included in former article 71 (2) TEC (see above). Also arti-
cle 172 TFEU (previous article 156 TEC) under the title related to ‘Trans-European Net-
works’ makes reference to the ordinary legislative procedure. This rulemaking process 
also begins with a Commission proposal (acting by majority in accordance with article 
250 TFEU) dealt with by the EP in a first reading (acting by a majority of the votes cast 
according to article 231 TFEU), the position of which is communicated to the Council. If 
the Council agrees (acting by a qualified majority in accordance with article 16 (3) TEU), 
the proposed act is adopted; if not, both the Council and the Commission positions are 
forwarded to the EP. If in the second reading the EP approves the Council decision or 
takes no decision, the proposed act is adopted; if the EP rejects the Council position, the 
act is deemed not to be adopted. Another possibility for the EP is to propose amendments 
that are to be communicated to the Council and to the Commission. Rejection of a pro-
posed act or the proposition of amendments requires a majority of component members of 
the EP. The Council can subsequently approve the EP amendments by qualified majority 
and thus adopt the proposed act, or activate the Conciliation Committee in collaboration 
with the EP. The respective procedure is analogous to the one specified in the former 
TEC. Again, amendments to a Commission proposal, as well as amendments for which 
the Commission delivered a negative opinion, have to be voted unanimously by the Coun-
cil. One of the differences to the previous legislative proceeding is the fact that the Euro-
pean Parliament (instead of the Council) is the starting point of the various readings and 
adopts a position instead of an opinion. Pursuant to article 3 of the Protocol on transitional 
Provisions, the following conditions apply for achieving a qualified majority in the Coun-
cil (taking into account the changes brought about by EU enlargement):  
• Differentiated weighting of votes across member states (3-29 votes). 
• At least 255 votes in favor, to adopt acts proposed by the Commission.  
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• In all other cases, at least 255 votes, representing at least two-thirds of 
the members. 
As far as the scope of the EU is concerned, the Treaty of Lisbon has not procured any 
changes relevant to the area under study. The Union competences related to transport and 
trans-European networks remain unchanged. Article 4 (2) TFEU now stipulates the prin-
ciple of “shared competences” in these domains, implying that member states remain en-
gaged in policymaking as long as the EU has not exercised its competence.201 Moreover, 
the rules and procedures related to military aspects in general, and to the common foreign 
and security policy in particular, are still generally based on unanimity; any legislative 
acts in this field are excluded.202 In summary, table 31 shows the results of the evaluation 
of data related to the policymaking phases of SES I and SES II. 
Findings 
As can be recognized when comparing the two table columns referring to SES I and SES 
II, the legal foundation defining EU competences in respect of the creation of a Single 
European Sky has to a large extent remained unchanged in the timeframe during which 
SES activities have been carried out. With regard to agenda setting, the European Com-
mission always enjoyed the possibility of making legislative proposals in the field of air 
transport with the consent of the Council (acting by qualified majority), but without any 
decisive influence from individual member states. As far as decision-making procedures 
in the relevant EU bodies is concerned, mainly the institutional position of the European 
Parliament has been strengthened by the Treaty of Lisbon; member state influence through 
the Council is still ensured, though. Qualified majority voting in the case of the Council 
and majority voting in the European Parliament are the standard principles applied in the 
policy areas under investigation, namely ‘Transport’ and ‘Trans-European Networks’. It 
stands out that the regulatory potential at supranational level in these two functional do-
mains is very much limited to harmonization and standardization and in principle lacks the 
possibility for the EU to directly intervene in national infrastructures. This, however, 
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would be an important precondition to promote the structural changes necessary to reduce 
fragmentation and make the European air traffic management system more efficient. The 
military perspective, which plays a pivotal role in achieving this goal, cannot be addressed 
at all without the consent of member states. It becomes apparent that the European Union 
is to a large extent dependent on member states’ cooperation in its endeavor to establish 
the Single European Sky. 
Table 31: Results of data evaluation for ‘regulatory autonomy of a supranational organization’  
 
Dimensions SES I SES II 
Degree of member state 
involvement in agenda 
setting process 
Agenda setting by European Com-
mission, but action only with ap-
proval of the Council (by qualified 
majority); no decisive influence on 
agenda setting by individual member 
states 
Agenda setting by European Com-
mission, but action only with ap-
proval of the Council (by qualified 
majority); no decisive influence on 
agenda setting by individual member 
states 
Supranational organiza-
tion’s voting procedure 
Council: Generally qualified major-
ity voting; unanimity if foreign and 
security policy is concerned, if 
Commission provides negative opin-
ion, (or if national standard of living, 
employment, or operation of trans-
port facilities is affected) 
Parliament: Generally voting by the 
absolute majority of the votes cast, or 
by absolute majority of component 
members (particularly for rejections 
and amendments) 
Council: Generally qualified majority 
voting; unanimity if foreign and secu-
rity policy is concerned, or if Com-
mission provides negative opinion; 
conditions for QMV adapted follow-
ing EU enlargement 
Parliament: Generally voting by ma-
jority of the votes cast, or by absolute 
majority of component members 
(particularly for rejections and 
amendments) 
Functional scope of    
decision-making 
• Air transport 
• Trans-European Networks (except 
when affecting member state ter-
ritory) 
Implies EU definition competences in 
the following areas related to ATM:  
• Charging policy 
• ANSP performance objectives 
• Safety management policies 
• ASM/ATFCM principles 
• ATM operational standards and 
procedures 
• ATM technological standards 
• AIM standards 
• ANS training standards 
• Air transport 
• Trans-European Networks (except 
when affecting member state terri-
tory) 
Implies EU definition competences in 
the following areas related to ATM:  
• Charging policy 
• ANSP performance objectives 
• Safety management policies 
• ASM/ATFCM principles 
• ATM operational standards and 
procedures 
• ATM technological standards 
• AIM standards 
• ANS training standards 
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5.2.2 Density of EU regulation promoting FAB integration 
As discussed in sub-section 4.2.7, the indicator for ‘density of supranational regulation’ is 
measured in a quantitative and a qualitative dimension. The basis for analysis is the vari-
ous enactments related to the Single European Sky, as shown in table 23. As a first step, 
respective provisions are analyzed with a view to their potential to specifically promote 
the development of functional airspace blocks. Second, the assessment is made whether 
the provision concerned is aiming at directly influencing such developments, or whether 
an indirect impact can be expected. Finally, the sensitivity of policy areas affected by the 
relevant provisions is examined. Table 32 lists only those enactments where regulation 
with FAB relevance is found, and provides the information specified. Once more it needs 
to be emphasized that the focus of this analysis is on provisions within the SES regulatory 
framework that actively or passively promote the implementation of FABs. This implies 
that any conditional regulation related to the establishment of FABs is not taken into ac-
count. The same is true for pure harmonization efforts that may be necessary prerequisites 
to enable FABs but do not advance their implementation as such, as well as for cross-
border optimizations between neighboring states, which can also be dealt with outside a 
FAB context through bilateral agreements.  
SES I 
Under SES I, only one article in the entire regulatory framework is designed to actively 
foster the introduction of functional airspace blocks: article 5 of the Airspace Regulation. 
Article 5 (1) unmistakably states that the upper airspace is to be “reconfigured into func-
tional airspace blocks”. It is to be noted that reference is made only to the upper airspace, 
i.e. the gate-to-gate principle of air traffic management203 is not yet considered. Articles 5 
(4) and (5) establish additional restrictions: mutual agreement is required by all member 
states with responsibility over any portion of airspace affected by the FAB; such agree-
ments need to provide for modification and exit options. The only additional provision 
that could be considered as moving member states towards designing FABs is article 4 (1) 
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of the Regulation on Flexible Use of Airspace, which requires states to establish cross-
border airspace use and airspace structures that accommodate the relevant transnational 
traffic flows. However, this article also fails to integrate the ‘big picture’. Hence, it be-
comes evident that in the context of SES I legislation supranational influence on FAB de-
velopment is virtually non-existent. Also as far as the functional scope of EU regulation is 
concerned, all areas of higher sensitivity in accordance with table 6 in sub-section 4.2.2 
remain unaffected. There is even no indirect incentive contained in the regulations that 
would promote FAB implementation. Consequently, if full commitment is missing at 
states level to walk the path towards a more integrated air traffic management system by 
establishing functional airspace blocks, respective progress is hard to achieve under these 
circumstances. 
SES II 
When analyzing the regulations contained in the SES II legislative package, a much 
stronger focus on FAB evolution is noticeable. However, this focus does not become 
manifest in a ‘top-down’-approach where functional airspace blocks are designed at su-
pranational level and forced upon member states. Rather, the attempt is made to set up a 
regulatory framework designed to indirectly incentivize states to accelerate FAB devel-
opment. The only provision aiming at direct influence is the new article 9a (1) of the Ser-
vice Provision Regulation, which sets a clear deadline for the implementation of func-
tional airspace blocks: 4 December 2012. Besides that, several new instruments are intro-
duced which have the potential to advance the progress of FABs. The definition of a per-
formance scheme by means of the revised article 11 of the Service Provision Regulation, 
and further detailed by the Performance Regulation, may be considered the most important 
measure in that respect. As was shown above, EU-wide performance targets are defined in 
the areas of safety, environment, capacity, and cost-efficiency, and have to be adhered to 
by the performance plans set up nationally or in the context of FABs. The fact that adop-
tion of EU performance targets is done following the regulatory procedure (as briefly de-
scribed in sub-section 2.2.2) does not constitute a problematic obstacle since none of the 
voting procedures in any of the institutional bodies involved are based on unanimity. As 
some performance targets may be quite challenging for a single ANSP or member state to 
achieve by itself, the performance scheme may push individual states and providers into 
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cooperation within the framework of functional airspace blocks to enable them to attain 
the set goals. This is particularly relevant for those targets that are related to a more direct 
airway structure, as addressed by the environment key performance area, or to a more le-
nient overall cost-structure in ATM, as addressed by the cost-efficiency target. As was al-
ready mentioned, the performance scheme is supported by a new charging philosophy, 
abandoning the full cost recovery mechanism for air navigation services and introducing 
the concepts of determined costs (revised article 15 of the Service Provision Regulation) 
and risk sharing (new article 11a of the Charging Regulation).204 This puts additional pres-
sure on air navigation service providers to reduce costs and increase cost-efficiency of 
their operations. The revised charging principles may thus also be seen as an indirect en-
abler of FAB implementation. Another supportive measure is the introduction of a net-
work management and design function at European level through a new article 6 of the 
Airspace Regulation (and further specified by the Regulation on Network Management 
Function). Its tasks encompass the design of the European airway network, the coordina-
tion of scarce resources such as radio frequencies, as well as ensuring that the EU-wide 
performance targets are met. However, the responsibility for designing national route and 
airspace structures remains with individual nation states. Yet, more supranational author-
ity is vested in centralized air traffic flow and capacity management, with some discre-
tionary power of the central ATFM unit in terms of optimization of network operations, as 
specified by the respective Commission Regulation on Air Traffic Flow Management. 
These various activities, aiming at a more central governance of ATM network functions, 
may create stronger necessities for a coordinated approach in the framework of FABs. Fi-
nally, a FAB system coordinator is introduced by article 9b of the revised Service Provi-
sion Regulation and assigned a coordinating function between member states to overcome 
possible differences, thus facilitating the establishment of FABs. Recognizably, the new or 
revised regulatory provisions at EU level still do not affect potentially sensitive ATM pol-
icy areas. In summary, there is no supranational regulation able to actively and directly en-
force FAB evolution, but there is a series of instruments working indirectly with the po-
tential to speed up the process.      
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SES Enactment Articles relevant to promote FABs Contri-bution 
Sensiti-
vity 
Regulation (EC) No 
551/2004 of the European 
Parliament and of the 
Council of 10 March 2004 
on the organisation and use 
of the airspace in the single 
European sky 
Article 5, requiring member states to 
reconfigure the upper airspace into 
functional airspace blocks that have to 
enable optimum use of airspace, taking 
into account air traffic flow, and be jus-
tified by overall added value, but only 
by mutual agreement between member 
states 
Direct Low 
I 
Commission Regulation 
(EC) No 2150/2005 of 23 
December 2005 laying 
down common rules for the 
flexible use of airspace  
Article 4 (1) requiring member states to 
develop cross-border airspace use as 
well as airspace structures to ensure 
optimized traffic flows across national 
borders 
Direct Low 
Regulation (EC) No 
1070/2009 of the European 
Parliament and of the 
Council of 21 October 2009 
amending Regulations (EC) 
No 549/2004, (EC) No 
550/2004, (EC) No 
551/2004 and (EC) No 
552/2004 in order to im-
prove the performance and 
sustainability of the Euro-
pean aviation system (Pro-
posal via COM(2008)388 of 
25 June 2008) 
Article 1 (5), introducing a perform-
ance scheme (Article 11 of Regulation 
(EC) No 549/2004) 
Article 2 (5), insertion/revision of arti-
cles in Regulation (EC) No 550/2004: 
• Article 9a (1), requiring member 
states to ensure the implementation 
of functional airspace blocks by 4 
December 2012 
• Article 9b, introducing a FAB system 
coordinator 
• Article 15, revising the charging 
scheme introducing the concept of 
determined costs 
Article 3 (6), introducing a Network 
Management and Design function (in-
sertion of article 6 in Regulation (EC) 
No 551/2004) 
Indirect 
Direct 
Indirect 
Indirect 
Indirect 
 
Econ. 
Low 
Low 
Econ. 
Low 
II 
Commission Regulation 
(EU) No 691/2010 of 29 
July 2010 laying down a 
performance scheme for air 
navigation services and 
network functions and 
amending Regulation (EC) 
No 2096/2005 laying down 
common requirements for 
the provision of air naviga-
tion service  
Entire regulation, in particular article 
14, allowing the European Commission 
to demand corrective actions by mem-
ber states if the national/FAB perform-
ance targets are inconsistent with the 
EU-wide targets (indirect contribution) 
Indirect Econ. 
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SES Enactment Articles relevant to promote FABs Contri-bution 
Sensiti-
vity 
Commission Regulation 
(EU) No 1191/2010 of 16 
December 2010 amending 
Regulation (EC) No 
1794/2006 laying down a 
common charging scheme 
for air navigation services 
Article 1 (11), introducing a risk shar-
ing mechanism (new article 11a) Indirect Econ. 
Commission Regulation 
(EU) No 255/2010 of 25 
March 2010 laying down 
common rules on air traffic 
flow management  
Entire regulation Indirect Low II 
Commission Regulation 
(EU) No 677/2011 of 7 July 
2011 laying down detailed 
rules for the implementation 
of ATM network functions 
and amending Regulation 
(EU) No 691/2010 
Entire regulation Indirect Low 
Table 32: SES I / SES II enactments potentially promoting FAB development 
Findings 
It is evident that the density of regulation with the potential of promoting FAB develop-
ment has drastically increased from the first to the second regulatory package related to 
the Single European Sky. It appears that the Commission and the EU institutions as a 
whole have made an additional effort to overcome the impediments identified in the pro-
gress review of the SES I period, and to further the evolution of ATM integration in 
Europe. However, it can also be observed that there is no change to the principle of mem-
ber states being in charge of setting up and designing the core element of SES, namely the 
functional airspace blocks. Hence, advancement is bound to rely on the effectiveness of 
the incentive framework provided by the various additional regulations related to perform-
ance, charging, and centralized network management. It will have to be demonstrated 
whether member states are susceptible to respective mechanisms or attempt to circumvent 
them by choosing other options to ensure compliance, but which do not fulfill the underly-
ing objectives of the Single European Sky. 
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6 RESULTING INSIGHTS 
Chapter introduction and summary 
This chapter contains the final analysis and interpretation of all data collected in the con-
text of this study, beginning with the evaluation of the proposed hypotheses and moving 
on to an overall assessment of the current situation presented in FABEC in terms of its in-
tegrative potential, including proposals for a way forward. It is empirically demonstrated 
that the preference intensity of influential domestic stakeholders in respect of FABEC in-
tegration has an impact on the respective position of national governments. Yet, govern-
ment agencies also take their own perspective into account. The second liberal-
intergovernmentalist hypothesis, which suggests a relationship between a nation state’s 
bargaining power and the (institutional) level of integration cannot be properly evaluated, 
as respective preference intensities of FABEC member states are too close to each other to 
be able to make the necessary differentiation. When looking at the supranational level, it 
can be observed that the European Commission in fact makes extensive use of its compe-
tences to advance the development of functional airspace blocks. As the EU does not pos-
sess the authority to implement FABs top-down, a framework of indirect regulations has 
been set up to provide the ‘incentives’ required for the states to gear towards increased co-
operation and integration. Their effect on FABEC has been marginal to date, though. 
Since FABEC member states support civil airspace redesign and functional ANS integra-
tion in specific areas, but currently exclude a centralized structure for air traffic service 
provision, national ANSPs will continue to exist for the time being. However, instead of 
finding common arrangements to improve the overall ATM system, national providers ap-
pear to be in a state of competition, thereby preventing all forms of enhanced collaboration 
and integration. The study therefore recommends finding measures and tools to eliminate 
competition between air navigation service providers and to implement positive incentives 
to foster cooperative solutions. 
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6.1 Evaluation of the liberal-intergovernmentalist perspective 
6.1.1 The influence of domestic stakeholders on governmental preference 
structures 
To analyze the relationship proposed by the first hypothesis, domestic stakeholders’ posi-
tions in respect of FABEC integration are compared to governmental preference intensi-
ties in the three member states selected for this purpose: Germany, the Netherlands, and 
Switzerland. It is thereby examined whether the theoretically assumed influencing power 
of domestic organizations correlates with the extent to which respective positions on spe-
cific sub-issues are incorporated in the governmental position of nation states. An organi-
zation with high influencing power is expected to be able to have its preferences accom-
modated in the government’s preference structure. Evidently, it is possible that an existing 
correlation may be coincidental and not linked to any influencing activity. Still, discus-
sions between stakeholders and the relevant governmental institutions can be assumed to 
be taking place at least where a close relationship or involvement in FABEC processes has 
been confirmed. The comparison of all four examined organizations per FABEC member 
state will thus show which issues stakeholders were more successful at convincing gov-
ernment authorities to adopt a specific position on, notwithstanding the possibility that the 
latter would have come to the same conclusion without any sort of influence. In either 
case it shows which stakeholder positions could not be persuasively conveyed to the gov-
ernment level.    
Germany 
When analyzing the (personally expressed) preference intensity of the representative of 
the German Ministry of Transport (MoT), and assuming – in most aspects – sufficient 
parallels with the official governmental position, it can be observed that a high correlation 
exists with the positions as reported by the Ministry of Defense (MoD) and the German air 
navigation service provider DFS. However, there are still a few discrepancies to either or-
ganization. In contrast with the governmental expert view, the DFS representative could 
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accept a (qualified) majority vote in the FABEC Council, on the condition that there is a 
possibility of justified veto.205 Obviously, this is very close to the unanimity rule preferred 
by both the MoT and MoD, but it is to be considered a deviation from an exclusively in-
tergovernmental approach. The German ANSP even conceives that a decision on civil and 
military airspace design as well as on the ANSP institutional model could be taken at FA-
BEC level (which is most probably linked to the qualified majority just specified). Fur-
thermore, the DFS expert would be ready to accept a single supervisory authority for FA-
BEC, a notion shared by neither representative of the two ministries. On the other hand, 
the respondent of the Ministry of Defense would, in contrast to the Ministry of Transport, 
agree to have both civil and military control center locations defined at FABEC level and 
to centralize the civil ATS function within an ANSP alliance structure. Finally, both the 
MoD and DFS could envisage a reduced number of ATC centers for FABEC, while the 
expert of the MoT was not ready to formulate a respective opinion yet.  
It stands out that the representative of the German Ministry of Transport has in al-
most every instance chosen the more restraining option in terms of integration compared 
to the various positions provided by the two stakeholders. The only issue where the MoT 
expert is less restrictive than the MoD is the definition of en-route unit rates, which the 
latter prefers to keep fully under national prerogative. Conversely, there are three excep-
tions where the MoT representative displays a more pro-integrative attitude than DFS, 
concerning the topics of definition of civil ACCs (although explicitly restricted to a 
unanimous decision) and of functional integration of AIM and training. Hence, the non-
accepted items of the Ministry of Defense are better accounted for in the governmental 
expert position than those of DFS, which may lead to the conclusion that the MoD has a 
stronger influence on the matter. 
As far as the remaining two organizations Lufthansa and GdF are concerned, corre-
lation of views is far lower compared to MoD and DFS, obviously as the Ministry of 
Transport seems to pursue a rather conservative approach compared to the more pro-
integrative attitude of the German main air carrier and the ATCO staff. This is particularly 
true with regard to FABEC policy enforcement (Lufthansa favoring appeal to EU institu-
tions), the definition of civil and military center locations, and military airspace design. In 
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contrast to GdF, Lufthansa and the German Ministry of Transport share their objection to 
a single air navigation service provider. Yet, Lufthansa would still like to see some form 
of integration as far as ATS functions are concerned. Consequently, one may conclude 
that German stakeholders appear to be able to influence FABEC developments in accor-
dance with their relative influencing power as assessed in the context of this analysis.   
The Netherlands 
Looking at the preference intensity reported by the Dutch Ministry of Infrastructure and 
Environment, most parallels exist with the opinions expressed by the Ministry of Defense 
and LVNL, the national ANS provider. The main differences are that a less intrusive 
mechanism is chosen on the part of the military to ensure the correct application of policy 
decisions (mediation instead of arbitration), and that LVNL clearly prefers an alliance 
model with integrated functions to a single ANSP structure. Both organizations also are of 
the opinion that civil control center locations should be excluded from the decision scope 
of the FABEC Council. It must be noted, though, that the respective government position 
is based on the principles of unanimous decision-making and of keeping at least one na-
tional center in the Netherlands. Hence, there is no factual discrepancy on this issue. The 
same can be said about the position conveyed by the Netherlands Guild of Air Traffic 
Controllers and the Dutch main air carrier KLM, according to which civil-military coop-
eration principles, the ANSP institutional setup, and en-route unit rates should be situated 
within the decision competence of the nation state. Yet, KLM further differs from the min-
isterial opinion by subjecting military airspace design and military center locations to a 
Council decision, keeping in mind the airline’s preference for a majority voting rule in the 
governing body of FABEC. Moreover, KLM tends towards the status quo in terms of the 
supervisory authority model. The Netherlands Guild of Air Traffic Controllers mainly dif-
fers from the Dutch governmental position by supporting policy enforcement at European 
Union level, by generally rejecting performance objectives for ANSPs, and by desiring to 
maintain today’s center configuration in the FABEC area.  
It would also appear that correlation between government and interest group opinion 
increases with influencing potential of the latter. The position of the Ministry of Defense 
is almost identical to the one expressed by the representative of the Ministry of Infrastruc-
ture and Environment, followed by LVNL, where one important discrepancy exists in 
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terms of the preferred ANSP institutional model. More pronounced differences are ob-
servable compared to those organizations attributed a lower influencing capability, namely 
KLM and NGATC. A clear distinction between the two in accordance with their assessed 
influencing potential is difficult to establish; although NGATC was rated lowest in terms 
of its possibilities and opportunities to shape governmental policy, a relatively high corre-
lation exists with regard to the desired functional steps of integration. However, this could 
also be due to the fact that other more ‘powerful’ organizations share the same opinion.  
It is noticeable that the government’s opinion in a few instances even goes beyond 
the more restrictive attitudes of relevant stakeholders, which seems to be the case in re-
spect of policy enforcement and the ANSP institutional model. This suggests that gov-
ernmental preferences are not only shaped by the influence of relevant stakeholders, but 
also by other factors and considerations, complemented by their own appreciation of the 
situation. 
Switzerland 
When comparing the positions of Swiss domestic stakeholders affected by FABEC inte-
gration to the Federal Office of Civil Aviation’s expert opinion on how far integration 
should progress, a similar picture is presented as in the other two FABEC member states 
under investigation. The organization with the highest influencing potential, the Swiss Air 
Force, shows most parallels to the governmental view, followed by Skyguide and subse-
quently Swiss Intl. Airlines and SwissATCA, both featuring lower influencing capabilities 
as well as correlation rates. A variance between the positions expressed by the air force 
and the FOCA representative lies in the observation that the military respondent explicitly 
excludes decisions about security issues such as military airspace design, location and area 
of responsibility of military control centers, or civil-military coordination principles from 
FABEC competence, while the FOCA position includes these topics – though under the 
condition of unanimity. In practice the outcome is identical, as national interests can be 
pursued in any case. The only more significant difference might be the fact that the air 
force would be supportive of a centralized management of civil air traffic service func-
tions in the context of an alliance model. In the view of the FOCA expert, this could only 
be an option at the very final stage of cooperation and integration within an ANSP alli-
ance. In contrast to FOCA, the Swiss ANS provider Skyguide favors a qualified majority 
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vote in the Council, the scope of which should also include military airspace design and a 
single supervisory authority for FABEC. Overall, FOCA tends to take on the more restric-
tive position of the two principal influencing stakeholders when it comes to transferring 
decision-making power to the FABEC level, or to functional integration. Hence, compared 
to Swiss Intl. Airlines and SwissATCA, who both share a similar and more pro-integrative 
view, discrepancies obviously become more pronounced. In contrast to the FOCA opin-
ion, the airline and the ATCO associations prefer a strong enforcement mechanism for 
FABEC policy decisions and a single ANSP structure. They agree together that a qualified 
majority should apply for votes in the FABEC Council. According to the airline, the 
Council’s regulatory scope would be permitted to include military airspace design as well 
as the ANSP institutional setup. Furthermore, SwissATCA differs from the FOCA view 
by its desire to implement a ‘virtual center’ architecture in the initial phase, before even 
starting a discussion about center consolidation.    
In summary, the FOCA position takes into account the concerns and limitations ex-
pressed by the two most influential stakeholders: the air force and the Swiss ANS pro-
vider. The overall slightly more integrative approach supported by Swiss Intl. Airlines and 
SwissATCA is only reflected in those areas where it is shared by both Skyguide and the 
military. This results in a generally cautious and step-by-step attitude towards integration 
at the level of the Swiss government.                     
Evaluation of hypothesis 
As shown by the above analysis of the three example FABEC member states, the first lib-
eral-intergovernmentalist hypothesis, according to which the more influential domestic in-
terest groups tend to shape governmental preference intensities, appears to hold truth also 
in the domain of air traffic management. All nation states under examination display a 
very similar picture in terms of relative influencing power and, consequently, government 
positions; they correlate to a high degree with the opinions of those organizations possess-
ing regular and intense input channels to governmental authorities, or experts directly in-
volved in the FABEC proceedings, or who take part themselves in FABEC working 
groups. Perception of concernment seems to be comparable across all investigated stake-
holders, with some differences as to the type of concernment. While on the part of the 
military the impact of FABEC integration appears to be focused mainly on the operational 
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and administrative level, air navigation service providers could be strongly affected in re-
spect of their organizational setup. Airlines, on the other hand, will see no significant im-
pact in this respect; for them, the operational efficiency gains and cost reductions related 
to air traffic management stand at the fore. As far as the associations representing air traf-
fic controllers are concerned, potential effects are perceived on a very personal level, re-
ferring to possible changes in working conditions or working location. Some staff organi-
zations also have difficulties in expressing an opinion as to how they will be affected, as 
the direction into which FABEC will develop is still too vague. In any case, since all 
stakeholders under investigation perceive a certain level of concernment, respective com-
parisons become less relevant. The deciding factor in measuring influencing power is thus 
the organizations’ institutional ability to shape policy outcomes through direct or indirect 
involvement in drafting and decision-making processes.   
Evidently the military, being part of the government system and thus enjoying co-
decisional power in all investigated countries, is able to have all relevant interests related 
to its areas of activity accommodated in the national preference structure. The same can be 
said about the air navigation service providers, which constitute the national ‘expert or-
ganizations’ in air traffic management and in this role are fully involved in the develop-
ment process of FABEC at working level. Lesser influence can be observed from airlines 
and staff associations. Although the airlines are the customers of air traffic management, 
for whose benefit the various European integration projects are actually undertaken, their 
inclusion in the evolutionary process of FABEC is rather low and mainly limited to con-
sultation. The situation looks even worse for the air traffic controllers’ associations: For-
mal consultation on the FABEC Treaty was only reported from Switzerland, otherwise in-
volvement at the domestic (ANSP) level is restricted to mere information exchange. As a 
result, the views of airlines and staff seem hardly to find their way into the government 
position on FABEC. 
As was discussed earlier, a respective government opinion does not necessarily have 
to be formed by relevant domestic interest groups; it may develop from its own considera-
tions and other influencing factors not covered by this study. Nevertheless, a certain de-
gree of stakeholder influence may be assumed to exist, as no governmental agency will act 
fully on its own behalf, particularly not in a complex domain like air traffic management 
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where respective tasks are executed by specialized organizations. However, in particular 
the example of the Netherlands shows that the preference intensity of the responsible min-
istry may go beyond the interests of relevant stakeholders. This leads to the conclusion 
that governmental bodies are autonomous actors who, despite outside influence, have their 
own perspective on matters, which influences their opinion-making. This also has to do 
with the fact that the ‘principal-agent’ relationship is not directly applicable in the specific 
case under study.206 Taking into account this constraint, the validity of the first liberal-
intergovernmentalist hypothesis may still be supported.         
6.1.2 The relative influence of nation states on the level of FABEC integration 
When comparing the preference intensities communicated by the four state representatives 
with the level of institutional integration as determined by the FABEC Treaty, no clearly 
differentiable influence pattern can be recognized that would correspond to the assessment 
of relative bargaining power performed in sub-section 5.1.4. Such a differentiation is al-
ready very difficult due to the fact that none of the investigated states is willing to allow 
the FABEC Council supranational authority. As far as policy enforcement or the regula-
tory scope of the Council is concerned, certain individual discrepancies exist between 
government positions and the factual situation in the treaty, both in the direction of more 
and of fewer competences assigned to the FABEC level. However, these discrepancies are 
present across all four FABEC member states, irrespective of the theoretically attributed 
bargaining power.  
In principle it can be asserted that the FABEC Treaty includes those regulatory areas 
which should, according to a majority of states, be covered by the competence of the 
Council, while areas that a majority of states do not wish to have covered are outside of 
the scope. This does not imply that respective decisions were taken by a majority vote; 
even the highly sensitive issue of including the military dimension in airspace design, 
which was only supported by half the states, is accommodated in the treaty. This is relativ-
ized by the fact that the extent of the regulatory scope is less significant when ultimately 
subjected to unanimous decision-making, as this always permits any contracting state to 
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bring its individual interests to bear if necessary. As regards issues of low sensitivity, the 
only area not addressed by the treaty is ANS staff training, although during data acquisi-
tion for the present study a common regulatory approach was supported by all interviewed 
states. It must be presumed that training was either seen as an ANSP cooperation matter 
without direct operational implications, and thus not worth of being included in the treaty, 
or as a field which should be regulated at EU level. Another topic of different state views 
is the mechanism to ensure application and/or implementation of FABEC policy deci-
sions, where the treaty stipulates an arbitration procedure if the FABEC Council is unable 
to find a solution. Some states point to the fact that FABEC members take unanimous de-
cisions and thereby commit themselves to respective actions, rendering enforcement obso-
lete. Arbitration is thus seen as a means to resolve potential conflicts of interpretation 
rather than as an actual ‘enforcement’ mechanism, and one which should only be applied 
as a last resort.      
Obviously, the FABEC member states under investigation share a very similar pref-
erence structure as far as cooperation and integration in institutional terms are concerned. 
It may thus be concluded that, during the drafting phase of the FABEC Treaty, an actual 
‘negotiation’ situation most probably did not arise where individual negotiation potentials 
would have become manifest. It is therefore not possible to provide a well-grounded 
evaluation of the second liberal-intergovernmentalist hypothesis. It can only be pointed 
out that the present agreement accommodates the requirements of those states that possess 
a generally lower preference intensity with regard to FABEC integration, given the par-
ticular fact that the treaty is fairly high-level and does not yet specify any (functional) de-
tails. It is still conceivable though that negotiation strategies may take effect in specific 
FABEC working groups or later within the various committees working for the FABEC 
Council, where more tangible options of cooperation and integration are discussed. These 
processes, however, are not covered by this study.             
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6.2 Evaluation of the rationalist-supranationalist perspective 
In order to make a statement about the relationship proposed in the third hypothesis, regu-
latory autonomy of the European Union institutions and the corresponding regulatory ac-
tivity in respect of the implementation of the Single European Sky during the phase of the 
first regulation package is compared with the phase encompassing the second package. 
The hypothesis is sustainable if an increase in regulation that has the potential to promote 
FAB integration can be identified during the second phase, even without any addition of 
regulatory competence at the supranational level.  
Analysis of acquired data shows that the regulatory density possibly promoting inte-
gration in the framework of functional airspace blocks has indeed considerably increased 
from the first to the second Single European Sky regulatory package. This even occurred 
without adding any competences to the European Union institutions in terms of agenda 
setting, decision-making power, or functional scope, pertaining to the domain of air trans-
port and air traffic management. Particularly the European Commission made extensive 
use of its existing authority to come up with creative proposals on how to advance the de-
velopment of FABs. It stands out that except for the requirement to establish cross-border 
airspace use and functional airspace blocks by the deadline of 4 December 2012, no other 
direct interventions aimed at FAB creation were formulated in the SES II regulations. Ob-
viously the Commission was unable to propose regulations that would deny member states 
their right to explicitly agree to a transnational network activity affecting their territory or 
national security issues. Instead, the Commission chose to arrange a series of indirect in-
centives that are expected to foster a more integrative approach. A powerful tool in this 
regard may be the newly introduced performance scheme in combination with the revised 
philosophy on charging for air navigation service provision. The Commission managed to 
implement rules stating that the Commission has the power to set European-wide per-
formance targets that the member states are required to adhere to when drafting their own 
performance plans, and even managed to have the final say on whether the national plans 
are adequate to attain that goal. This is a remarkable step, as it provides the Commission 
with the authority to exercise a certain pressure upon member states, the more so as the 
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adoption of performance targets cannot be vetoed by any of the member states. All targets 
relating to cost-efficiency, capacity, and environment (in terms of horizontal flight effi-
ciency) have the potential to drive states and air navigation service providers towards co-
operation and integration. The overall cost base of air traffic management can only be no-
ticeably reduced if ATM functions, ancillary/support services, and infrastructure are con-
solidated and centralized. This is supported by the abolishment of the full cost recovery 
principle, a long-standing favorable tradition removed by the Commission, and the linkage 
of anticipated cost bases to the performance scheme, putting providers under enormous 
cost pressure. Improving airspace and control sector design to better accommodate trans-
national traffic flows, which requires cross-border operational arrangements, can increase 
capacity. Better horizontal flight efficiency would mean more direct routings and a corre-
sponding hub-to-hub route network that is only achievable when applying a more compre-
hensive perspective beyond nation states. Network and coordination functions at European 
level complement these measures. They provide additional institutional bodies, which are 
designed to continuously push for solutions optimizing the overall ATM network. This 
can almost be looked at as a constant dripping intended to wear away the stone of resis-
tance to cooperation and integration.  
It thus appears that rationalist supranationalism has a strong point in suggesting that 
the European institutions and in particular the European Commission are able to exploit 
their competences in a way that states find themselves confronted with new regulations, 
designed to advance integrative processes which are hard to escape from and which are in-
troduced in the framework of regulatory structures that can be rightly described as ‘path 
dependencies’.207 The Commission has proven its capacity to “define and pursue a politi-
cally relevant agenda on an ongoing basis”,208 by formulating new proposals to achieve 
the objectives of the Single European Sky in a period over more than seven years. Yet it 
must be noted that respective regulations in the specific case of air traffic management in-
tegration do not directly tackle the sensitive topics, but attempt to do it circuitously. It is 
evident that it is not possible for the European institutions to simply expand the authority 
vested in them by the EU treaties. This is particularly relevant in the policy domain under 
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study, as real progress is only possible by addressing issues that are under national pre-
rogative. Consequently, it is not certain that the requested impact will in fact materialize, 
as states may find ways to fulfill the SES regulations without actually walking the in-
tended path of integration. In summary, though, based on these results, the proposed hy-
pothesis is also applicable to the ATM sector and can thus be sustained.         
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6.3 Assessment of the integrative potential with regard to FABEC 
6.3.1 Supranational contribution 
The results of this study have shown that European air traffic management integration in 
the framework of functional airspace blocks, in particular with regard to FABEC, is sub-
jected to various and partially opposing influences. On one side, an increasing density of 
European Union legislation and regulation puts pressure on EU member states and affili-
ated countries to foster cooperation and integration through FABs. The European Com-
mission, which, according to the EU treaties, does not possess the legal authority to super-
impose a functional airspace structure on member states, chooses a more indirect approach 
by addressing the air navigation service performance to be achieved by ANS providers in 
the areas of safety, capacity, cost-efficiency, and environmental sustainability. The most 
effective regulatory tool to that end is the SES Performance Regulation in combination 
with the revised charging scheme. The requirement for national air navigation service pro-
viders to determine their cost bases and unit rates in advance and to subsequently bear po-
tential excessive costs, already enhances cost-awareness in ANS operations. Moreover, the 
setting of binding EU-wide cost-efficiency targets, which national targets have to be con-
sistent with, might over time force ANSPs to enter cooperative or even integrative ar-
rangements with other providers to be able to meet respective goals. The same is true for 
the environment and capacity targets, which at some point may no longer be achievable by 
individual providers in isolation, as this will require the reduction of airspace and control 
sector complexity and the introduction of a simpler and more direct airway structure. A 
different situation is presented for the key performance area of safety, the proposed indica-
tors of which can be adequately complied with in the national context. More supportive 
regulations have also been adopted at EU level, relating to the establishment of network 
functions designed to facilitate a pan-European approach to ATM by coordinating FAB 
interfaces, or by ensuring effective air traffic flow management. Yet, although respective 
activities may generate additional expectations towards states, they do not share the ‘en-
forcing’ character attributed to the performance scheme.       
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6.3.2 Aggregation of national preferences 
It is evident that the main actors in respect of FAB integration are the nation states. Na-
tional sovereignty dictates that it is essentially they who decide to what extent cooperation 
and integration are pursued and which ultimate shape functional airspace blocks will as-
sume. Although the present Single European Sky regulations are able to set common stan-
dards and generate incentives to support integration, no FAB model can be forced upon 
the states. It is therefore relevant what stance national governments take towards func-
tional airspace blocks. The example of FABEC demonstrates that, in general, nation states 
maintain a cautious attitude. The fact that unanimity prevails in FABEC Council voting 
procedures is a clear indication that a lot of nationally sensitive issues are affected by FA-
BEC integration. The main topics identified here are military airspace design, the institu-
tional setup of supervisory authorities and air navigation service providers, and control 
center infrastructure.  
As for the supervisory model, the investigated FABEC member states share the be-
lief that national supervisory authorities must still be able to execute the sovereign tasks 
assigned to them, such as specific regulatory functions. They therefore propagate a rather 
cooperative arrangement, or one where only the supervision part is done at FABEC level. 
Only the Netherlands would accept a single authority, but also points to the fact that do-
mestic political access to the organization needs to be ensured. Noticeably, the single air 
navigation service provider is seen as a possible very-long-term option by all FABEC 
states except Germany. However, at this time, all nations support a gradual and step-by-
step approach into a more integrated structure, leaving air traffic service functions out of 
scope for the moment. When it comes to the issue of control centers, government positions 
become even more conservative. While the smaller nations agree to some sort of reduction 
whilst wishing to maintain at least one center facility under national authority, the bigger 
nations question the usefulness of consolidation or point to the lack of decision criteria for 
such a step. Overall, states in the current phase give the impression that they are strongly 
concerned with assuring that national sovereignty is not unduly compromised by FABEC 
evolution.  
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The governmental opinions appear to be aligned to a large extent with those stakeholders 
in the system having regular access to decision-making structures and who are able to 
strongly influence developments, namely the national defense authorities and the air navi-
gation service providers. Although national military organizations recognize the opportu-
nities offered by FABEC, such as the possibility to establish larger cross-border training 
areas, they insist on remaining in charge for all decisions related to their area of activity. 
Hence, there is a clear preference for unanimity in the FABEC Council. In this respect, 
military airspace design and the definition of military (tactical) control infrastructure are 
of particularly high sensitivity. On the other hand, all three national military representa-
tives interviewed for this study quite vigorously supported more progressive steps of inte-
gration in civil air traffic management. The same is true regarding integration, or at least 
co-location of civil and military ATS units. It is evident that national security considera-
tions still play a major role in contemporary Europe.  
When examining the different en-route air navigation service providers in the FA-
BEC area, a strong focus on individual ‘business’ interests is perceived. Although a ma-
jority of consulted ANSP representatives is supportive of a qualified majority vote in the 
FABEC Council, an optional veto is still seen as necessary for important decisions. It must 
be assumed that the latter refers to issues related to the ANSP institutional setting, control 
center infrastructure, or airspace design, which all appear to be sensitive to providers. This 
assumption is derived from the fact that all analyzed ANSPs show an explicit preference 
for an alliance model where the execution of air traffic service provision is left with indi-
vidual providers. There is also no support for a single FABEC ANS provider, not even in 
the long run. Only DSNA from France could envisage such an option in the future, but is 
aware of the social sensibilities involved; these became manifest during the industrial con-
flicts related to the respective intentions announced by the French minister of transport in 
the beginning of 2010.209 Hence, also in light of the present quasi-unanimous state support 
for the alliance setup, it may be expected that national ANSPs will continue to exist in the 
foreseeable future and that cooperative or even integrative arrangements will only be con-
sidered in specific domains still to be defined. Discussions about the implementation of a 
‘FABEC Entity’, within which certain functions could be centralized, are ongoing. The 
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preference structure expressed by ANSP representatives coincides with the observations 
of current developments in the FABEC program: some progress is visible, mainly in areas 
of low sensitivity where cooperation is considered to be mutually beneficial. This is par-
tially the case in the domains of ATM technology and ATS staff training. Yet, respective 
steps are limited to bi- and multilateral collaboration, aiming instead at harmonization or 
the use of common tools, without indicating the intention to head for more integrated solu-
tions. It thus appears that air navigation service providers are generally protective and 
seem to be reluctant to ‘surrender’ any function related to their business activity, at least 
not devoid of compensation.     
The consequences of this attitude also become apparent in the ongoing airspace re-
design projects. As stated earlier, air navigation services are essentially financed through 
en-route charges based on the number of flights passing through the area of responsibility 
of an ANS provider. Consequently, there is little incentive to amend airspace or airway 
structures at the risk of losing traffic shares. This creates a competitive situation between 
air navigation service providers in cross-border areas, which, apart from the military and 
sovereignty issues, provides an additional impediment to integration and ultimately to a 
functional airspace and route design. From this viewpoint there is also a risk that the com-
bination of the supranational performance scheme with the air navigation service provid-
ers’ focus on individual interests could produce unwanted effects. This may particularly be 
the case in respect of the performance target related to cost-efficiency: instead of reducing 
costs by creating synergies through collaboration and integration, it appears that individual 
providers attempt to achieve the financial performance objectives on their own.210 Even 
though the improvement of individual cost-efficiencies may be desirable, the potential ex-
cessive cost-cuts resulting from such activity could over time become critical in a safety-
relevant domain like air traffic management. Moreover, although the consistency assess-
ment of performance plans carried out by the SES Performance Review Body seems to be 
conducted in a diligent and fair manner, taking into account a variety of factors such as the 
interrelation between capacity and cost-efficiency,211 a cost-related target may at the pre-
sent stage not adequately support integration as considerable initial investments are re-
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  The FABEC performance plan only contains an aggregation of cost-efficiency targets set out in the re-
spective national performance plans (see FABEC 2011a: 42ff.).  
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  See Eurocontrol (2011). 
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quired to implement corresponding structural changes. On the contrary, it might actually 
exacerbate the ‘individualist’ attitude of ANSPs.  
Obviously airspace users, in particular commercially operating airlines as the actual 
customers of air traffic services, have a strong interest in a cost-efficient air traffic man-
agement infrastructure. This is both confirmed by the statements provided by the air carri-
ers interviewed in the context of this study and by the position of the Association of Euro-
pean Airlines (AEA), predominantly addressing ATM costs in conjunction with the SES 
performance scheme and emphasizing the need for short-term stabilization and drastic re-
duction of unit rates in the longer term.212 This may explain the European Commission’s 
focus on cost-efficiency during the first reference period. It was mentioned earlier that the 
AEA was a significant promoter of the Single European Sky initiative and thus appears to 
be an influential stakeholder at European Union level.213 However, in the domestic con-
text, airspace users seem to have a lesser impact on the governmental attitude towards 
FABEC: the airlines’ supranational approach to air traffic management is currently not 
supported by the states, and involvement of airspace users in FABEC proceedings is con-
sultative only. It must therefore be presumed that airlines turn to their transnational body 
to foster the interests of their sector.  
The same is true for the operational staff at the sharp-end: the air traffic controllers. 
Due to their lack of sustaining influence at the national level, they have organized transna-
tionally through the MARC (MOSAIC ATM Regional Coordination) group, which repre-
sents both controller and technical staff associations in every FABEC member state and is 
attempting to establish a social dialogue at FABEC level.214 In accordance with the so-
called MOSAIC principles, the ATCO associations are commonly in favor of a single air 
navigation provider, established in analogy to the Eurocontrol model as an international 
organization under full state control. Besides the fact that Eurocontrol operates a highly 
efficient en-route ATS infrastructure in a complex airspace (Maastricht UAC),215 the ob-
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jective is also to maintain favorable employment conditions within an international or-
ganization. Thus, the MARC/MOSAIC concept is mainly to be understood as a counter-
proposal to a competition-based system of air navigation service provision, which might 
not only “induce unacceptable trade-offs in the field of safety versus economics” 
(MARC/MOSAIC 2008: 0-2), but also be detrimental to the working environment of 
ATM staff. The MOSAIC Framework Document also advocates the establishment of a 
‘virtual center’ setup, which entails holding on to the present center infrastructure in order 
to avoid forced staff transfers and possible related social conflicts (ibid., 3-53). However, 
although a majority of states could envisage a single provider as a very long-term option, 
the staff associations seem not to have been able to convince all FABEC member states to 
at least make a declaration for a move in that direction. Their influencing capability thus 
also appears to be minor beyond the domestic context.  
An exception to the conclusion related to staff associations must be made in respect 
of trade unions operating in France. Although not explicitly analyzed in the context of this 
study, reports from the French government and air navigation service provider suggest 
that these unions do have a significant impact on decision-making. Whereas by the time of 
this analysis the majority of air traffic controllers were grouped under the organization 
supporting the MOSAIC principles, other unions also representing (a minority of) ATCOs 
strongly opposed respective intentions, not without success.  
6.3.3 Overall assessment of integrative potential 
Having observed aggregated preference structures of governments and relevant stake-
holders within the FABEC framework, one must conclude that for the time being the envi-
ronment appears inhospitable to foster support of more ‘radical’ integrative moves in the 
area of air traffic management, which go beyond mere harmonization efforts. Although 
most governments of FABEC member states could envisage a single air navigation service 
provider for FABEC in the long-term future, there seems to be a general consensus among 
states that integration of air navigation service provision should be pursued in incremental 
steps, beginning with cooperative arrangements in functional domains of lower sensitivity 
and leaving air traffic service tasks out of scope. Also the consolidation of en-route control 
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centers remains subject to national decision-making and is assumed to only be an option in 
states with two or more existing facilities. FABEC governments agree, however, that there 
is a need for airspace redesign, at least in cross-border areas, and for implementation of 
shorter routes, whilst always taking into account military requirements. However, the 
‘competitive’ situation that national air navigation service providers perceive neither fa-
cilitates the process of promoting advanced cooperation and integration, nor assists the 
functional redesign of airspace. It is uncertain whether the Single European Sky perform-
ance scheme in its current form will be able to overcome these hurdles, considering the ef-
forts made by national ANSPs to realize performance optimizations at the domestic level; 
as was stated above, it may even exacerbate the competitive situation between ANSPs. 
One must bear in mind though that the performance framework is only a very recent regu-
latory measure of the European Commission, which may not have reached its full poten-
tial yet and is open for further development and improvement. In addition, the willingness 
of national governments to achieve operational benefits and at least some sort of func-
tional integration may offer an opportunity to set things in motion. Moreover, the institu-
tional setup of FABEC and the ongoing cooperative arrangements bring people from dif-
ferent ANSPs together and cultivate the formation of mutual trust, which may, over time, 
facilitate further cooperation as well as integration. 
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6.4 Possible way forward 
In light of the above observations, the question arises which way forward could be pur-
sued in order to be able to achieve the principal objectives of the Single European Sky. 
Just as a reminder, the main purpose of integration in the field of air traffic management is 
to enhance safety and ATC capacity by designing control sectors and airway networks of 
lower complexity in accordance with traffic flows, thus also increasing flight efficiency 
and reducing environmental impact. Furthermore, the goal is to reduce the costs of air 
navigation service provision by promoting the consolidation of ANS-related functions.  
It must be concluded from the findings of this study that the business competition 
obviously prevailing between governmentally ‘protected’ national air navigation service 
providers constitutes a major stumbling block in terms of effective cooperation and inte-
gration within the FABEC framework. It is understandable that the highly autonomous 
ANS organizations are eager to retain or even expand their share of business activities and 
that they are not necessarily willing to accept any disadvantages or losses in this regard 
without due compensation. Evidently this particularly concerns issues where revenues are 
at stake. Hence, ways have to be found to eliminate competitive thinking and to establish 
‘positive’ incentives to foster cooperation between ANSPs, whilst accommodating the re-
quirements of states related to sovereignty. From an operational point of view, one of the 
key issues is to remove the notion of ‘competing for traffic’, which complicates the redes-
ign of airspace, route structures and ATC control sectors. The FABEC feasibility study al-
ready anticipated this problem and suggested that the entire FAB should constitute a sin-
gle charging zone with a single unit rate (FABEC 2008a: 66). To achieve this, the cost 
bases of all participating ANSPs would be pooled to establish a single cost base for the 
charging zone, and the total cost base divided by the number of service units within the 
FABEC area to calculate the common unit rate. Respective revenues would then be dis-
tributed among ANSPs according to their cost bases, irrespective of traffic share. Hence, 
the delineation of the route of flight would no longer be a revenue-defining factor, ena-
bling the establishment of a functional airspace and airway structure independent of na-
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tional boundaries. However, as described earlier,216 the main disadvantage with this con-
cept is that current differences between national cost-efficiencies, unit rates, and complex-
ity factors are blurred. Since traffic revenues would be ‘pooled’ at FABEC level and sub-
sequently paid out to ANS providers based on their individual costs for service provision, 
ANS organizations would find themselves in a new competition for their share of reve-
nues and, according to the proposed distribution principle, might even be incentivized to 
maximize their costs. Moreover, airspace users mainly operating in relatively ‘cheap’ air-
space today would be penalized. It is thus not surprising that IATA, the International Air 
Transport Association representing some 230 airlines worldwide, is of the opinion that “a 
single en route unit rate should only be introduced when the FAB has proven to deliver 
quantified cost- and flight efficiency benefits to the users” (IATA 2010). However, as the 
findings of the present study suggest, the contrary may be the case at least in terms of 
flight efficiency: airspace design improvements may not materialize without introducing a 
single FAB unit rate.  
Hence, the challenge is to implement a single unit rate in order to remove traffic 
competition while at the same time ensuring that progressive performance improvements 
and cooperative behavior are stimulated amongst national ANSPs. Whereas the calcula-
tion of a single unit rate and subsequent revenue distribution would initially have to be 
based on current individual cost bases, an option could be to link the future allocation of 
revenues to a specifically defined performance level to be met by air navigation service 
providers. Such a ‘Best-in-Class’ standard would have to address all relevant performance 
areas (safety, capacity, environment, and cost efficiency) in a balanced way. In respect of 
safety, one criterion could be that adequate investments in the ‘core business’ of air traffic 
service provision are constantly assured and not subjected to excessive cost-cuts. This 
would include continued technological evolution and modernization in accordance with 
the European ATM Master Plan of SESAR, as well as appropriate financial compensation 
of key operational staff carrying out safety related tasks, such as ATCOs or ATSEP,217 in 
order to ascertain sufficient quality and motivation of personnel. Furthermore, to protect 
staff from potentially safety-critical over-productivity, regulation related to maximum 
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working hours and minimum rest time should be in place, based on traffic volumes and 
complexity. Another criterion could be a high ratio of ‘systemically’ safe solutions versus 
human-based mitigations implemented in ANSPs following safety risk assessments.218 
This would promote a safety-sustainable development of the ATM system. With regard to 
capacity and environmental efficiency, the aspired standards should be the ability of an 
ANSP to accommodate the expected traffic volume within its airspace by providing the 
required technology and manpower, and the organization’s assistance in implementing an 
optimized route network based on traffic flows (and military needs). Complexity is also to 
be taken into account in this respect, as obviously the effort to ensure satisfactory capacity 
increases with complexity. This could be done by determining a prospective complexity 
factor evaluated on an EU-wide or a FAB-specific functional ‘to-be’ route structure, 
which also incorporates military airspace requirements. The establishment of cooperative 
solutions with neighboring ANSPs in terms of airspace and control sector design in accor-
dance with traffic flows could also be rewarded. Since the overall number of ATC sectors 
existing today is not expected to decrease significantly when arranged within a functional 
airspace block,219 no ANS provider should be forced to relinquish control sectors to other 
providers. To allow for the seamless and efficient handling of air traffic between adjacent 
centers and possibly for the application of dynamic sector configurations in accordance 
with changing traffic patterns, interoperability of technical ATM systems needs to be en-
sured, the pursuance of which could also be assessed when evaluating ‘Best-in-Class’ 
achievements. Interoperability does not necessarily entail installing the same hardware 
products in all center facilities, but the availability of identical system functionalities and 
tools, as well as the capability of systems to interconnect and communicate with each 
other. Of particular importance is the possibility to electronically coordinate flights be-
tween neighboring sectors and to extend the planning scope of arrival management tools, 
the function of which is to determine approach sequences into major airports and to pro-
vide sequencing instructions to upstream sectors. Given the fact that almost all stake-
holders interviewed in the context of this study are supportive of a high level of interop-
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erability between ATM technical systems at FABEC level, this should not raise excessive 
difficulties. By establishing interoperability between ATS facilities, considerable im-
provements in terms of ATC capacity and flight efficiency could be achieved without the 
immediate need for ANSP or center consolidation. Finally, as regards cost-efficiency, the 
‘Best-in-Class’ standard would be met by those ANSPs reducing their support costs by 
means of enhanced mutual cooperation and by consolidation of related structures and ser-
vices in the FAB framework, such as in areas of CNS, AIM, or training. The governments 
of FABEC member states should actively promote respective steps, as they seem sympa-
thetic to an alliance structure with most of these functions integrated. Depending on the 
experiences made in the outline of such arrangements, and taking into consideration the 
possible continuous development of mutual trust, ‘spill-overs’ may later occur into more 
sensitive areas, until ultimately a single provider might emerge in the distant future, if 
functionally advisable and supported by relevant stakeholders. To summarize, the follow-
ing criteria could possibly be used to define ‘Best-in-Class’ in air navigation service pro-
vision: 
Key performance area Possible criteria 
Continuous investments in ATS provision are ensured (staff and technology) 
Regulation is in place to protect staff from over-productivity  Safety 
Systemic safety is promoted 
Capacity is ensured to accommodate anticipated traffic volumes (taking into 
account the level of complexity based on a ‘to be’ functional route structure) 
The implementation of a functional route structure is supported 
Cooperative solutions regarding airspace and sector design are promoted 
Capacity /  
Environment 
Interoperable technology between centers is promoted 
Cost-efficiency Support costs are reduced through cooperative arrangements 
Table 33: Possible options for ‘Best-in-Class’ standards in ANS provision 
Obviously, the criteria described above are ideas only and far from being conceptually 
mature or even operationalized. Nevertheless, a ‘Best-in-Class’ approach could provide an 
opportunity to break up the current deadlock and promote the kind of cooperation and in-
tegration between air navigation service providers that seems to be missing. It becomes 
evident, though, that today’s traffic-based revenue allocation mechanism needs to be re-
vised to create a basis for incentivizing ANSPs to strive for the aspired performance levels 
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in the different areas. This, in turn, implies central ‘pooling’ of revenues and the introduc-
tion of a single unit rate to avoid distortions of traffic flows by unit rate differentials. Con-
sequently, airspace users would have to temporarily put up with certain additional costs 
caused by the single unit rate, in order to allow for further progress, which should lead to 
an overall cost-reduction in air traffic management over time. In the author’s view, the 
European Commission should have the necessary tools at its disposal to promote respec-
tive changes: Member states could be mandated by a revised Charging Regulation to es-
tablish single unit rates for functional airspace blocks; ‘Best-in-Class’ criteria could be in-
tegrated in the SES performance scheme; the SES Performance Review Body could be 
tasked with assessing individual performance of ANSPs and their compliance with ‘Best-
in-Class’ standards; the Central Route Charging Office of Eurocontrol could distribute the 
revenues accordingly. As the proposed incentive model is not expected to affect national 
sovereignty or military requirements, state support should be attainable. The prospect of 
creating new and possibly larger cross-border military training areas in regions of low 
complexity may even have a tempting effect on national defense authorities. In order to 
keep changes manageable, it makes sense to continue striving for cooperative arrange-
ments in the context of existing FAB initiatives. Yet, it is obvious that all efforts towards 
an optimized airway and sector structure and towards an interoperable ATM technology 
should not be limited to a FAB’s airspace, which ultimately is also delimited by national 
boundaries, but should be extended instead to adjacent functional airspace blocks in close 
coordination with the SES Network Manager and taking into account SESAR develop-
ments. Otherwise, functional airspace blocks just risk becoming a new layer of fragmenta-
tion.   
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CONCLUSION 
The present study has aimed at answering the following question: ‘Is the European Union 
successful in its promotion of the establishment of functional airspace blocks within the 
policy area of air traffic management?’ Since the development of FABs may be consid-
ered a process of political integration, the potential factors influencing such processes 
were analyzed in respect of one of the most significant FAB projects, the Functional Air-
space Block Europe Central (FABEC). Influencing factors were derived from two theories 
representing opposite views as to whether integration is more predominantly driven by the 
European Union or by the individual nation states.  
The investigation conducted allows drawing the main conclusion that, with regard to 
implementing functional airspace blocks, the EU is considerably limited by the sovereign 
interests of states. The Union lacks the necessary legal basis to take supranational deci-
sions affecting national airspace or infrastructure. However, supranational pressure in fa-
vor of FAB integration is steadily growing, and avoiding it becomes increasingly difficult 
for nation states. In accordance with the rationalist-supranationalist theory by Stone Sweet 
and Sandholtz (1997), it was demonstrated that the European Commission searches for 
ways to make extensive use of its regulatory capacity even in the absence of additional 
competences, thereby gradually reducing the nation states’ room for maneuver. The two 
subsequent timeframes under analysis, referred to as SES I and SES II, have not only seen 
a quantitative increase in regulatory density with a potential of advancing FAB develop-
ment, but also the emergence of an intelligent framework of incentives which may have 
the capability to push states into integrative solutions without having to directly touch on 
sovereignty. It can thus be acknowledged that the phenomenon of supranationally driven 
institutionalization, as postulated by the rationalist-supranationalist account, is in fact pre-
sent in the domain of air traffic management. 
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Yet, since the ultimate decision as to the form and to what extent integration will be ef-
fected lies with the nation state, the final outcome is still unclear. Based on Moravcsik’s 
(1993) liberal intergovernmentalism, this study has compared relative influencing power 
of various domestic stakeholders assumed to be relevant in the area of ATM, namely na-
tional defense authorities, air navigation service providers, major air carriers, and staff as-
sociations representing air traffic controllers, and examined their impact on governmental 
preference intensities related to cooperation and integration. All three domestic settings 
under analysis have displayed very similar influencing patterns. Government positions 
largely correlate to those of the military and the ANS providers, which are assessed to be 
most influential due to their strong institutional involvement in FABEC matters. The lack 
of effective inclusion both of airlines and ATCO associations at the domestic level (with 
the exception of French trade unions) compels these two groups of stakeholders to seek 
more active representation of their interests through transnational bodies, which mainly 
address their lobbying activities towards FABEC and the SES institutions at EU level and 
thus have a lesser impact in the national context.  
When looking at governmental preferences, the foremost requirement is to maintain 
national supremacy on military issues, be it airspace or infrastructure. Furthermore, far-
reaching steps of integration in ANS provision are not supported at this time. Whilst cen-
tralization or consolidation of functions would be endorsed in the areas of AIM, CNS, 
training, or other supporting services, the execution of air traffic service tasks, which in-
cludes air traffic control services, is to remain under national control. A single ANSP 
could be a long-term option for a majority of FABEC states, but is not accepted unani-
mously. However, all states subjected to this analysis are in favor of a functional airspace 
design for civil air traffic in order to increase capacity and improve flight efficiency. The 
FABEC Treaty, the founding document of the Functional Airspace Block Europe Central, 
also reflects these rather conservative state preferences. Although the decision-making 
scope of the agreement includes quite sensitive areas, such as military airspace design, the 
unanimity principle applied for decisions provides all contracting states with the opportu-
nity to support or reject functional steps of integration as they see fit.  
In accordance with Moravcsik (1993), the study also attempted to determine differ-
entiations in bargaining power between FABEC states which might have become manifest 
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in the treaty. Apart from the fact that respective disparities were difficult to identify, a 
higher correlation rate between the treaty and one specific state could not be found. Gen-
erally, the current FABEC Treaty is rather ‘high-level’ and of an open nature; it makes no 
reference to tangible steps of functional integration. From this point of view, one could as-
sume that the attitude of more conservative FABEC members was accommodated. How-
ever, since all interviewed state officials required voting in the FABEC Council to be 
unanimous, this differentiation is irrelevant. It is expected that relative bargaining power 
will play a more decisive role at the time when more specific integrative steps are under 
discussion.   
Within the context of this governmental preference structure, which supports the 
continuous existence of national air navigation service providers, ANSPs find themselves 
in an environment which is dominated by competition rather than cooperation. The pros-
pect of ‘integration’ seems to create apprehension: potentially ANSPs have to face restruc-
turing which may result in the loss of organizational units or business opportunities. Con-
sequentially, although a widespread institutional network has emerged in the framework 
of FABEC to enable cooperation and seek common solutions, there are recurring obstacles 
which hamper the development of substantial outcomes. Cooperation appears to be suc-
cessful in only those areas where benefits are perceived to be mutual. Yet, these areas 
hardly offer the required optimizations leading to the increase of safety and capacity, or to 
cost-reduction. In particular, competition for traffic volumes and corresponding revenues 
poses an impediment to a traffic-flow oriented route and airspace structure, as redesigned 
airways may no longer feed through a provider’s airspace.  
It is obvious that under these circumstances the establishment of functional airspace 
blocks becomes very difficult. Despite the quantitative and qualitative intensification of 
supranational regulation, tangible progress in FABEC integration is barely noticeable. 
There is a risk that the deadline of 4 December 2012 may be achieved in formal and insti-
tutional, but not in functional and operational terms. However, consideration needs to be 
given to the fact that the recent regulatory initiatives, which have introduced new per-
formance and charging mechanisms, have only been in effect for a short period of time. 
Furthermore, a more cooperative culture may emerge within the FABEC context simply 
by increased personal interactions and trust-building. Nevertheless, the European Com-
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mission should consider additional measures to in particular eliminate competitive think-
ing and promote cooperation between providers. The introduction of a revised revenue al-
location mechanism (based on a FAB single unit rate) in conjunction with a ‘Best-in-
Class’ standard for air navigation service provision, which should aim at positively incen-
tivizing cooperation, could be one step in that direction. It thus seems that the European 
Commission will be required to exploit additional avenues to ultimately achieve the goal 
of a functional air traffic management system for Europe. 
Theoretical considerations and further research 
It was demonstrated that both theoretical strains applied by this study, liberal intergov-
ernmentalism and rationalist supranationalism, appear to contain valid assumptions that 
are also applicable to integration processes in the domain of air traffic management. Not-
withstanding the discussion conducted in sub-section 4.1.3 on external validity of derived 
results, one may conclude that neither concept alone is able to fully explain the factors and 
influencing variables involved in this highly specific policy area. Hence, it seems best 
from a theoretical point of view to abstain from the debate over whether integration is 
more driven by the EU or by the nation states and to accept that both levels have a consid-
erable impact on respective proceedings. A theory combining the two perspectives should 
concentrate on analyzing the conditions under which one or the other actor is expected to 
possess greater potential of being dominant in the process. In particular the role of the 
European Commission, exhibiting a remarkably autonomous, proactive and strategically 
relevant behavior, should be put in focus when discussing the logic of institutionalization 
at the supranational level.  
Although the present study has examined probably the most significant functional 
airspace block in terms of air traffic density and thus relevance to the European air trans-
portation system, a respective analysis of other ongoing FAB development programs 
could still be useful both from a theoretical and from a regulatory point of view: Underly-
ing environmental and influencing factors assisting or constraining integrative processes 
may differ considerably between FAB initiatives. Supranational regulation may have a 
stronger impact on certain FABs, as for example not every functional block of airspace 
may display the same competitive situation between ANSPs as appears to be the case in 
FABEC. Moreover, relative bargaining power may play a more prominent role when it 
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comes to finding integrative solutions. Consequently, it is conceivable that regulatory ac-
tion taken at the level of the Single European Sky to foster integration needs to accommo-
date varying integrative potentials among functional airspace blocks. It is advisable, 
though, that the focus of analysis should remain on those FAB projects where airspace and 
ATM capacity will, over a mid- and long term period, become a limiting factor in the face 
of growing air traffic.           
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Appendix: Online questionnaire 
Throughout this questionnaire, please provide the official opinion of your organization, if possible. If no offi-
cial opinion is available, please provide your best expert opinion/judgement.  
v1 Name of your organization  
Type of organization   
v2 Ministry of Transport / Civil Aviation Authority  0/1 
v3 Ministry of Defense / Air Force  0/1 
v4 Air Navigation Service Provider (including MUAC)  0/1 
v5 Union/Staff association  0/1 
v6 Airline  0/1 
Your contact details   
v7 Name, First Name  
v8 e-Mail  
v9 Phone number  
 
 
 
How certain is your organization and/or are the members of your organization to be positively or negatively 
affected by increased integration at FABEC level in terms of financial consequences, cultural implications (1) 
and/or organizational status (2)? 
v10 Certain  0/1 
v11 Likely  0/1 
v12 Unlikely  0/1 
v13 No effect  0/1 
v14 Not assessable  0/1 
 
 
(1) Cultural implications refer to any kind of impact on your organization expected to result from integration 
that is related to cultural aspects (ideologies, religion) or personal convictions.  
 
(2) A change in organizational status refers to any expected changes in function and/or hierarchical position 
or working location of an individual member of your organization resulting from integration.  
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Will these effects be positive or negative?  
v16 By the majority positive  0/1 
v17 Both positive and negative  0/1 
v18 By the majority negative  0/1 
v19 No opinion / not assessable  0/1 
 
v20 Please specify the expected POSITIVE effects  
 
v21 Please specify the expected NEGATIVE effects  
 
 
 
How significant do you assess the (positive or negative) impact of increasing integration in the framework 
of FABEC on your organization or on the members of your organization? In other words: How significant is 
FABEC for your organization? 
v23 Very significant  0/1 
v24 Significant  0/1 
v25 Little significant  0/1 
v26 Insignificant  0/1 
v27 Not assessable  0/1 
v28 No opinion  0/1 
 
 
 
What percentage of your organization's members do you estimate to benefit or lose from FABEC integra-
tion in financial and/or cultural (1) terms or in terms of organizational status (2)? 
v30 Benefit % 
v31 Lose % 
v32 No effect % 
v33 Not assessable  0/1 
v34 No opinion  0/1 
 
 
(1) Cultural implications refer to any kind of impact on your organization expected to result from integra-
tion that is related to cultural aspects (ideologies, religion) or personal convictions.  
 
(2) A change in organizational status refers to any expected changes in function and/or hierarchical posi-
tion or working location of an individual member of your organization resulting from integration.  
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If you expect positive effects from FABEC for your organization, how high do you perceive the risk that 
these effects will not materialize due to delayed or insufficient integration? 
v36 Very high  0/1 
v37 High  0/1 
v38 Low  0/1 
v39 No risk  0/1 
v40 Risk not assessable / uncertain  0/1 
v41 No opinion  0/1 
 
 
 
Until present time, has your organization in any way been involved in or tried to influence the development 
or design of FABEC/the FABEC State Treaty/any FABEC related matter?  
v43 Yes (please specify type of involvement below)  0/1 
v44 No  0/1 
v45 Don't know  0/1 
 
 
 
The voting procedure in the FABEC Council, according to the FABEC State Treaty, is the unanimous vote. 
Which voting procedure would you prefer for the FABEC Council?  
v47 Unanimity  0/1 
v48 Qualified majority  0/1 
v49 Majority  0/1 
v50 No binding vote / consultative only  0/1 
v51 No preference / no opinion  0/1 
 
 
 
What legal options would you prefer to enforce FABEC policy decisions? 
v53 Appeal to European Commission / European Court of Justice  0/1 
v54 Appeal to a Court of Arbitration  0/1 
v55 Use of a mediation procedure  0/1 
v56 There should be no enforcement mechanism  0/1 
v57 No opinion  0/1 
 
 
 
 
 
   Appendix: Online questionnaire 
  
254 
 
Irrespective of the current provisions in the FABEC State Treaty, and irrespective of whether 
the Council's vote is unanimous, by qualified majority or by majority, which of the following 
regulatory functions should be carried out at FABEC level? 
(several 
replies 
possible)  
v59 Definition of National Supervisory Authorities' institutional setup  0/1 
v60 Definition of ANSP institutional setup/model  0/1 
v61 Definition of safety management policies  0/1 
v62 Definition of ANSP performance objectives  0/1 
v63 
Definition of airspace and capacity management (including air traffic flow management) 
principles  
0/1 
v64 Definition of airspace and route network design (excluding military airspace)  0/1 
v65 Definition of airspace and route network design (including military airspace)  0/1 
v66 Definition of location & area of responsibility of civil area control centers  0/1 
v67 Definition of location & area of responsibility of military area control centers  0/1 
v68 Definition of ATM operational standards and procedures  0/1 
v69 Definition of principles for civil-military cooperation  0/1 
v70 Definition of charging policy / en-route unit rates  0/1 
v71 Definition of ATM technological standards for the FABEC area  0/1 
v72 Definition of aeronautical information management standards  0/1 
v73 Definition of air navigation services training standards  0/1 
v74 No opinion  0/1 
 
 
 
What is your preferred institutional model for (National) Supervisory Authorities/regulators within FABEC?  
v76 Status quo (one NSA per country)  0/1 
v77 One Supervisory Authority for the entire FABEC  0/1 
v78 Other (please specify below)  0/1 
v79 No preference / no opinion  0/1 
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What is your preferred ANSP institutional model for FABEC?  
v81 Contractual cooperation model (no centralized management)  0/1 
v82 Alliance model (centralized management only in selected functional areas)  0/1 
v83 Single ANSP (fully centralized management)  0/1 
v84 Other (please specify below)  0/1 
v85 No preference  0/1 
 
 
 
In an Alliance model, which of the following functions should be centrally managed?  
(several 
replies 
possible)  
v87 Safety management  0/1 
v88 Performance management  0/1 
v89 Airspace and capacity management (including Air Traffic Flow Management)  0/1 
v90 Civil air traffic control service (GAT)  0/1 
v91 Military air traffic control service (OAT)  0/1 
v92 Collection of charges  0/1 
v93 Selection and procurement of ATM technical systems  0/1 
v94 Aeronautical information management  0/1 
v95 Air Navigation Services (ANS) staff training  0/1 
v96 Relations with social partners (including negotiation of labor contracts)  0/1 
v97 No opinion  0/1 
 
 
 
What is/are your preferred scenario(s) with regard to the number and location of area control 
centers in the FABEC area? 
(several 
replies pos-
sible)  
v99 Status quo  0/1 
v100 Status quo with harmonized ATM technical systems and procedures  0/1 
v101 Status quo, but "virtual center" with fully interoperable technology  0/1 
v102 Reduced number of control centers (possibly also with "virtual center" technology)  0/1 
v103 Single control center for the entire FABEC (excluding military ATC)  0/1 
v104 Single control center for the entire FABEC (including military ATC)  0/1 
v105 No opinion / no preference  0/1 
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If you would like to see a reduction of area control centers 
(including upper and/or lower centers, excluding approach 
control units) in the FABEC area, how many of them should 
there be and in which countries should they be located? 
(please enter numbers) 
 Upper 
ACC 
 Lower 
ACC 
 Upper/ 
Lower 
ACC 
combined 
 Military 
ACC 
(OAT) 
v107 Belgium      
v108 France      
v109 Germany      
v110 Luxemburg      
v111 The Netherlands      
v112 Switzerland      
   
 
 
To what extent is your organization normally involved in political decision-making processes 
related to your area of activity? 
(several 
replies 
possible)  
v115 Co-decision on all relevant matters  0/1 
v116 Co-decision on selected matters as decided by your organization  0/1 
v117 Co-decision on selected matters as decided by government authorities  0/1 
v118 Formal consultation on all relevant matters  0/1 
v119 Formal consultation on selected matters  0/1 
v120 Informal consultation initiated by government authorities  0/1 
v121 Informal consultation initiated by your organization  0/1 
v122 Informal contacts to individual government officials  0/1 
v123 No involvement  0/1 
 
 
 
With how many of the following officials does your organization maintain regular contacts (min 2 contacts 
per year) with the aim to influence policy decisions in your area of activity? (if unable to enter exact num-
bers, please state "YES" and comment on intensity below)  
v125 
Members of parliamentary committees preparing policy decisions related to your area of 
activity 
 
v126 Government officials drafting policy proposals related to your area of activity  
v127 Leaders of political parties  
v128 Others (please specify)  
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What is the structural level of leadership/hierarchy in your organization? 
(Situation 
2010/2011) 
v131 
Institutionalized management body (e.g. formal leader, executive board) with discre-
tionary power over (hierarchically subordinate) group members  
0/1 
v132 
Institutionalized management body (e.g. formal leader, executive board) without legal 
authority over group members (democratic structure, authority based on persuasive 
power only)  
0/1 
v133 Informal leadership (ad hoc or permanent)  0/1 
v134 No leadership structure  0/1 
 
 
 
Do you enjoy the legal right to pursue industrial actions? 
(Situation 
2010/2011)  
v136 Yes  0/1 
v137 Yes, but only under certain conditions (please specify below)  0/1 
v138 No  0/1 
 
 
 
Are there any alternative organizations available to take over your specific functional tasks in 
case your organization decides to interrupt your activities (e.g. in case of industrial action)? 
(Situation 
2010/2011)  
v140 Yes  0/1 
v141 No  0/1 
 
How many alternative organizations are available?  
v143 Please enter exact number  
 
Within which timeframe are these alternative organizations able to take over your organizations' activities?  
v144 Without delay  0/1 
v145 Within days  0/1 
v146 Within weeks / months  0/1 
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Government-specific questions 
 
How would you assess the negative implications for your country, should integration / policy coordination 
in the framework of FABEC be insufficient or fail?  
v337 Very significant  0/1 
v338 Significant  0/1 
v339 Little significant  0/1 
v340 Insignificant  0/1 
v341 Not assessable  0/1 
v342 No opinion  0/1 
 
 
 
Do you recognize any opportunities to join alternative coalitions/FAB programmes in case FABEC should 
not materialize?  
v345 Yes  0/1 
v346 No  0/1 
v347 No opinion  0/1 
 
 
 
To accommodate your country's needs and requirements in the negotiation process about the develop-
ment of FABEC, do you recognize  
•  any room for compromise in certain areas related to FABEC that are less important to  
    you?  
•  any possibility to link the FABEC issue to (open) issues in other policy areas?  
•  any options to offer side-payments for certain concessions?  
v349 Yes  0/1 
v350 Yes, but only limited options  0/1 
v351 No  0/1 
v352 No opinion  0/1 
 
 
 
 
